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Preface 
 
 
In a previous study that I conducted on Jean-Paul Sartre’s “existential biography" 
of Gustave Flaubert, I was intrigued by what Sartre called his “hermeneutics of 
silence”. In five massive volumes called L’idiot de la Famille, Sartre applied his 
own philosophical theories to the "idiot" Flaubert. His goal was twofold: first, to 
see - through Flaubert’s work - into the dark abyss of 19th century French 
bourgeois society; and, second, to show that although his ontological 
predispositions imprisons Flaubert in “nothingness” he is able to transcend this 
conditionl through the act of “writing” allowing hims to escape the expectations 
of the family he despises.1 Flaubert’s discovery of the “said unsaid”, the silent 
echo-chamber of words and worlds, reverberates our failed attempt to evoke 
meaning and throws the use of empty words back at us: the “unsaid” slowly 
poisons the “said” revealing hidden hypocrisies of human communication and 
our overall tragic condition. In Sartre’s view, Flaubert thus saves himself by 
inventing a perfect rhetorical instrument, allowing him to transcend his 
“nothingness”, to become what he desires to be.2 From this nihilist perspective, 
our existential predicament reveals a sinister “trap”.3 Freedom means to escape 
from what we are not (a lie, a social role) towards what we are (beings who 
exist). But our beingness seems permanently caught up in unavoidable forms of 
self-deception and freedom only leads us towards the terror of choice. Hence, we 
are forced into a struggle between being and nothingness, a struggle which 
determines our notion of self and others. This diagnosis shapes Sartre’s 
existential philosophy. 
                                               
1 Ironically or evidently, in contrast to writing five volumes on Flaubert, on his own personal 
biography entitled Words, Sartre devoted to the author only 80 pages. Jean-Paul Sartre, Les 
Mots (Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1964).  
2 If one thing was clear from Sartre’s massive volumes on Flaubert, is that “Flaubert” - the 
person and author – had slowly disappeared into the fog of Sartre’s own philosophical 
obsessions. The conclusion in my study was that via the echo-chamber “Flaubert”, Sartre’s own 
philosophical system “got back at him”. Cf. Marc de Leeuw, Das Unsagbare. Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Hermeneutik des Schweigens als Autobiographische Praxis  (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2001), pp. 186-212. 
3 Paul Ricoeur, Negativity and Primary Affirmation (HT 324-25). It is impossible to summarize 
the complexity and brilliance of this early article that harbors all the main aspects of Ricoeur’s 
entire affirmative anthropology (opposing Hegel’s and Sartre’s notion of negation while 
embracing Nabert’s notion of "primary affirmation").    
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Although sharing with Sartre their rebuttal of Husserl’s absolute idealism, 
Ricoeur also opposes Sartre’s “solution”, namely, his ontological existentialism 
and, in particular, the idea of the fundamentally fraud nature of our desire for 
self-fulfillment. As a result, Ricoeur aims to replace Sartre’s finding of primordial 
nothingness with a more productive descripton of the relation between the 
voluntary and involuntary aspects of our nature. While we do suffer from a 
“broken unity” (unite brisée) or “fault” at the heart of all human experience, this 
fault, in Ricoeur’s understanding, points to a primary, infinite affirmative 
potential that roots in our desire to persist and create. This perspective also 
aspires to regain “unity in plurality" and to work towards a reunion “of man with 
himself, his body, and the world” in the hope of finding “reconciliation in 
ontology”.4 Connecting a phenomenology of willing with a philosophy of poetic 
disclosure and creation, a basic anthropology appears for which the act of 
“existing and of making exist” signifies the core of all human self-understanding.5 
It is this opposition to negation, contrasted with a more hopeful and enduring 
potential for human self-affirmation (as the affirmation of our humanity), which 
forms the implicit thematic structure of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology; we 
are free because we can affirm our own humanity.  
Work on this project spanned a period of fifteen years. This temporal excess 
does not necessarily reflect a higher summit of understanding. Rather, my 
overwhelming “sense of an ending” coincides with the letting go of an 
unfinishable project, in which the relation between negation and affirmation was 
sometimes more concrete than I had wished for. I took many shortcuts through 
Ricoeur’s notorious detours and many complex layers of thought suffered severe 
reduction. What is present now is both too grand and too small a perspective on 
Ricoeur’s enormous achievement; it is “too grand” in that it sets out to 
rediscover the forgotten tradition of Philosophical Anthropology as the only 
“frame” that can do full justice to Ricoeur’s original intentions; it is “too small” 
because it focuses mainly on the writings written since the 1980’s, and 
specifically those that are concerned with narrative, identity, memory and ethics. 
Nevertheless, as one will read in the pages to come, the core of this project lies 
within these two seemingly uneven frames and is a modest attempt to 
demonstrate the centrality of philosophical anthropology by methodically 
working through the poetic and ethical response to an anthropological aporia. 
Knowing what we are will never entirely reveal who we are. Hence, for Ricoeur, 
                                               
4 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction,  3th  ed. 
Phaenomenologica (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1982), p. 589.  
5 HT 328. 
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explanation and understanding can only be bridged by a hermeneutic 
anthropology examining the structures of the poetic will.    
This project went through various phases of doubt: it started as a 
comparison between Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self and Ricoeur’s Oneself as 
Another. This seemed an unbalanced comparison, since Ricoeur’s text was so 
much richer and more complex than Taylor’s work, which would just fade away 
as an overview of the history of the self in western philosophy (many colleagues 
though disagree with me on this point). The project then aspired to examine 
Ricoeur’s conceptualization of the self throughout his philosophy, but as the 
excellent book Identifying Selfhood (2000) of Isaac Venema on the same topic 
was published I felt I had nothing to add to it. Subsequently, I decided that a 
confrontation of Ricoeur’s work with poststructuralist and feminist claims 
concerning the relation between the subject, self, and ethics could actually show 
a silenced but nonetheless intimate relation between his project and more 
prominent authors such as Jacques Derrida or Judith Butler. But, again, several 
books appeared to show the productive tension of this confrontation.6 
Moreover, Butler’s own Giving an Account of Oneself 7 (her “ethical turn”) 
confirmed that the search for an ethical repositioning of the subject between 
poststructuralist, feminist and hermeneutic theories is deeply rooted in the same 
aporetic field – truly a mine-field – between subject and self. Of course, one can 
write just “another book” along the same lines, as friends and colleagues 
insisted; it will in the end always be an Other book, namely, my “own” version of 
the same argument. I decided, however, to opt for an alternative path. 
 It seems that “the question of the human” (as a claim of valid descriptive 
precision) is currently split between a reductive biology (am I my DNA? Am I my 
neurological network?) and reductive legal rights (does my humanity depend 
solely on the rights – “human rights” – that I can claim?). From Ricoeur’s 
perspective, a phenomenological and hermeneutical examination of our human 
potential must take place between these two poles of “truth” and “rights”. This 
potential occurs as the realization of what humans as acting persons can do: I can 
be human because I can speak, act, narrate, attest, respond, remember, 
recognize; I can be human because I can orient myself in a here and now, in 
space and time, towards my “self” and “others,” as part of a community, towards 
                                               
6 Leonard Lawlor, Imagination and Chance: The Difference Between the Thoughts of Ricoeur and 
Derrida (New York: SUNY Press, 1992); Lois McNay, Gender and Agency. Reconfiguring the 
Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (London: Polity Press, 2000);  Christopher Watkin, 
Phenomenology or Deconstruction?: The Question of Ontology in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul 
Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
7 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
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a world disclosing meaning (our life means nothing for the infinite universe but 
everything to our own finite lives). If we follow Ricoeur’s final maxim, we have a 
task as humans to lead a “good life with and for others, in just institutions”, or, in 
other words, to realize our common humanity. It is the connection between 
anthropology as a particular philosophical perspective, and Ricoeur’s 
examination of the poetic will as a human force and potential to realize our 
ability to read, act, narrate, attest and remember, which discloses the reflective, 
poetic and ethical aspects of human self-affirmation.  
Seeing Ricoeur’s work as a fundamental contribution to philosophical 
anthropology also reconnects his early assessment of the fragile human being 
with current attempts to develop a “thicker” anthropological philosophy of “bare 
life” and human “precariousness”.8 The growing political, financial and ecological 
vulnerability of humans in a biotechnological, globalizing and neo-liberal time 
which occurs “out of joint”, calls for a philosophical anthropology that is able to 
reflect upon this vulnerability and our potential for a response that testifies to 
what we can, or wish to, “stand for” as self-affirmative, creative and responsible 
beings.
                                               
8 Cf. Judith Butler, Precarious Life (London: Verso, 2004); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Saccer: 
Sovereignity and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Here the instability and 
fragility of the human as “embodied subject-self among others,” and our experience of “life as 
such,” evoke both our primordial reflective, social, and ethico-political coping mechanisms as 
well as an unresolved tension between (historical, universal) conceptualizations of the “human” 
suggested by empiricism, realism, constructivism, idealism and utopianism, and the actions we 
undertake and sufferings we endure, within a finite concrete existence as fragile bodies and 
vulnerable persons.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Unstable Equilibrium 
 
 
Paul Ricoeur died on May 20th 2005 at the age of 93.9 His complex anthropology, 
reflecting sixty years of critical engagement with the Western philosophical 
tradition, responds to a quadruple heritage – or “repertoire of themes”10 – which 
can be summarized as 1) the systematic-epistemological heritage (Kant, Hegel, 
Husserl), examining questions of knowledge, history, (self-) consciousness and 
freedom; 2) the suspicious heritage (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), questioning our 
notions of false-consciousness, subjection, alienation and agency; 3) the 
                                               
9 Ricoeur’s work covers almost sixty-five years of philosophical reflection. Amongst his most 
important works are Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and Involuntary (1965) and Finitude 
and Culpability (which has two parts: Fallible Man (1965) and The Symbolism of Evil (1967)), 
followed by his book Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation (1970), questions of 
creation and interpretation are further worked out in his work on the poetic structures of 
metaphor and narrative: The Rule of Metaphor (1977) and the three-volume Time and 
Narrative (1980-84); in Oneself as Another (1990) the question of identity and ethics was 
central while in Memory, History, Forgetting (2004) our notions of remembering and the 
historicity of the human condition is examined. Ricoeur’s last book The Course of Recognition 
(2005) not only summarizes his “phenomenology of the capable human being” but offers a final 
formulation of his fundamental anthropology through a complex study of the triple meaning of 
human recognition (as knowledge, identity and mutuality). Besides these monographs, 
Ricoeur’s articles and lectures are published in various volumes such as, amongst others, 
History and Truth (1965), Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology (1966), The Conflict of 
Interpretations. Essay in Hermeneutics (1974), Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essay on 
Language, Action and Interpretation (1981), From Text to Action (1991), Thinking Biblically: 
Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies (1998), and two volumes on The Just (2000) and  
Reflections on the Just (2007). Besides this, a volume with interviews, Critique and Conviction: 
Conversations with Francois Azouvi and Marc de Launay (1998), and Ricoeur’s debate with the 
neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher 
Argue about Ethics, Human Nature and the Brain (2000) were published. Ricoeur’s academic 
recognition in France was closely linked to two main figures of the French academic life, 
Foucault and Derrida, both of whom he survived. Ricoeur was promised the chair of History of 
Philosophy at the Sorbonne as the college decided to rename the chair The History of Ideas and 
grant it to Michel Foucault instead of Ricoeur, who then left for Chicago. Although Jacques 
Derrida (who was Ricoeur’s assisant in Nanterre, a fact often forgotten) had a fundamental 
different view on the creative potential and function of language and writing (mainly disputed 
in their work on metaphor), he later became a close friend of Ricoeur’s (it seems they respected 
each other more than was recognized by their followers, who often considered their 
perspectives as being incommensurable).  
10 Andrea Borsari, Notes on “Philosophical Anthropology” in Germany. An Introduction, Iris. 
European Journal for Philosophy and Public Debate, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April 2009), p. 123. 
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anthropological heritage (Gehlen, Scheler, Cassirer), exploring the possibilities 
and impossibilities of our “nature”; and finally, 4) the existential-
phenomenological heritage (Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, 
Nabert), reflecting on questions of Being, intentionality, perception and care.  
While the philosophical background returns in Ricoeur’s many detours, the 
particular anthropological core of his thinking remains, after the early trilogy of 
The Philosophy of the Will, rather absent. As a result, his work is seldom 
considered and assessed as an important contribution to the field of 
philosophical anthropology, neither as an extension or reaction to the early 
tradition nor as part of its current re-emergence. This awkward omission results 
from the usual emphasis on the phenomenological and hermeneutical aspects of 
his philosophy, overshadowing its actual anthropological core.  
After initially translating, adopting and extending Husserl’s work, Ricoeur 
grafts phenomenology upon hermeneutics (and vice versa) and thereby stays 
true to his declaration that “phenomenology remains the unsurpassable 
presupposition of hermeneutics … [and] ... phenomenology cannot constitute 
itself without a hermeneutical presupposition” (FTA 26).11 Concretely, this means 
confronting the phenomenological problem of the unity of the cogito, 
intentionality and the Lebenswelt with the ontological importance of the body, 
language and history and, finally, with the hermeneutics of meaning-making, 
conceptualized as a triple alliance of belonging, distanciation and appropriation.12 
                                               
11 As the phenomenological formulation that consciousness is always a consciousness of 
something already shows, Ricoeur argues that we need a “third” or other source that actually 
enables conscious self-reflexivity. “Of” refers to our experience of an exterior entity as 
appearing in our field of consciousness: it can be our body, Other (bodies), language, time or 
the natural and cultural world into which we are born. Ricoeur connects the need to 
understand the intentionality of consciousness with the need to understand the interpretation 
of structures of meaning and signification; the intentional act can only fulfil (as a becoming of 
“presence”) its potential in a meaningful articulation.   
12 A core theme of Ricoeur’s anthropology is his attempt to find a “cure” for the following 
problem: how to stabilize our fundamental transcendental rupture, which causes an ontological 
and ethical ambiguity. We find the core dialectic of this ambiguity in the tension between 
human instability (in the form of fallibility and fragility) and human capability (in the form of the 
ability to act, speak, narrate, be accountable, and so on). To formulate this more in line with the 
problematic of reflexive philosophy: the subjects’ unity and coherence can no longer be 
retrieved as part of a metaphysical principle (substance). Rather, through hermeneutic forms of 
self-understanding, the fragmented and discordant subject must attain an “analogical unity of 
action” (OA 303). Closely connected to the problem of instability/stability is the question of 
morality as the relation between what I can do and what I ought to do (to be able to be with 
others). Hence, underlying his anthropological themes are ethico-political considerations on 
authority, sovereignty, utopia, ideology, deliberation, practical wisdom, solicitude, forgiveness, 
justice and recognition. The connection between the anthropological and ethic-moral level is 
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Ricoeur’s anthropology presents itself as a dense and multifaceted analysis of the 
involuntary/incapable and voluntary/capable aspects of the human will. 
Furthermore, it is our will to exist and endure that shows that “life” as lived does 
not depend on a metaphysical substance but on our efforts: life confronts us with 
a task, the task of self-affirmation in the light of the “acting and suffering self” 
(OA 315). In Fallible Man Ricoeur states, “Man is the Joy of Yes in the sadness of 
the finite” (FM 215). This position recalls Spinoza’s conatus, signifying the “acting 
energy” of the “homo capax” (OA 315): humans are bodies capable of existing 
with the power to act, to endure, to exist. It is upon this “groundwork” that 
Ricoeur examines the poetic and moral will and their inner connection. In chapter 
one and two I intend to unpack the anthropological frame of this groundwork so 
as to demonstrate its importance in defining the theoretical and philosophical 
parameters of this study. 
 
Defining the Argument 
My main working hypothesis is that Ricoeur’s entire project tacitly absorbs the 
anthropological tradition while renewing its importance as a hermeneutic and 
humanistic anthropology. This means that the task of a philosophical 
anthropology is to understand the human both through its interpretative and 
creative ability and its capability to act towards, with and for others; the 
interpretation of the world in front of us, the interpretation of "who we are" and 
the interpretation of what it means to be among others (as "other selves") 
coalesces in a humanistic anthropology that binds the question of poetic (self-) 
understanding to a moral, ethical and just overall project reflecting our common 
existence.  
Ricoeur’s philosophical journey draws on a central core which is the 
diagnosis of the human as a broken or “wounded cogito”. Once we discover that 
our cogito is neither its own absolute master, nor absolutely transparent to itself, 
this inflicts a “wound” (brisé) in the centre of our Cartesian self-certainty. This 
anti-Cartesian and Nietzschean moment of disillusionment does not simply 
amount to a victorious anti-cogito but opens up another route towards self-
                                               
 
made through questions of human intentionality, initiative, critique, conviction and testimony. 
All these topics are used to advance a theory of human action that originates in Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of the “I can,” extended with Aristotle’s notion of Being, Spinoza’s notion of 
conatus and Nabert’s primary affirmation. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception (London: Routledge, 1962), p. 137 ff. 
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understanding. A “third path” replaces the direct road of intuition or annihilation 
with the detour of interpretation. Finding an alternative for the “wounded 
cogito” or, to use a more religiously inspired formulation, healing it, connects 
Ricoeur’s anthropological diagnosis and search in Freedom and Nature with 
Oneself as Another, published 40 years later. This trajectory places interpretation 
and meaning in the gap, the disproportion, between subject and self; it is in the 
poetic will, the potential of the transcendental imagination, that Ricoeur 
discovers the resources not only for the creation of meaning but, subsequently, 
also for human self-creation. As such, the poetic will bridges the descriptive 
objective of anthropology and the prescriptive imperative of ethics; the 
imagination allows us to express “who” we are and, thus, what we “stand for”: 
both the question of identity and of our moral and ethical “standing” refer to the 
need for a fundamental response – a response towards the permanent possibility 
of our own otherness, and an equally permanent responsibility triggered by the 
appeal of Others. In both cases, humility is in place: we can never have an 
absolute self-knowledge nor an absolute knowledge of others. Our own inner 
coherence as well as those of others might be a fiction, but "notwithstanding" 
(OA 168) this suspicion we count on what others "stand for" turning the 
"notwithstanding that we do not know" into the starting point for a philosophy of 
testimony, hope and affirmation.  
Put differently: Ricoeur’s itinerary is motivated by his attempt to find a 
“remedy” for an anthropological diagnosis – the “cogito brisé” - of his early work. 
This remedy is finally found in the concept of attestation—the “cogito blessè”—
which brilliantly integrates his theories of text, action, narrative and ethics in a 
concept of temporal intentional causality (responding to the inadequacy of pure 
analytical claims of physical causality).13 This anthropological arch connects 
different but interdependent methodological with topological registers: 
phenomenology (in its eidetic, existential and pragmatic variations), 
hermeneutics (clarifying the relation between speech and writing, text and 
action, explanation and understanding), and ethics (in its teleological, 
deliberative and phronetic assertions). Because immediate access to the cogito is 
an illusion, all self-reflective processes are mediations evoked through the 
expression of our experiences in language, art, science and history. All these 
expressions attempt to grasp and recognize the “real” behind our concrete 
experiences or metaphysical intuitions. But the instrument of grasping and 
articulation always already defers from what is grasped, thus making it 
                                               
13 Cf. Bernard P. Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur: The Promise & Risk of Politics (Boston: Roman & 
Littlefield, 1998), p. 304.  
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impossible for any reality to directly totalize itself. All meaning structures we 
“discover” in the world are irresolvably bound to the confines of human self-
articulation. Thus, we are left with the task of understanding the aporias and 
confines posed by the instruments of our corporeal grasping and recognizing: 
consciousness, language, perception.14  
My main argument concerns the central relation between anthropology, 
poetics and ethics. It is the ontological problem – which can easily be 
summarized by the question “who is this Being for whom being is in question – 
that tacitly binds these sections together. What “we are” does not tell us “what 
we ought to do or not do” (unless our ideology is socio- or neurobiologically 
determined); prescriptive rules do not follow from descriptive insights. This 
makes the relation between anthropology and ethics a precarious one. It is in the 
poetic response to the aporetics of being that the ethical position can be co-
clarified: the good life must be imagined before it can be lived. Here, the biggest 
challenge lays in the simple assertion that identity, and, thus, narratives and 
ethics, do not matter because their aporetic status can never be overcome and, 
therefore, we need to let go of their importance. This is the position held by 
Derek Parfit  – perhaps Ricoeur’s biggest adversary.  
This project perceives itself as a humble sequel to David M. Rasmussen’s 
Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology. A Constructive 
Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur (1971), which lays out Ricoeur’s 
theory of so-called "special languages" in which our experiences are pre-thought 
(because not yet articulated in the reflective language of logic and reason) but 
also "invite" thinking”.15 Each of these “languages” (symbols, myths, narratives, 
                                               
14 After the aporia of narrative (what is time?) and identity (what is sameness?), the aporia of 
memory shows the dilemma that the “absent past” can never be totally recollected in the 
present (what is the past?). The aporias of narrative and memory overlap in the problem of 
representation: is narrative a fictional or historical representation?; is the recollection of the 
past in the present a re-imagination or a re-actualization of a neural imprint? In short, as in his 
previous studies, it is through an a priori aporia that Ricoeur develops a “point d’acces” for a 
phenomenological, hermeneutic and ontological understanding.  
15 Rasmussen, in short, extends Ricoeur’s well-known remark that “the symbol gives rise to 
thought” (le symbol donne à penser). In Ricoeur's own words: “This maxim that I find so 
appealing says two things. The symbol invites: I do not posit the meaning, the symbol gives it; 
but what is gives is something for thought, something to think about. First the giving, then the 
positing; the phrase suggests, therefore, both that all has already been said in enigma and yet 
that it is necessary ever to begin and re-begin everything in the dimension of thought. It is this 
articulation of thought...in the realm of symbols and of thought positing and thinking that I 
would like to intercept and understand” P. Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and 
Philosophical Reflection”, in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of his Work, ed. 
Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 36f. 
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promises, confessions, histories and so on) reflect a human experience that can 
only be expressed in that particular, unique, language. This perspective 
undermines the usual idea that human self-articulation progresses from symbol 
and myth to logic and philosophical reasoning. Rasmussen argues that Ricoeur 
“has shown in a very concrete way that a particular mode of language (...) has a 
certain set of properties which can be specified by reference to the overall task 
of a philosophical anthropology.” He further assumes that:  
 
Ricoeur’s designation of the particular function of symbolic-mythic 
language is a type of verification. Here verification is not logical but 
distinctly anthropological in the sense that (...) problems of language 
find their foundations in problems of man. Inasmuch as the 
anthropological problematic was established prior to a consideration of 
language, and because language was considered only to enhance that 
anthropological problem, language has its referent, or its possibility of 
verification in an anthropological context.16  
 
Rasmussen’s exact summary of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic insight – “language has its 
referent, or its possibility of verification in an anthropological context” – fits with 
Ricoeur’s later work on narrative, selfhood and history which can be considered 
as other unique “languages” whose “possibility of verification” lies in the 
anthropological problematic of time, identity and memory.  
Consequently, this project seeks to continue where Rasmussen’s ended. 
Ricoeur’s important renewal of philosophical anthropology consists of a 
paradigmatic shift from the question of “what is the human?” to that of “whom 
does the human stand for”. Admittedly, it is in the connection between 
anthropology, poetics, ethics and an “ontology in view” that this “who” reveals 
itself. 
 
Method 
In a simplified way, Ricoeur’s work can be divided into three main 
methodological-topical phases: The Philosophy of the Will (Freedom and Nature, 
Fallible Man), Hermeneutics (Symbolism of Evil, Freud and Philosophy, The Vivid 
Metaphor, From Text to Action) and, synthesizing the previous work, a 
                                               
16 David M. Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology: A 
Constructive Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1971), 
p. 49.   
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Hermeneutic-Phenomenology of the Capable Human Being (Time and Narrative, 
Oneself as Another, Memory-History-Forgetting). Because Ricoeur conceives 
each new study as an attempt to complement and extend previous work, the 
process of his projects, although not set up as an overall philosophical system, 
clearly shows an overall vision that unfolds in a precise dynamic-systematic 
manner.   
This “manner” never amounts to a Hegelian closed structure (which Ricoeur 
opposes). Rather, openness is part of its programme: in confronting and 
discussing the work of theoretical opponents, Ricoeur turns the ethics of 
dialogue not just into a normative intent albeit as a productive contradiction, but 
also into a standard guideline for his hermeneutic-dialectic methodology of 
“working through.” Karl Simms rightly points out that Ricoeur’s “foundational 
dialectic” is the dialectic between same and other.17 From this dialectic all other 
oppositions derive, for example: binding and unbinding, absence and presence, 
continuity and discontinuity, concordance and discordance, idem- and ipse-
identity, self and other, remembering and forgetting, to act and being acted 
upon, joy and suffering and so on.18 Jean Grondin calls Ricoeur’s work an 
“apologetics”19 that, as a rhetoric of defense, can lead to a conflict of 
interpretations or a dialogue. In both cases, it offers the reader a pedagogical 
insight on how to “work-through” a philosophical problem. On a more formal, 
methodological level, Ricoeur’s dialectic characterizes, as Bernard P. Dauenhauer 
remarks, not an “either-or” system (either Hegel or Kant) but a “both-and” (both 
Kant and Hegel, Plato and Aristotle, Marx and Freud, Husserl and Heidegger, 
Jaspers and Marcel, Nabert and Levinas), and, in particular, both phenomenology 
and hermeneutics.20  
Besides phenomenology and hermeneutics, Ricoeur’s methodology engages 
in a praxis that adopts and integrates Aristotelian, Kantian, Hegelian and 
Freudian manners of "thinking through" while aiming at the “reconciliation of 
terms, the internalization of conflicts and, finally, the actualization of meaning”.21 
A shift from immediate to mediated meaning transfers the focus from 
                                               
17 Karl Simms, Ricoeur, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (accessed April 2., 2012).  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/ 
18 Some commentators consider other dialectical fields in Ricoeur’s work more central, like the 
one between philosophy and religion or love and justice. Cf. David Hall, Paul Ricoeur and the 
Poetic Imperative: The Creative Tension between Love and Justice (Albany: SUNY, 2007).  
19 Jean Grondin, L’herméneutique positive de Paul Ricoeur: du temps Augustinian récit. In 
“Temps et récit” de Paul Ricoeur en débat (Paris: Les Èd. Du Cerf, 1990), p. 123. 
20 Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 5. 
21 Paul Ricoeur, What is Dialectical?, in: Freedom & Morality, ed. John Brick, (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas 1976), p. 184.  
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Letztbegründung to a practical, second philosophy; it, furthermore, also shifts the 
solipsistic perspective towards a hermeneutic and social ontology, in an attempt 
to overcome the deadlock of Husserl’s Vth Cartesian Meditation, which blocked 
any genuine intersubjective relation between self and others.  
In Ricoeur’s philosophy of the subject, a suspicion towards autonomy and 
agency remains central – but only if balanced by the conviction that human self-
affirmation and accountability are as much in need of trust, conviction and a 
belief-in as they are in need of epistemological and moral critique.22 Ricoeur 
develops an open and critical anthropology, which aspires towards systematic 
thinking but considers this thinking, in advance, as constitutively limited by 
antinomies and aporias (leading to a fundamentally unfinishable project). It is 
exactly this limit of thinking which also marks the impossible completion of 
narrative, identity, history or ethics. The following statement functions as a 
programmatic self-description of Ricoeur’s basic philosophical attitude, which 
includes this premise: 
 
We should reject any definition of truth which is, as it were, monadic, 
wherein truth would be for each person the adequation of his answer to 
his problematic. On the contrary, we now approach an intersubjective 
definition of truth according to which each one “explains himself” and 
unfolds his perception of the world in “combat” with another; it is the 
“liebender Kampf” of Karl Jaspers. Truth expresses the being-in-common 
of philosophers. Philosophia perennis would then signify that there is a 
community of research, a “symphilosophieren,” a philosophizing-in-
common wherein all philosophers are in a collective debate through the 
instrumentality of a witnessing consciousness, he who searches anew, 
hic et nunc.23  
 
                                               
22 Ricoeur’s approach to resolve the position of “both-and” also aims to “place … one position in 
the context of the other” leading to a “nonsynthetic mediation”. Cf. Kaplan, Ricoeur’s Critical 
Theory, p. 1. Ricoeur once admitted his “obsession for reconciliation,” asking himself if “what I 
was doing was merely a compromise, or if it was really the proposal of a third position capable 
of holding the road.” Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: 
Columbia University press, 1998),  p. 61, 76. In a similar fashion, Charles A. Kelbley states that 
Ricoeur seems “obsessed with a desire for reconciliation, either in the more methodological 
order…, or in the ethico-cultural order”, in Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, transl. and 
introduction by Charles A. Kelbley, p. xii. 
23 Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy and the Unity of Truth (HT 51). 
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This “symphilophieren,” set up as “detour and return”24 showing thinking as a 
“kinship through conflict” (FM ix: FN 6), forms the rhetorical composition, the 
hallmark, of Ricoeur’s thinking-in-process. The most important “figure” of this 
thinking-through, a figure that covers both method and matter, is what Ricoeur 
himself, half ironically and half seriously, and following a self-description of Eric 
Weil, called his “post-Hegelian Kantianism”.25 This label, besides drawing in a 
huge philosophical friction, simply means seeking the universal in the historical 
and the historical in the universal and, thus, overcoming the tendency of 
totalization in both.  
A final remark on Ricoeur’s method concerns the actual “ethics” it discloses, 
not so much as a methodological or normative presupposition (“method” in itself 
still presupposes being value-free), but as a practice of reading. This practice, as 
Oliver Abel explains, starts from aporias and ends with the acceptance of a 
residue, a remainder26: in search of a reconciliation of conflicts, Ricoeur’s critical 
hermeneutics accepts the absence of origins while defying closure. This is the 
methodological paradox at the heart of his thinking.27 According to Abel, 
                                               
24 Boyd Blundell Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
25 Emphasis added. Cf. “... the Kantianism that I wish to develop now is, paradoxically, more to 
be constructed than repeated; it would be something like a post-Hegelian Kantianism, to 
borrow an expression from Eric Weil, which, it appears, he applied to himself. For my own part I 
accept the paradox, for reasons that are both philosophical and theological. First, for reasons 
that are philosophical: chronologically, Hegel comes after Kant, but we later readers go from 
one to the other. In us, something of Hegel has vanquised something of Kant; but something of 
Kant has vanquished something of Hegel, because we are as radically post-Hegelian as we are 
post-Kantian. In my opinion, it is this exchange and this permutation which still structure 
philosophical discourse today. This is why the task is to think them always better by thinking 
them together – one against the other, and one by means of the other” (CI 407). Cf. Robert 
Piercey, What is a Post-Hegelian Kantian? The Case of Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy Today, Vol. 51, 
Nr. 1, April 2007. Piercey mainly argues that Ricoeur’s post-Hegelian Kantianism is the central 
figure both of his method of thinking and the content of his philosophy whereby Piercey 
considers Ricoeur’s study on the “ontology of selfhood” (study ten in Oneself as Another) the 
main illustration of this figure of thought.   
26 Cf. Olivier Abel, Ricoeur’s Ethics of Method, Philosophy Today (Spring 1993), 23-30. The next 
section has profited greatly from Abel’s illuminating insights into the crucial aspects of Ricoeur’s 
method, showing that “content” and “method” are inseparable. Abel is, together with Jean 
Greisch and Francois Dosse, without doubt the best interpreter of Ricoeur’s philosophy as a 
“system of thought”.   
27 Ricoeur’s primary aim is not to dissolve philosophical aporias. Instead, he recognizes that our 
epistemological or moral limits evoke a particular encounter in need of poetic response. We 
find a good example of the relation between aporetics and poetics in the last volume of Time 
and Narrative, which is, according to Ricoeur, “entirely constructed around the relation 
between an aporetics of temporality and the response of a poetics of narrativity” (OA 96). The 
third volume examines the concept of “narrated time” and is split into two sections; section 
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Ricoeur’s notion of the aporia is almost “transcendental, constitutive”28 and is 
derived from three main sources: Husserl, Nietzsche and Plato. Husserl's crisis, 
evoked by the impasse between pure idealism and the Lebenswelt, leads to the 
absence or impossibility of “origins”. It is this “absence” which can be considered 
the “great educator of contemporary French philosophy”, leading to its 
fundamental “reorientation” by philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Jacques 
Derrida or Gilles Deleuze. For Ricoeur this absence marks his turn to 
hermeneutics.29 Nietzsche’s suspicion, that truth itself is destructive (layer after 
layer we discover that truth is nothing else but the perpetuation of the act of 
unveiling itself), shows that we need to reverse “truth” and make it an act of 
creation instead of destruction.  
Hence, truth is no longer the unveiling of a hidden layer of meaning, but 
rather the poetic creation of it. We need, therefore, “to accept that truth itself is 
poetic.”30 This acceptance is what motivates Ricoeur’s “poetics of the will”. The 
third source from which Ricoeur derives his notion of aporia refers back to Plato’s 
metanoïa, the rhetorical undermining of our basic assumptions, a method which 
aims to implant “in the soul an emptiness, a night, an impotence, an absence” 
which functions as “preludes to the revelation.”31 Thus, it is a three-fold absence 
– Husserl’s Crisis, Nietzsche’s suspicion, and Plato’s metanoïa – which defines 
                                               
 
one concerns “The Aporetics of Temporality” while section two is called “Poetics of Narrative: 
History, Fiction, Time”. This model clearly indicates that our response to the aporetic of time is 
the poetics of narrative. The final chapter,  called “Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical 
Consciousness,” is already a programmatic announcement of Ricoeur’s very last book Memory, 
History, Forgetting. Thus the aporetics of time, identity or memory cannot be resolved, but our 
poetic response to the aporia – narratives, attestation and history – can be examined as a 
creative solution to our epistemological, biological or moral limits. In this way, we can, as 
Ricoeur writes, “at least [make the] aporia work for us” (TN 3: 4). In reverse: in our creative 
responses to aporias the “poetic will” reveals its potential as a human capability of meaning-
making in light of the unknowable. 
28 Ibid., Abel, 24. Ricoeur himself states, “Now it certainly seems that the non-transparence of 
our cultural codes is a necessary condition of the production of social messages”. Cit. in Abel, 
24. 
29 Ibid., 24. Abel cites Ricoeur here: “I wish in effect to lead hermeneutical reflection to the 
point at which it calls, by an inner aporia, for an important reorientation.”  
30 Ibid., Abel, 25. 
31 Ibid., 25. At this point Abel radicalizes Ricoeur’s position because “the revelation is perhaps 
the very absence of revelation.” If a revelation (of truth) is no longer possible - I follow Abel’s 
citation of Ricoeur here - ontology becomes “the promised land for a philosophy which begins 
with language and with reflection, (but) like Moses, the speaking and reflecting subject can only 
glimpse this land before dying.” Thus, the “ontology in view” belongs to a philosophy of hope; 
language and reflection might bring us to the brink of the “being who we are” but, due to the 
absence of origins and lack of total revelation, we can never cross this brink.  
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Ricoeur’s notion of the aporia for which his method serves as a way-through.32 It 
is only in a “hermeneutics of reading” that all points of view can become 
legitimate, because plurality emerges from different responses and effects of our 
confrontation with the aporia(s) of life. Ricoeur, as a “philosopher of reading”, 
affirms that (I again follow Abel’s lead here),   
 
to understand oneself is to understand oneself before the text and to 
receive from it the conditions of a self, other than the “I” which comes 
to reading. 
 
Abel further explains that because “[the reader] has suspended the exclusivity of 
his or her point of view, [it] receives a subjectivity augmented by the” – Abel cites 
Ricoeur – “opening of new possibilities which is the work in me of the stuff 
(chose) of the text”.33 This attitude reveals that it is “in the variations, in the very 
conflict of interpretations that existence is to be interpreted”.34 And it is only in 
the conflict that the “coherent figure of the being which we are” can be found. 
This typical Ricoeurian twist – coherence is only to be found within the dialectic of 
the conflict – points to the ethical possibility (truly an “ethics of possibility”) that 
enables the binding of the “plurality of views” and “conflicts of interpretation” in 
a common human desire to create meaning.  
It is this “ethics of method” which returns in all key-concepts of Ricoeur’s 
late anthropology: the “concordant discordance” of narrative time, the 
“attestation” of idem- and ipse-identity and the “history” of our “present past” 
(these different forms of a “unity of opposites” refer back to a creative poetic 
coherence at the heart of our plural ontology). More than just a “hermeneutical 
gesture”35, Ricoeur’s ethics of method also determines the dialectic of his “small 
ethics” in Oneself as Another. It is here that the tension between the teleological 
ethical aim (to realize the "good") and the deontological moral obligation (to 
                                               
32 Abel now divides this method into two different persons: the first refers to a “Ricoeur-Moses” 
who searches for the promised land of revelation and pure ontology, while the second appears 
as a “Ricoeur-Ulysses” who is the “navigator of all possible passages to attain Ithaca”. It is in this 
duality that the “ethics of the questioning process” resides; this process must become ethical 
because the “navigator of passages” (through aporias) and the searcher for the “promised land” 
(of ontology) can never be synthesized. Thus, following Ricoeur leaves us with a “pluralisation 
of questions” showing the primacy of a hermeneutics of reading. While method searches for a 
passage through the aporias of knowledge, it is ontology that shows a “promised land” which is 
unreachable, yet necessary as our “Ithaca of hope” (Ibid., 25). 
33 Ibid., 26. 
34 Emphasis added. 
35 Ibid., 25. 
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prevent “evil”) leads to a practice of deliberation which must be understood as 
an “ethics in situation” or phronesis (practical wisdom). Practical wisdom 
accounts for the view that no perspective should be “sacrificed” (Antigone!), and 
announces a politics of recognition “to come”: even if it is true that not all views 
can be integrated, we must stay aware that particular positions “escape” the 
“grasp” of the political debate (Abel refers to the “community of the shaken”36 as 
Jan Patočka called them). This means, in Abel’s summary of Ricoeur’s position, 
that 
 
There is “always already” a “debt” toward others who do not — or do 
not yet or no longer — belong to the community, and without whom the 
social contract and deliberation are not complete, not fully valid, not 
totally “authorized”.37 
 
This “debt” surely motivates many of Ricoeur’s obsessive detours but  even 
“indebtedness” is finite and reveals an epistemological, moral or poetic 
“residue,” a “remainder” previously un-thought, forgotten. Consequently, each 
new project answers the need for a “recovery of the remainder” which after 
being only “marginal ... now passes to the center of attention”.38  And, thus, as 
Abel concludes,  
  
For a given theoretical or discursive model, the remainder is the index of 
the ‘whole’, of the totality of the experience in which this model 
inscribes itself.39  
 
Anthropology of the Will 
Between 1930 and 1960 anthropology as a philosophical discipline underwent 
three strong influences: phenomenology, existentialism and a return of the 
                                               
36 Ibid., 26. 
37 Ricoeur cit. in Abel, Ibid., 25. 
38 As I will show in the second part, after three volumes on time and narrative, this “remainder” 
is the question “who narrates?”, this leads to an examination of identity and intersubjectivity in 
Oneself as Another. Both Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another put the question of time at 
the center, as phenomenological experience of temporality or as the sameness/endurance of 
the self over time (for example in promises and testimonies), but for both conditions we need 
to understand what the enabling capability of endurance is: memory, the ability to remember. 
Even memory is aporetic (as the enigma of a “present past”) and leaves a “residue” (memories 
and histories always change, are forgotten or suddenly reemerge).  
39 Ibid., 28. 
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question of evil raised by the horrors of the Second World War and, in particular, 
the Holocaust. It is against this theoretical and historical background that Ricoeur 
starts developing his own project. While the work of Edmund Husserl forms the 
basic methodological starting point for Ricoeur’s early work, it is the 
interpretation, extension or dismissal of Husserl’s Idealism by Martin Heidegger, 
Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers which forces Ricoeur to find his personal position 
on the claims of phenomenology as a philosophy of pure transcendentalism.40 
This position, mainly formulated in various early articles and the three-volume 
masterpiece Philosophy of the Will, is also an attempt to position himself among 
influential contemporaries as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
In contrast to the perceiving subject of Merleau-Ponty’s work (turning 
phenomenology almost into an aesthetic theory) and the totalising emphasis on 
freedom as negation in Sartre’s project, Ricoeur decides to focus on the 
subjectivity and praxis of the sujet de “vouloir”: the willing, desiring and acting 
subject. Although Ricoeur is much closer to Heidegger and will often return and 
use his work to develop his own position, he also raises a fundamental objection 
which concerns “the hierarchy [Heidegger] established between a heroic 
authenticity of anxiety that continually faced up to its death and the banality of 
an inauthenticity that tried to flee death.”41 Olivier Abel asserts that Ricoeur is 
closer to Spinoza, for whom philosophy is not a reflection upon death but on life 
and living until... . In other words, Ricoeur stresses the ontological potential of a 
before, of “a being-against-death and not a being-towards-death” (M 361). Not 
finitude but the infinite, not sorrow but joy, not negation but affirmation.42 The 
will of the willing subject constitutes and signifies a fundamental desire for self-
                                               
40 As is well known, Ricoeur translated Husserl’s Ideen I while in a German prisoners of war 
camp. After the war, the published and extensively commented manuscript had a deep and 
lasting influence on the French phenomenological movement. Cf. Pol Vandevelde, Paul 
Ricoeur‘s A Key to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I (Marquette Studies in Philosophy: Marquette 
University Press, 1996).   
41 Olivier Abel, “Preface”, Paul Ricoeur, Living Up To Death, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), p. 99. This critique is, as Ricoeur later finds out, very similar to Hannah Arendt’s 
main objection to Heidegger’s philosophy. 
42 Heidegger’s own rejection of anthropology amounts to the unsurprising claim that philosophy 
should not look at the human as “creature” but examine the meaning of its “Being”. Before we 
ask “what is the human ?” we have to answer the question “of what man is?”. For Heidegger 
the pre-anthropological “shaping power” is to be found in the awareness of our Beingness, 
finitude and anxiety – in short, in a metaphysics of Dasein. Cf. Ibid., Pavesich, 423-24. 
Heidegger’s rejection of anthropology as a serious philosophical project was also central to his 
famous dispute with Ernst Cassirer at the Davos Forum, see: “Davos lectures”, reprinted as 
Appendix III to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1997), p. 283-292, and Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), §10.   
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affirmation: by making a decision I initiate initiative, I decide what “I” choose. 
Each decision I make has an existential and ontological effect – it shapes what I 
want to do, who I want to be, and, finally, the “who” I wish to “stand for”. The 
subject only becomes a self by taking decisions and actions in response to a 
world that unfolds in front of it; the disclosure of this world “in front of me” 
makes “my world”. World-disclosure and self-disclosure belong to the figure of 
mutuality. In phenomenological terms, they form a “chiasm.” 
In hermeneutical terms, understanding the world “in front of me” needs the 
translation of experiences in meaning as articulation, creation and interpretation. 
Consequently, there can be no pure, absolute or original self-presence as Husserl 
proposes. But this “absence of the subject to itself” shows the transcendental 
dislocation of the subject, which is the point of departure for Ricoeur’s 
anthropology, an anthropology which juxtaposes a philosophy of the wounded, 
fragile and fallible human with a philosophy of human potential, affirmation and 
hope. 
For Ricoeur, freedom has limits, but these limits are exactly what enables 
our experience of freedom. Human freedom unites the voluntary and involuntary 
aspects of being through the experience of their inescapable reciprocity: the 
human will – in its eidetic core – is simultaneously involuntary and voluntary. This 
reciprocity is further developed in Ricoeur’s philosophy as, in my understanding, 
a hermeneutic-phenomology of human dislocation and relocation. While the 
human ability to reflect might evoke suspicions that destabilise our sense of self 
and the world, simultaneously, the ability to reconfigure our experiences, 
knowledge and self-understanding enables new, stronger, forms of an 
equilibrium. 
As mentioned earlier, Ricoeur’s position aims to bind critique to conviction. 
Thus, the “conflict of interpretations” and “plurality of meaning” lead, in the end, 
to new reflective unities (narrative identity) while keeping an “ontology of 
testimony” (attestation) in view. This condition is, as John Wall summarizes, “not 
observable in the empirical world but rather part of each self’s own specifically 
human mode of being-in-the-world.”43 Hence, Ricoeur’s shift from an eidetic to 
an empirical description – in Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil 
(subsequently part one and two of the second volume of the Philosophy of the 
Will) – no longer aims to reveal a pure phenomenological ideal core, but, rather, 
“the phenomenological sense of the self’s concrete experience of its own will.”44 
                                               
43John Wall, Moral Creativity. Paul Ricoeur and the Poetics of Possibility (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford & New York: 2005), p. 30. 
44 Ibid., Wall, p. 30. 
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From this point on, the actual question becomes: how do humans 
concretely experience themselves as willing and acting subjects? The original 
triple intention of Ricoeur’s Philosophy of the Will, namely, to write an eidetics, 
pragmatics and poetics of the will, appears, in altered forms, seminal to Ricoeur’s 
entire philosophical enterprise45. This enterprise manifests itself respectively as a 
Kantian questioning of phenomenological idealism, a hermeneutic critique and 
extension of phenomenology, and a “corrective force”46 to structuralism and 
deconstruction. Ricoeur connects questions of intentionality, reflexivity and 
interpretation with the firm conviction that our ontological subjectivity is 
situated, embodied and anchored in a physical, temporal, historical and social 
world. The shift in Ricoeur’s methodology also influences the main topics of his 
research: after starting with an analyses of the involuntary, finite and fallible 
aspects of the will, he turns towards a hermeneutics of linguistic activity 
(discourse, metaphor, narrative) and an examination of moral selfhood; this 
phase is complemented with a phenomenological hermeneutics of memory, 
history and recognition. This wide range of topics and the phenomenological-
hermeneutical approach cumulates in a poetic moral selfhood of the fallible but 
capable human being. Underlying this dialectic is Ricoeur's shift from the 
question of human willing (formulated as the problem of the cogito and the 
voluntary and involuntary aspects of our embodiment) to the question of 
meaning and human identity (formulated as the act of interpretation and the 
idem- and ipse-aspects of our identity). This dialectic is extended to questions of 
morality and justice (formulated as the relation between self and others and the 
way we come to ”stand for” who we are - towards and with others). 
In Fallible Man, Ricoeur shifts from an eidetics of the will to an empirics of 
the will, from the essentials of freedom to actual freedom (freedom in its 
actuality). This freedom can only be realized if we overcome the disproportion 
between subject and self and accept that our fundamental condition is one of 
“being-intermediate”47 (FM 6). But in The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur presumes the 
                                               
45 Ricoeur ’s triple division is inspired by Karl Jaspers’ trilogy “Exploration of the World,” 
“Existence” and “Transcendence and Metaphysics”, see Karl Jaspers Philosophy of Existence 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). In an interview with Charles Reagan, 
Ricoeur remarks: “This is the format I planned for my future work”, in Charles E. Reagan,  Paul 
Ricoeur His Life and His Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 124.  
46 Patrick Bourgeois, Philosophy at the Boundary of Reason (SUNY University Press: New York, 
2001), p. 238. 
47  Cf. “Man’s specific weakness and his essential fallibility are ultimately sought within this 
structure of mediation between the pole of his finitude and the pole of his infinitude” (FM xliv). 
Ricoeur describes three responses—three forms of synthesis/mediations— between the finite 
 
16  | Introduction  
 
impossibility of total transparency of consciousness: our only access to the 
meaning of evil is to interpret the opaque mythical and symbolic expressions in 
which we articulate our experiences of evil and clarify the double intentionality, 
one manifest and one hidden, of these representations. Through the 
interpretation of symbols and myths, Ricoeur hopes to reveal “what is said in the 
utterance that we have called the confession of the evil in man by the religious 
consciousness” (SE 4). Instead of focussing on the Christian function of original 
sin or a theological understanding of radical evil, Ricoeur interprets the myth of 
evil as a form of “traditional narration … and thought by which man understands 
himself in his world” (SE 5), and discovers that our self-understanding in relation 
to evil is articulated or confessed through notions of defilement, sin and guilt. 
These symbols show how acts of evil are given meaning through expressions of 
impurity or pollution. Hence, we have no direct access to the problem of evil, but 
are left with an indirect interpretation of the mythical, symbolic and textual 
articulations of the human experience we have come to name “evil”. With this 
mediated access to self-understanding, Ricoeur shifts to hermeneutics; it is no 
longer the pure cogito but the “surplus of meaning” within the symbol which 
“gives rise to thought” (SE 347). 
 
Towards a Capable Subject 
This study examines how Ricoeur’s anthropological project moves away from the 
early negative anthropological diagnosis of the subject’s finiteness towards a 
more optimistic diagnosis of the subject’s capabilities to act, intervene and 
persevere (in narratives, selfhood and memories). These poetic acts of self-
articulation reflect the ways we are affected, ontologically and ethically, by our 
concrete, embodied encounter with the world, history, and Others. Ricoeur 
himself very clearly explains the relation between hermeneutics, ethics and 
action in following statement,  
 
This point is important, for if ethics can itself be said to be hermeneutic, 
this is to the extent that it borrows from the theory of action what the 
latter itself owes to the theory of texts. Now what does it borrow? 
Essentially, the rootedness of what I then called the “ethical intention” 
in the experience of “I can.” Not only have I not repudiated since then 
                                               
 
and infinite aspects: the transcendental synthesis, the practical synthesis and the affective 
synthesis. 
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this reference to “I can,” but I have given an even greater scope to it by 
extending it well beyond the sphere of action as such: the power to 
designate oneself as the speaker of one's own words; the power to 
designate oneself as the agent of one's own actions; the power to 
designate oneself as the protagonist in one's own life story - here are so 
many uses of "I can" that can be considered coextensive with the notion 
of the self. Since Oneself as Another I have given even greater force to 
this idea of being-able-to-do, in view of providing a basis for a political 
philosophy. I therefore speak of capable man, as the primary object of 
esteem and respect and even as the primary subject of law.48 
 
The three main topics of Ricoeur’s mature philosophical endeavor are the 
capability to narrate, to attest and to remember. These capabilities connect the 
hermeneutics of meaning and action with an ethics of testimony and mutuality. 
Within the basic anthropological dialectic of human action (capability) and 
suffering (incapability), Ricoeur’s project formulates new forms of a dynamic and 
open coherence (aiming to soften the “disproportion between subject and self”) 
by, for example, re-binding the meaning of text with action, time with narrative, 
idem- with ipse-identity, memory with forgetting, ethics with politics and, all 
encompassing, love with justice.49 These dualities must be read as both a 
reaction to and extension of three basic problematics which determined 
Ricoeur's early work, namely, “the Cartesian conviction of the unifying role of the 
Cogito, the phenomenological discovery of the role of intentionality, and the 
hermeneutic emphasis on a semiotic and interpretive mediation.”50 Ricoeur 
reformulates each of these problems – unity of the cogito, intentionality and 
interpretation – into a core aspect of his “phenomenology of the capable human 
self”.  
The “unity of the Cogito” can only be fulfilled in the “I can” of a concrete and 
“lived body” in which the act of willing forms the actual unifying source; the 
intentional act fulfills itself in initiatives that intervene in my experience of being-
in-the-world (while for Husserl this initiative refers only to acts of consciousness, 
                                               
48 Paul Ricoeur, Reply to Ted Klein, in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ed. E. Hahn, (Chicago: 
Open Court, 1995), p. 367. 
49 In his mature anthropology Ricoeur replaces the dichotomy voluntary/involuntary with 
capability/incapability, which mainly defines the difference between human action and human 
suffering.  
50 Pol Vandevelde, “Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Phenomenon”, in Paul Ricoeur: A Key to 
Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I, Edited by Pol VandeVelde, Marquette Studies in Philosophy 
(Milwaukee: Marquete UP, 1996), p. 7.  
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for Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur it refers to embodied experience). Through the 
desire that these acts endure in time, my acts also fulfill an ethical response: the 
fulfillment of the act of promising something to someone, for example, only 
counts as a valid initiative if the promise can be trusted to hold through time. 
This binds the initiative of “I can” to a responsibility towards others (the “I can” 
becomes an “I should”). Ricoeur aptly summarizes the “four phases traversed by 
the analysis of initiative” as,   
 
[F]irst, I can (potentiality, power, ability); second, I act (my being is my 
doing); third, I intervene (I inscribe my act within the course of the 
world: the present and the instant coincide); fourth, I keep my promises 
(I continue to act, I persevere, I endure).51  
 
In short: we can (potential), act (doing), intervene (inscribe) and persevere 
(continue). We have the potential of doing things marking our intervention and 
endurance in the world.52 In Husserl’s original scheme the fulfillment of the 
intentional act depends on the way we grant meaning to it.53 How do we 
                                               
51 Ricoeur, Initiative (FTA 216). 
52 A precondition for this is that an “intention cannot be separated from its potential 
fulfillment,” because only the fulfillment of the intention unifies the meaning-making acts, for 
example, in narratives (stories that articulate our experiences), testimonies (that attest to 
“who” we “stand for”) and history (fulfilling the intentionality of a collective understanding of 
the presence of “our” past).  Vandevelde, ibid., p. 28. 
53 In Husserl’s Logical Investigations, intentional acts can only be fulfilled through a meaning-
conferring act which, “in turn, in order to fulfill its function, must be correlated with a meaning 
or sense. This meaning is the mere correlate of the act and therefore does not depend on 
anything outside the act. It is the content of the act and, as such, an ideal content” (Ibid., 
Vandevelde, p.16). The actual complexity and problems of the “correlative act” and its source in 
perception, intuition or interpretation forms the starting point for Ricoeur’s shift from pure 
phenomenology towards a hermeneutic phenomenology. The correlative act unifies 
intentionality with its fulfillment. This fulfillment happens in symbolic mediations (like the vivid 
metaphor, discourse or narratives). This process is crucial for an understanding of the 
“analogical unity of action” that establishes the “unity of the cogito”. As Vandevelde further 
points out, “only in action, it seems, can one’s intentional acts find their fulfillment. Fulfillment, 
in other words, does not take place in one’s own mind, when there is an encounter between an 
empty intention and the givenness of something; in order to be fulfilled, an intention has to be, 
first, articulated in signs and, second, made understandable, i.e., concrete and relevant, by how 
one is to act upon it. Intentional acts are, thus, no longer to be understood as purely mental 
acts representing the absolute starting point. They are already called for by the way they can be 
fulfilled in a pragmatic framework. However, Ricoeur does not merely turn to pragmatics. His 
genius is to introduce a pragmatic slant into phenomenology. Action itself is not merely 
submitted to pragmatic rules or pervaded by pragmatic motives. To act means to act upon 
intentions, so that action is the embodiment of intentional acts. There is thus a solidarity 
between action as embodiment of intentions and intentional act as anticipating its pragmatic 
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translate experiences of being-in-the-world into a “meaning-conferring” act, 
which reveals how we inhabit the world? In relation to the three themes of the 
second part of this thesis (narrative, identity, memory), this inhabiting, signifying 
the appropriation of meaning, implies following “translations” of our 
experiences: narratives articulate how we inhabit our experience of temporality 
(as “human time”); attestation articulates how we inhabit our experience of self-
identity (as “selfhood”); and history articulates how we inhabit our experience of 
a present past (as “history”).54  
 
The Structure of this Study 
This study is divided into three parts—Anthropology, Poetics, and Ethics—
consisting of six chapters. After the Introduction we turn to the German tradition 
of Philosophical Anthropology (Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, Ernst Cassirer) which 
forms the “invisible college” surrounding Ricoeur’s early anthropology. A more 
visible college, in the sense that Ricoeur directly interacts with these philosophies 
(Gabriel Marcel, Jean Nabert, Karl Jaspers), extends the former. Together, these 
two circles represent Ricoeur’s early intellectual contemporaries. The goal of my 
somewhat scholarly overview is to show the deep, often forgotten, traces of this 
influence in Ricoeur’s entire body of work. But any presentation of this tradition 
must first return to Immanuel Kant’s seminal Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View (1798).   
Part two of this study examines in three chapters Ricoeur’s poetic “turn” to 
narrative, selfhood, and remembering. Time and Narrative rethinks the dualities 
of historical/fictional narratives on one side, and cosmological/phenomenological 
time, on the other. It confronts the plurality of articulation, history as objective 
narrative and literature as subjective narrative, with the plurality of human 
                                               
 
fulfillment. In such an interplay between intention and action, action is pervaded and 
articulated by a narrative and is, thus, a quasi-text, just as a text – as a conglomerate of 
intentional acts - is already pervaded by the potentialities for action” (Ibid., Vandevelde, p. 21). 
This “conglomerate of intentional acts” does not only account for Ricoeur’s notion of narrative 
fulfillment but is also valid for the acts of ipse-identity and acts of remembering. Vandevelde’s 
remark that “to act means to act upon intentions, so that action is the embodiment of 
intentional acts” (ibid.) aptly summarizes the phenomenological core of Ricoeur’s theory of 
action and capability. 
54 Ricoeur binds the interior experience of temporality, sameness and memory to the actual 
exteriorization of this experience (articulated in narratives, selfhood and history). Thus, the 
phenomenological intentionality and the hermeneutic initiative coincide in a personhood that 
practically inhabits and attests to a world through symbols, metaphors, narratives and 
testimonies signifying an open, dynamic coherence. 
20  | Introduction  
 
experiences of time: cosmic time as an experience of pure objective physicality 
and phenomenological time as an experience of pure subjective temporality. 
Narratives are forms of reflective re-appropriation of these experiences. The 
result is a narrative theory that shows how we translate our experiences in / with 
time into a narrative of “human time” (providing an alternative reading of the 
divide between time and being). 
Within Ricoeur’s overall project, it is easy to recognize that the theory of 
identity laid down in Oneself as Another supplements and extends his early 
Fallible Man. The diagnosis of the finite and “wounded cogito” signifying the 
fragile and unstable subject is now elevated into the stabilizing synthesis of 
narrative and ethical identity in the concept of “attestation” or the me, voici (look 
at me, here I am, here I stand for). For Ricoeur “attestation” symbolizes the 
endurance and persistence of my “self with others in just institutions”. Since in 
Fallible Man the pragmatics of the will was at stake, Ricoeur now proposes a 
narrative, ethical and ontological selfhood in which identity affirms itself as a self-
endurance emerging both from an interior dialogue between idem- and ipse-
identity and an exterior dialogue between self and others.55 This ethical selfhood 
responds in and to the world, through language and towards and with others.56 
In his introduction to Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur declares that he 
still needs to fill a “lacuna” or “impasse” between Time and Narrative and 
Oneself as Another. In narratives we articulate the experience of temporality; our 
moral selfhood depends on the manner we experience and hold on to the 
manner we want to endure over time (for example by keeping a promise or 
                                               
55 Aspects that are excluded from the analytical tradition – time, body and Others – now appear 
as constitutive of moral selfhood. The passage from narrative to moral selfhood culminates in 
an ontology of responding. In short, the solipsistic ego detached from the world, language and 
others is countered with a subject able to attest (Bezeugen) to its “standing for”. 
56 The empirical, sceptical and analytical perspective reduces the question of identity to the 
absolute sameness or “idem” of the subject over time. Ricoeur shows that the basic 
assumptions of the empirical “sameness” are mistaken because it lacks a notion of time, body, 
otherness and an ontology of Being. For Ricoeur, idem-identity can only exist in cooperation 
with an ipse-identity, which includes a “narrative identity,” and a form of self-endurance 
symbolized by the ability to keep a promise, remember, attest and be accountable. The main 
difference concerning Ricoeur’s approach to questions of identity and the approach of the 
analytical tradition refers to the notion of coherence and consistency and to the manner we 
validate these criteria. In short: our experience of being produces fragmentation and dispersion 
but, simultaneously, a striving for stability and coherence. For Ricoeur, both processes 
cumulate in an ontological testimony, in an attestation of selfhood, which replaces being as 
substance with being as the dialectic between same and other, self and other, discordance and 
concordance, plurality and unity. This dialectic constitutes an analogical unity, for example as 
narrative identity, attestation or responsibility.  
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attesting to what we stand for). But both processes are not possible without the 
capability to remember: we can remember things (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
and we can forget things. The dialectic between remembering and forgetting 
determines our experience of historicity, of living through a past, in a present 
towards a future. This final topic of the poetic will adds a systematic 
phenomenological, ontological and hermeneutic examination of memory, 
historicity and forgetting, extending Ricoeur’s early work on the historical 
condition (History and Truth), to describe what it means for us to live in a 
"present past".  
The phenomenology of memory, remembering and forgetting on an 
individual and collective level connects the narrative of time with the attestation 
and persistence of our selfhood over time. The “I can narrate” and “I can attest” 
are in need of the “I can remember” to function. On all three levels – narrative, 
selfhood, and memory – time signifies a phenomenological experience, a 
condition of existence and a particular cultural and historical articulation. Thus, 
the me, voici of attestation is connected with the j’y étais of testimony.  
In conclusion: Narratives bind dispersed experiences and events into a 
coherent structure, for which the “plot” of a story or “character” of a personage 
is exemplary; narratives enable a “synthesis of the heterogeneous” and reflect 
the human experience of temporality. By evoking the question “who narrates?” 
the narrative structure points to a “narrative identity” cumulating in the 
statement “me, voici” by which I attest and testify to my own selfhood towards 
others. The “testimony of selfhood” is closely related to our “testimony of the 
present past”, connecting the epistemological question “what really happened?” 
and the ontological question of how we are affected (être affecté) by our 
historicity. In short, Ricoeur shifts from narrative as a means to express human 
time to narrative as the means to bridge idem-identity and ipse-identity while 
also showing that “narrative identity” always includes our “moral identity”. All 
these steps are synthesized in the concept of attestation; the "me, voici" is my 
declaration in front of and in response to Others and, thus, provokes a quest for 
mutuality and solicitude. 
The final part describes the ethical “supplement” of Ricoeur’s 
anthropological and poetic trajectory.57 It examines the difficult normative 
triangle between ethics, morality, and justice and its relation to the question of 
recognition. Although Ricoeur never wrote a separate book-length study entirely 
                                               
57 These ethical “supplements” function as an affirmative or corrective force for the potential of 
human fallibility; they intend to iron out the unsolvable aporias of the “analogical unity” that 
Ricoeur projects into the moral capable self. 
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dedicated to ethics, his fundamental anthropology begins and ends with an 
ethical vision: in the The Philosophy of the Will, his examination of willing leads to 
a reflection on the fault and evil while in Memory, History, Forgetting he adds an 
epilogue on forgiveness and pardoning. The “small ethics” Ricoeur proposes in 
Oneself as Another reflects a particular form of virtue ethics: we aim for the 
“good life with and for others, in just institutions” (OA 172). This ethical aim 
needs translation into moral laws and norms and an understanding of the 
fundamental mutuality of self and other (this explains the title: one-self as an-
other).58 Put differently: Our ethical intentionality binds the idem-aspect to the 
ipse-aspect of my identity, which means that it binds “oneself” to an “other,” and 
it binds me to all unknown others in a “shared life” of communality with a 
common desire to live equally in justice, with self-esteem for oneself and others. 
In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur adds an epilogue on the theme of 
“Difficult Forgiveness”, which stands in close proximity to the theme of forgetting 
and forgetfulness. Forgiveness forms the “eschatological horizon”59, a “horizon of 
completion” (M 285), to the dialectic of Memory, History, Forgetting. This is why 
Ricoeur holds the theme of forgiveness in suspension and does not include it in 
the original dialectic, but rather considers it an ethical appendix (similar to his 
suspension of the fault outside the dialectic of choice, decision and consent in 
the Philosophy of the Will). Taken together, the “small ethics” of Oneself as 
Another and the “epilogue” of Memory, History, Forgetting add an ethical 
perspective to Ricoeur’s theory of action, identity and memory. In his last book, 
The Course of Recognition, this process is reversed: the predominant normative 
use of recognition as a concept of social and political inclusion or exclusion is 
placed back in the original philosophical meanings of recognition as cognition and 
recognizing (as the act of re-identifying something or someone). Thus, 
recognition is first an act of consciousness and identity, before it can be an act of 
mutuality and social respect. Ricoeur also replaces the definition of mutuality as 
utilitarian exchange with the acts of giving and receiving without the 
precondition of a return-gift. He sees this in the gift of love and friendship and 
the pure gratitude of the receiver. Here social recognition does not result from 
                                               
58 The classical ideal of mutual recognition starts with Aristotles idea of friendship. But the 
structure of friendship is not sufficient to attain justice on the collective level. For this, we need 
trustworthy legal institutions and a social contract that includes solidarity, equality, justice and 
fair forms of redistribution. Our “social ontology” evoked by sentiments of friendship (extended 
to the “good neighbour” or my “fellow man”) and care is in need of a “translation” to be viable 
for a larger collective, to serve our common life (“with oneself and others in just institutions”). 
59 Cf. “forgiveness offers itself as the eschatological horizon of the entire problematic of 
memory, history, and forgetting” (M 285). 
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war or struggle, but from a common humanity in which Agape and the Joy of life 
are the reason for just actions and mutual care. It seems that the ethical 
imperative, which Ricoeur puts on hold, fulfils a particular function which the 
dialogical conciliation could not solve: this function is to compensate or balance 
the fragility, finiteness, fallibility and temporality which cause various degrees of 
instability within the human condition. Thus, the fault, the promise and 
forgiveness are the "ethical markers" that complete the dialectic of the 
voluntary/involuntary, finite/infinite, idem/ipse, remembering/forgetting which, 
taken together, mark the fallible and capable, the acting and suffering human 
being. The extension of this dialectic with an ethical vision turns the 
phenomenological investigation, hermeneutic interpretation and ontological 
condition back into an overall anthropology of the human being. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
Ricoeur and the task of Philosophical Anthropology reconsidered  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. THE GERMAN TRADITION  
 
 
 
In the 18th century, anthropology as the science of "human nature" combined 
religious, philosophical, and biological questions until Immanuel Kant redefined 
the actual task of anthropology as a call for a pragmatic theory of action. 
Although Kant was at first concerned with the true nature of humans (as defined 
by character, emotions, and race), he later turned the question "Was ist der 
Mensch?" into an examination of human freedom and human action. For Kant it 
is not the innate religious or biological "nature" of humans that is central in his 
inquiries, but rather it is the question of how the human ought to act humanly. 
But the revival of philosophical anthropology at the beginning of the 20th century 
was not just an extension of the Kantian legacy but aimed to integrate the rise of 
the biological, historical, linguistic, and medical sciences in the 19th century with 
the new philosophical fields of Phenomenology, Existentialism, and 
Hermeneutics. While Neo-Kantians mainly revived the project of the Critique and 
neglected Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, the new anthropological movement 
(Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, Helmut Plessner) re-examined the God/man and 
nature/human divide as both a question about what the human is and what it 
means to be human.  
An important shift from anthropology as an examination of human nature to 
the question of human culture is marked by the occurrence of linguistics, or the 
question "what is the origin of language?", which now no longer addresses a bio-
physiological or a linguistic-semiotic question but poses a philosophical problem: 
what does the human ability to produce symbols, metaphors, sentences and 
speech-acts mean for our self-understanding? What does it mean that the 
subject brings through “sein sprechen die Welt zur Sprache”.60 Language enables 
us to lift ourselves above our environment, to distance ourselves from the 
experiences of concrete existence and reflect on our actions, our hopes, 
suffering, history, place in the world, and connections to others. In short, through 
language we position ourselves towards the world. It gives us a world-view 
(Weltbild) and an ontological self-awareness. This self-awareness symbolizes the 
rupture between us and the natural world. It also causes a fundamental 
existential ambivalence grounded in the consciousness that our lives will be 
finite. From a transcendental viewpoint, the main anthropological question is 
                                               
60 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 4. Auflage (Tübingen: J.C. Mohr, 1975), p. 421. 
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what is more primordial: the experience of negation, of finiteness and suffering, 
or of self-expression, affirmation, of our desire to be, exist and endure? 
The negative anthropological diagnosis of the subject’s external and internal 
rupture also reverberates in early 20th century sociological and political theories 
of modernity that emphasize the fundamental alienation and reification of a lost 
and no longer rooted subject. Various labels were attached to this experience: 
from Max Weber’s Entzauberung (disenchantment) of the modern world, 
referring to the loss of a cosmological home, to Martin Heidegger’s diagnosis of a 
fundamental Seinsvergessenheit (forgetfulness of our sense of Being), to Ernst 
Bloch’s notion of the "Ungleichzeitigkeit" (non-contemporaneity), to Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s verdict of our existential nothingness, and to George Lukàcs’ 
transzendentale Obdachlosigikeit (transcendental homelessness). What seems 
clear is that in modernity we no longer have a cosmology to hide in, a Being we 
care for, let alone a sense that we master our own household. These different 
forms of a broken external and internal cosmology mark the passage from an 
anthropology still considered a pragmatic, even positivistic science of human 
nature, towards a negative anthropology evoking "theories of suspicion" and the 
acknowledgement of a deep epistemological, existential and moral crisis of the 
"human condition".  
Although Ricoeur’s work is firmly rooted in the Philosophical 
Anthropological school, it is seldom placed, contextualized, and examined as part 
of this tradition. The following overview of three main representatives of this 
school – Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler and Ernst Cassirer – aims to provide a better 
understanding of the traces of this tradition and how it reoccurs in Ricoeur’s 
philosophy. Placing Ricoeur vis-à-vis this invisible college also aims to sketch 
three different points of access into the anthropological problematic as dominant 
in the first half of the 20th century.  In the second chapter of Part One, we turn to 
the more direct existential and reflective influences on the anthropological 
thematic in Ricoeur’s work: Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers and Jean Nabert. It is 
through these authors that Ricoeur succeeds to critically position himself by 
finding his own voice in relation to phenomenological and existential 
contemporaries, represented by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. 
These contextual layers disclose not only how Ricoeur’s thinking emerges 
from these influences but also how his work attempts to find answers to the 
crisis of the phenomenological and anthropological approach. Ricoeur’s 
formulation of the human as a "wounded cogito" suffering from a fundamental 
"disproportion between subject and self" not only reflects on the "theories of 
suspicion" of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, or the problem of solipsism in Husserl’s 
Letztbegründung, but also echoes both the theories prevalent in the German 
Anthropological Movement and the work of Marcel, Jaspers and Nabert, who 
The German Tradition   |  29 
 
 
 
represent Ricoeur’s first partners in dialogue. For Ricoeur, the task of 
anthropology coincides with the task of philosophy in general:  
 
Philosophical anthropology has become an urgent task of contemporary 
thought because all the major problems of that thought converge on it 
and its absence is deeply felt. The sciences of man are dispersed into 
separate disciplines and literally do not know what they are talking 
about. The revival of ontology, for its part, raises the same question in 
its own way: “who is this being for whom being is in question?” Finally, 
the “modernity” of man indicates the vacuum, which this meditation 
must fill: “if man can lose himself or find himself in labour, in pleasures, 
in politics, or in culture—what is man?”61  
 
This “urgent task of contemporary thought,” – the question “who is this being for 
whom being is in question?” – seems to have lost little of its urgency in the 21st 
century, in which an ethical crisis of the global post-human occurs. Ricoeur’s 
work aims to refocus the question of being within the scope of our human 
capabilities as ethical, able subjects.   
 
The Kantian Anthropological Turn to Freedom and Action 
In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,62 Kant divides the 
”knowledge of man” into a physiological and a pragmatic perspective. Whereas 
the former means the knowledge of man as an “object of and in nature”, the 
pragmatic perspective offers knowledge of man as a “freely acting being” and a 
“citizen of the world”. Kant pursues this anthropology in two stages, namely as 
an Anthropological Didactic and an Anthropological Characterization. These 
stages examine what characterizes the human, and how he can educate himself 
in becoming a good citizen. The ambivalent status of anthropology as just 
another form of philosophy, versus anthropology as the only real universal 
philosophy, is summarized in Kant’s famous remark:  
 
Das Feld der Philosophie in dieser Weltbürgerlichen Bedeutung läßt sich 
auf folgende Fragen bringen: 1. Was kann ich wissen? 2. Was soll ich 
                                               
61 Paul Ricoeur, The Antinomy of Human Reality and the Problem of Philosophical Anthropology, 
in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work. Ed. By Charles E. Reagan (Boston: 
Beacon Pres, 1978), p. 20. 
62 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, transl. Victor Lyle Dowdell 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1978).  
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tun? 3. Was darf ich hoffen? 4. Was ist der Mensch? Die erste Frage 
beantwortet die Metaphysik, die zweite die Moral, die dritte die Religion 
und die vierte die Anthropologie. Im Grund könnte man aber alles dieses 
zur Anthropologie rechnen, weil sich die drei erstere Fragen auf die 
letzte beziehen.63  
 
Strangely enough, the anthropology that Kant taught over 20 years did not 
actually have as its aim to answer the question "Was ist der Mensch?"64 Instead, 
the question of the being or essence of the human complements Kant’s moral 
philosophy; if we know how the human ought to act, we first need to know the 
laws, rules, and motivations that steer our behaviour in daily practice. The 
empiricism of Hume and Locke considered the observation of ”human nature” 
and the examination of experience as the necessary foundation upon which all 
other sciences should be based (see Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature). This 
results in a reduction of philosophy to anthropology and a reduction of 
anthropology to empirical psychology. 
The pre-Kantian German tradition of anthropology, represented mainly by 
Baumgarten, defined the human as the unification of the physiological and the 
spiritual. Kant opposes both the metaphysics of Baumgarten and the 
foundational empiricism of Hume. He replaces these two perspectives with a 
pragmatic orientation, which connects empiricism as an observational science 
(Beobachtungslehre) with a theory of action.65 This shift also turns the idea of a 
"philosophical anthropology" into an oxymoron: while philosophy refers to non-
empirical or transcendental knowledge, anthropology derives its knowledge from 
empirical observations and is not foundational. This means that anthropology is a 
practical or second philosophy, not a pure or first philosophy. Kant’s pragmatic 
empirical anthropology ties the question of how nature determines the human 
being together with how the human, as a free acting subject, can and ought to 
determine what it makes of itself.66 Thus, the Kantian anthropology observes and 
                                               
63 Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 9 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962), p. 447f. 
64 If we know “what the human is” – here the “what” refers to the Wesen or essence – all other 
questions would be answered as well. It will be Heidegger’s rigor to shift this question from the 
“what” to the “is” pole: the answer to “what is the human being?” must be examined through 
the question of being – the human “is”. Its essence lies in existing.  
65 The pragmatic anthropology will later attempt, through the empiricist tradition, to test its a 
priori arguments by revealing the structures of human experience. 
66 Cf. “A systematic doctrine containing our knowledge of man (anthropology) can either be 
given from a physiological or a pragmatic point of view. Physiological knowledge of man aims at 
the investigation of what Nature makes of man, whereas pragmatic knowledge of man aims at 
what man makes, can, or should make of himself as a freely acting being.” Kant, Anthropology, 
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describes the division and passage between the "nature of man" and "human 
nature", whereby human nature underlies a teleological model driven by reason 
and morality. In this model, the human has a task, namely “to become what he 
can be” and thus to fulfill its potential “as a citizen of the world”.67  
Kant realized that “what is truly permanent in human nature is not any 
condition in which it once existed and from which it has fallen; but rather the goal 
for which and towards which it moves.”68 This remark of Ernst Cassirer considers 
the potential to act as the core of the Kantian anthropology. In the capacity to act 
we realize freedom. Freedom signifies our capacity to change the pre-conditions 
of nature; for example, to "civilize" our instinctive reactions or rationally reflect 
upon our emotions and experiences. Kantian anthropology develops a 
phenomenology of action and reaction, and, subsequently, turns the outcome of 
this phenomenology into a pragmatics of action; this pragmatics restricts or 
stimulates certain forms of human behavior driven by a teleological morality. 
Morality serves here to create a moral autonomous person and, at large, a moral 
human species (which from Kant’s perspective meant a peaceful cosmopolitan 
species69). Hence, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology presents itself as an 
educational, civilizing model. This model establishes the German tradition of 
Bildungshumanismus and binds the need for human education, bourgeois civility 
and ethical imperatives into an overall pragmatic task of humanity.70 This leads 
Kant to his final conclusion: that overcoming evil, the need to strive for reason 
                                               
 
p. 3. Kant goes on to explain what he means by the pragmatic orientation of his anthropology: 
“He who ponders about natural phenomena, for example about the causes for the faculty of 
memory, can make sense (in the Cartesian fashion) of the traces of impressions which keep 
lingering in our brain; but, in doing so, he has to admit that he is a mere spectator in this game 
of his imagination and that he has to leave everything entirely to Nature, since he knows 
neither the cerebral nerves and filaments nor their operation when they carry out his 
intentions. Such speculative theorizing is a sheer waste of time. If, however, he distinguishes 
between those observations which have been found to hinder and those which have been 
found to promote memory in order to amplify it and make it more efficient, and if he needs for 
this purpose a better knowledge of man, then we are involved in a section of anthropology with 
pragmatic purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here”. Ibid., 4.  
67 Kant, Anthropology, p. 4. 
68 Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau-Kant-Goethe, trans. James Gutmann a.o. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1945), p. 20. 
69 The last sentence of Kant’s anthropology expresses the hope that “..through progressive 
organization of the citizens of the earth within and toward the species as a system [will be] 
united by cosmopolitical bonds”. Kant, Anthropology, p. 251. 
70 Ibid., p. 251. 
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and to realize the good lead to a “progressive organization of the citizens of the 
earth”: 71 
  
Thus we tend to present the human species not as evil, but as a species 
of rational beings, striving among obstacles to advance constantly from 
the evil to the good. In this respect our intention in general is good, but 
achievement is difficult because we cannot expect to reach our goal by 
the free consent of individuals, but only through progressive 
organization of the citizens of the earth within and toward the species as 
a system which is united by cosmopolitical bonds.72    
 
It is not difficult to find a trace of this Kantian intention in Ricoeur’s vision, that 
the goal of moral selfhood is to strive for “the good life with oneself and others in 
just institutions”. But while Kant disconnects his first philosophy and the notion 
of critique from the pragmatic intention of his anthropology, Ricoeur’s goal is to 
dialectically confront, intertwine, work through, or reconcile the domain of 
anthropology, philosophy and ethics. Ricoeur thus attempts to succeed where 
Kant failed: in developing a pragmatics (“I can”), which, because it is inherently 
bound to the practical, second philosophy of ethics is genuinely complementary 
to it. In Ricoeur, the imperative of the ought-to-do (Sollen) will not just be the 
authoritative or auctorial voice of conscience but the result of an intersubjective 
reciprocity, in which the intra-personal and inter-personal appear as inescapably 
                                               
71 It is well known that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology contains both misogynist and anti-
Semitic remarks, which must be regarded as exceptional even against the background of the 
period in which he lived. The two chapters on the “Character of Nations” and the “Character of 
Races” are filled with clichés and presumptions, which partly mirror the opinions of the 18th 
century and partly the fact that Kant never left his ivory-tower Königsberg. For Foucault, 
Kantian anthropology signifies the “invention” of the “human” as an quasi-autonomous, 
civilized and disciplined subject of modernity. Kant invents new concepts and presents, for 
example, a theory of mental illnesses without any sort of experience, evidence or knowledge in 
this field: here “words” – as empty concepts – turn into “things”. Thus, anthropology as a 
pragmatic, civilizing mission can easily turn into a state-ruled disciplinary practice whereby the 
“invention” of the/a human is the result not just of observational knowledge - but of a 
normative hegemonic wish-image of the “good citizen”. Although Foucault’s critique is entirely 
justified, it overlooks the fact  that Kant’s anthropology is also the harbinger of an important 
innovation: the shift from an empirical psychology towards a pragmatic anthropology. Here, the 
human is considered not as merely an individual, isolated soul, but as a social being in a society 
and, even, as a citizen of the world. In short, whereas Foucault dismantled the Kantian 
“invention” of man, Kant himself dismantled the previous metaphysical and spiritual 
“invention” of man, to place it back on earth and within a society of civilians at large.  
72 Ibid., p. 251. 
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intertwined and deeply grounded in an ethics of mutual trust and practical 
wisdom.  
 
Philosophical Anthropology and the Crisis of Human Nature 
The school of German Philosophical Anthropology usually refers to the work of 
Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Plessner and Max Scheler. Here I sketch the main 
arguments of Gehlen and Scheler, but replace a description of Plessner’s work 
with that of Ernst Cassirer. In the period of Ricoeur's early anthropology, Plessner 
still had little influence in the philosophical landscape – this, of course, changes 
later and currently Plessner is probably the most widely read of the three 
authors. But I consider Plessner not as part of the invisible college that influenced 
Ricoeur’s anthropological positioning.73 Although Ernst Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian 
philosophy does not officially belong to the school of Philosophical Anthropology, 
his theory of the symbolic function and his phenomenology of culture are firmly 
rooted in the anthropological and humanist project. As such, he has a crucial 
impact on Ricoeur's hermeneutic turn and humanistic ethical outlook. It is for this 
reason that I included Cassirer in this brief introductory overview.  
What these anthropologies share is the epistemological and philosophical 
question of how the human defines and understands himself as "nature," and as 
a rational, spiritual, political, social, symbolic or interpretative "animal"? In 
modern anthropology, the examination of the God/man and nature/human 
divide is extended by a focus on the internal rupture between subject and self, 
leading to the idea that the human being suffers from an internal dichotomy and, 
thus, loss of centre and inner coherence. These experiences of external and 
internal rupture are usually explained as signs of the alienation and reification of 
the secular subject.  
This crisis, formulated as an "anthropology of lack” leads to various re-
formulations of our core anthropological condition: the human is a Mängelwesen 
(Gehlen) or Selbstvergessen (Heidegger), it suffers from Mauvais foi (Sartre) or is 
considered a wounded cogito (Ricoeur). In contrast to these negative 
formulations, Ernst Cassirer’s work describes the subject’s fundamental 
capability to create meaning through symbols: for Cassirer, the human is first a 
                                               
73 Plessner’s bio-philosophical notion of “excentric positionality” (Exzentrische Positionalität) 
and “mediated immediacy” (vermittelter Unmittelbarkeit) as core aspects of the human do have 
particular similarities with Ricoeur’s purely hermeneutic concepts of “distanciation” and 
“mediated meaning”. A comparison of Ricoeur and Plessner would be an interesting project, 
one yet to be embarked upon. Cf. Helmut Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch: Einleitung in die Philosophische Anthropologie (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1975), pp. 288-308.  
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homo symbolicus. This puts the bio-anthropology, theo-anthropology or 
existential-anthropology on the path towards a cultural or hermeneutic 
anthropology, emphasizing the poetic, imaginative, communicative and 
innovative qualities of the human through its use of symbols that give meaning.  
It is this path that Ricoeur will follow, without forgetting the Kantian, Hegelian 
and Husserlian legacy that serves as his main starting point for his hermeneutic 
reformulation of philosophical anthropology.  
 
Arnold Gehlen: The Human as Mängelwesen 
In his magnum opus Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (first 
published in 1940), Arnold Gehlen defines the core problem of the human as the 
nature/human divide.74 Whereas nature seems just nature, the human does not 
yet know what it is: this means that the first mission of the human is to 
understand himself as a task (Aufgabe). This task has a biological and an 
anthropological side. Biologically, the human is defined through its lack and 
incompleteness. Hence, the human is a Mängelwesen (deficient being). 
Anthropologically, the human needs to examine what it means to live and 
conduct a life (Lebensführung). It is this experience of a fundamental “lack”, a 
deficiency, which motivates the human need to position itself towards the world 
and towards its own life, evoking the acting subject. In the duality of a biological 
lack and an anthropological task, Gehlen sees the basic structure of human 
existence. We compensate for our "lack" with a structural Weltoffenheit 
(worldliness). This openness towards the world, however, leads to a 
Reizüberflutung (overflow of impressions). The management of lack and 
Reizüberflutung force us to turn the environment into something we can survive 
in, make use of, settle in, control and dwell in. In the end, our use of the world 
and/as nature serves our survival. This appropriation of the life-world by humans 
turns nature into culture which, as a result, becomes our second nature. Through 
this process, the biological condition of lack evokes the anthropological need for 
the self-discovery of our capabilities and potentials. According to Gehlen, the 
core structure of the anthropo-biological condition produces the interaction 
between biological Eindrucksfülle and existential Entlastung.75 In Gehlen’s words:  
 
                                               
74 Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (München: Aula-
Verlag, 1986), p. 10.  
75 Ibid., 39. 
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Diese unmittelbare Belastung wird also produktiv zur Existenzchance 
gemacht werden müssen. Wir werden genau und bis ins einzelne 
verfolgen, wie die Bewältigung der Eindrucksfülle immer zugleich eine 
selbsttätig vollzogene Entlastung ist, sozusagen eine Herabsetzung des 
unmittelbaren Kontakts mit der Welt, wie aber gerade damit der 
Mensch sich orientiert, die Eindrücke ordnet, sich faßlich macht und sie 
vor allem in die Hand bekommt.76  
 
The consequence of Gehlen's diagnosis (which can be read as a “konservative 
Stabilisierungstheorie”77) is ambivalent: although humans are not able to free 
themselves from the fundamental condition of lack (Mängel), they are 
nonetheless able to successfully develop "coping mechanisms". In the end, 
Gehlen's anthropology culminates in an “Ordnungspolitischen Sozialtheorie”78 
(social-political theory of order) that presents the becoming human of the 
subject (its humanization) as an on-going process of self-cultivation and a 
struggle to master life. This self-cultivation is informed by the human’s capability 
to look forward, which helps in overcoming the permanent Reizüberflutung. 
Hence, for Gehlen, the human is permanently confronted with the dangers of 
nature which can only be conquered by actively reshaping nature into culture 
(which Gehlen considers an inherent part of "human nature"); our (natural) 
condition of lack forces us to act, to become “humans” we need to rebalance 
ourselves.79  
The experience of lack and actual powerlessness induces the drive for 
survival, culture, and power. Gehlen’s anthropology is a pragmatic anthropology 
focused on the acting human being, and one in which the acting aims to achieve 
self-control, in order to gain freedom. But Gehlen’s notion of self-discipline runs 
into a rather conservative ideology of permanent state-repression, to control the 
                                               
76 Ibid., 39.  
77 Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Einleitung, in Arnold Gehlen Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine 
Stellung in der Welt, (München: Aula-Verlag, 1986), p. xii. 
78 Ibid., p. xiii. 
79 Cf. “Der Mensch [wird] angesehen als ein Wesen, dessen Antriebsstruktur als Quelle seiner 
Gefährdungen wie auch seiner Daseinsbeherrschung und Selbststabilisierung (angesehen) 
wird.” Ibid., p. iii. The concepts of Reizüberflutung and Antriebüberschuß, in particular, show 
the influence of Scheler and Freud on Gehlen. Rehberg, in reference to the wider context of 
Gehlen's anthropology states, “Der Zwang zur Weltbearbeitung nimmt Motive der … 
Philosophien Fichtes und Hegels sowie der daran anknüpfenden Praxisphilosophie von Karl 
Marx auf und macht auch Gehlen's Nähe zum amerikanischen ‚Pragmatismus’ verständlich, 
einschließlich der späteren Anknüpfungen an den Interaktionismus George Herbert Meads, den 
Gehlen 1950 als erster deutsche Philosoph ausführlich rezipierte”, Ibid., p. iv. 
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human’s natural instincts and behaviour. Gehlen’s model implies the need for an 
authoritarian state. Main problem of this bio-anthropological model is the lack of 
a sense of history (hence Gehlen’s belief in the universalism of his model), its 
dismissal of individualism and the belief that only institutionalized forms of state-
discipline can produce self-control and, subsequently, evoke the self-esteem of 
humanity. 
 
Max Scheler: A Theo-Anthropology of Vitalism, Values and Love 
Max Scheler’s work was deeply influenced by Husserlian phenomenology, 
Christian theology (St. Augustine and Pascal) and by Lebensphilosophie 
(Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson). His work evolves from an anthropo-theology 
into an epistemology of the loving being (ens amans) and, finally, into a 
phenomenology of social values and ethics deriving from empathy and sympathy. 
In particular, Scheler's theory of empathy forms the central core of  his theory of 
community. Because “the primordial relation to the self, the other and God is 
emotional, and emotions constitute and disclose the world as a world of 
values”80, it is through empathy (or lack thereof) that our relation to the world is 
determined.  
 In a short text called Zur Idee des Menschen (1923), Scheler takes up the 
classical question of the "Stellung des Menschen im All" to immediately dismiss 
various definitions of what this “Stellung” could be, such as animale rationale 
(Aristotle) or homo faber (Marx), or various philosophical perspectives such as 
positivism and pragmatism. Instead, Scheler focuses on the origin of language 
(Sprache) and the use of tools (Werkzeug), which define the border (Grenze) 
between animals and humans (or between natural history and history). Our 
usage and need of language culminate in the question of the origin of the 
"word"; and it comes as no surprise when the deeply Catholic Scheler states that 
the only “sinnvolle Antwort” (meaningful answer) to the question of the origin of 
the Word is: “Das Wort (das den Menschen sprechen ließ) kommt von Gott."81 
For Scheler, the word is an Urphänomen, which constitutes all sense and 
knowledge before any kind of history (of this sense or knowledge) occurs. 
Language does not signify a border or possible passage from "human as nature" 
towards the "human as human", but rather marks the passage from animal to 
God. In this process the "word" does not just signify a development from beast to 
                                               
80 Frédéric Vandenberghe, Sociology from the Heart: Max Scheler’s Epistemology of Love, 
Theory, Culture, & Society, Vol 25: 3, 2008, p. 23. 
81 Max Scheler, Zur Idee des Menschen, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3 (Bern - München: Francke-
Verlag, 1914),  p. 182.  
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human. Scheler cites Wilhelm von Humboldt’s famous remark that: “Der Mensch 
ist nur Mensch durch die Sprache; um aber die Sprache zu erfinden, mußte er 
schon Mensch sein.“ This circular argument closes off any kind of evolutionary 
approach to the "Stellung des Menschen" as a development from animal to 
human. The human cannot survive in nature without the brainpower, which  
compensates for the underdevelopment of our intuition and skills. Scheler’s 
argument here echoes Nietzsche’s negative vitalistic anthropology. The 
development of the human as an animal rationale or animal with tools, taken as 
attempts of survival, shows that the human actually is, as Scheler states “das 
konstitutiv kranke Tier, das Tier, in dem das Leben einen faux pas gemacht und 
sich in eine Sackgasse verlaufen hat. Die Folge des faux pas – und die Sackgasse 
wäre dann die ‚Zivilisation’.“82 Civilisation as such is, thus, a dead end.  
Scheler seems to share Gehlen’s quasi-nihilism but makes a spiritual volte-
face: humans’ fundamental weakness and vulnerability (as Mängelwesen) 
suggests that man’s dignity lies in his ratio and use of tools, through which he is 
able to transcend himself. Like animals, humans are living beings and live in an 
environment but, unlike animals, we are self-conscious beings, aware of our body 
and, in particular, “able to contemplate values and ideas, realise them, 
transcending thereby our bodies and our environment.”83 The defining quality of 
the human becomes its ability to “partake in the sphere of the spirit”, to 
transcend itself, to “access and disclose an autonomous realm of absolute values 
and ideas that exist independently of their biological constitution.” Thus, the 
human is defined by its attempt to transcend. According to Scheler, all our 
seeking is ultimately an attempt to transcend towards God. This turns the human 
into “the God seeker”.84 
In Scheler’s understanding, only the search for God can “legitimate” men’s 
civilisation: all our work points towards God, whose love and spirit transcends 
through human beings who, in turn, are able to transcend themselves towards 
the love and spirit of God (to partake in its Divine Love). Here Scheler’s 
translation and use of the pantha rei metaphor helps to visualize the relation 
between the God seekers (humans) and Him, God: “He is the sea; they are the 
rivers. And from their offspring on, the rivers will fill the lake to which they 
                                               
82 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 3 Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972), p. 185.  
83 Ibid., p. 5. 
84 Scheler further states:  “Man is the intention and gesture of ‘transcendence’ itself, it is the 
Being (Wesen) that prays and seeks God.” Cited in Vandenberghe, Sociology from the Heart, p. 
21. 
38 |   Chapter One 
 
flow.”85 All culture and civilisation is rooted in the movement towards the holy 
love of God. In this religious anthropology the human is only an “In-between,” a 
“border,” a “passage,” an “appearing of God” in the flow of life itself and an 
eternal “transcending” (“Hinaus”) of life over itself.”86 That the human seeks God, 
confirms that the human is in fact an undefined Being: he does not know what he 
is and must, through seeking, transcend his incompleteness. Thus, the task of the 
human is to become a transcending flow. God did not reproduce himself in 
humans, humans must reproduce themselves towards God. As such, the 
(modern) anthropomorphisms of God, Scheler argues, need to be turned around 
into a theo-morphism of the human. 
For Scheler, in contrast to Husserl, the ego itself is grounded in the 
community: the difference between oneself and Others is constituted by the 
moment when the individual starts differentiating between inner/outer, 
mine/thine and community/ own. For Husserl, the recognition of being a "body 
among bodies" signifies the identification between the experience of our own 
living body here and that other living body over there (this is what Husserl calls 
pairing). In contrast, Scheler’s notion of the person cannot be split into a 
body/mind duality that is recognized or identified with on different levels. We 
recognize the other as a concrete totality or Gestalt in a direct and immediate 
way, which connects us with the spiritual sphere surrounding all beings.87 
Scheler’s notion of intersubjectivity refers to a “cosmo-vital unity”, which mirrors 
an anthropo-theo-teleological realm. At the same time, this realm shows the 
experience of a new cosmology of nature (echoing the Romantic’s philosophy of 
nature), which Scheler understands as a spiritual communality of love (of all 
people in, with and through God).88 
                                               
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid., 186. cf. “Er ist nur ein ‘Zwischen‘, eine ‘Grenze‘, ein ‘Übergang‘, ein ‘Gotterscheinen‘ im 
Strome des Lebens und ein ewiges ‘Hinaus‘ des Lebens über sich selbst.”  
87 Vandenberghe aptly summarizes the trajectory of Scheler’s intersubjective theory,  “In an 
attempt to re-evaluate both the vitalist theories of emotive identification (Bergson) and the 
spiritualist theories of divine love (Augustine), while devaluing the theories of empathy and 
sympathy (Adam Smith, Ferguson, Hutcheson) that privilege fellow-feelings over effervescent 
fusion and mystical union, Scheler hierarchically orders the whole gamut of feelings in such a 
way that the vital, almost animal feelings of immediacy and unity (Einsfühlung) with and in the 
other only forms the starting point of an ascending onto-theo-teleological stairway (Augustine’s 
ascensus) that leads, via the protracted plateau of the psychic feelings of empathy and 
sympathy (Einfühlung), to spiritual love of the other in and with God. From the depths of animal 
life, via the self-consciousness of the Ego, the stairway leads almost straight to Heaven.” Ibid., 
Vandenberghe, Sociology,  p. 26. 
88 “Even before he’s an ens cogitans or an ens volens, Man is an ens amans.” Ibid., Scheler, GW 
X: 356.  
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 On a second more personalistic level, Scheler examines the individual 
psychic components of empathy and sympathy by dividing them into Einfühlung, 
Einsfühlung and Nachfühlung. Scheler also reflects on the differences between 
Mit-einanderfühlen, Mitgefühl and Mitleid. For Scheler, both categories show 
how emotions conjure value and how they always point to the empirical concrete 
other through forms of identification. In the hierarchy of emotive values, 
unconditional love is superior to empathy or sympathy: “We can only feel in 
depth with the other to the extent that we love.”89 Our love for the “essentially 
and unspeakably other”90 overrules recognition or sympathy through mere 
identification (of the Other “just” as an-other self).91 One consequence of this 
approach is the fact that the primary social relation I-Thou can only reach its 
highest form of intimacy and unity if transcended through the sphere of ultimate 
love, the sphere of God. This means, translated into a post-metaphysical, 
incomplete modernity and a secular humanistic worldview, that the mediation 
between identity and alterity, between oneself as another and another as 
oneself, merges in a “we” of communication and culture.92 
Scheler’s late anthropology is dualistic in that it combines the human’s vital 
and spiritual drives to develop a value ethics of love and community, grounded in 
forms of affective intentionality and/or the emotional a priori (such as empathy 
and sympathy, which appear to be non-cognitive). In his ”small ethics”, Ricoeur 
pleas for a rehabilitation of “feelings of pity, compassion, and sympathy”, and 
states that Scheler’s “analyses devoted to sympathy, hate, and love remain 
unequalled, in particular with respect to the major distinction between sympathy 
and fusion or affective confusion, as well as concerning the play of distance and 
                                               
89 Ibid., VII, 147-48. In an interview with Richard Kearney, Ricoeur states, “I claim that ethics is 
not based on religion, but that religion is something other than a problem of duty. It is a 
problem of giving the gift, and so on like that. Love, for me, for example, does not belong to 
ethics; it belongs to a poetics of the will.” Richard Kearney On Paul Ricoeur. The Owl of Minerva 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), p. 120. In his Course of Recognition Ricoeur will exactly stress this 
difference between an ethics of recognition as resulting from a struggle or normative process 
and, in contrast, recognition resulting from a peaceful non-normative process of giving and 
receiving in which love, in the Christian sense of Agape, is considered the highest form of 
recognition (because it happens outside the concept of utilitarian reciprocity).   
90 Vandenberghe points out that, “to the extent that we love the other, we also love him or her 
as a unique, exceptional and irreplaceable Person. Unlike sympathy, which is always directed to 
the other in so far as he or she is like me, love never reduces alterity to identity, but always 
recognises and reveals the other as someone who’s essentially and unspeakably other.” Ibid., 
Vandenberghe, Sociology,  p. 29. 
91 The opposite of sympathy - repulsion - can evoke the same unconditional force as love but 
now directed at exclusion, dehumanization and hate. In the second part of Wesen und Formen 
der Sympathie (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1923) Scheler examines the relation between love and hate.  
92 Ibid., p. 31. 
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proximity” (OA 192). Ricoeur’s anthropological summary of the human as an 
“acting and suffering subject” places feelings, affects – as “revealed in the self by 
the other’s suffering” (OA 191)  –  back at the core of an ethical selfhood (and in 
opposition to the rational of the Kantian Gesinnungsethik).93  
 
Ernst Cassirer: The Human as Animal Symbolicum 
Although Ernst Cassirer does not belong to the triad Gehlen, Scheler and Plessner 
- who are the "official" authors under the label  of Philosophical Anthropology - I 
consider his work as so closely related that it may be considered as sharing the 
same goal. Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29) is an anthropology 
of culture describing the subject’s primordial capability to create meaning 
through symbols. The human is, in short, first and foremost a homo symbolicus. 
This puts bio-anthropology, theo-anthropology or existential-anthropology on 
the path towards a cultural or hermeneutic anthropology, which emphasizes the 
poetic, imaginative, communicative and innovative qualities of the human 
through its use of symbols (symbols that give meaning).94 The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms95 is usually depicted as an extension of Kant’s Critique of Reason, 
                                               
93 In his appendix to Émile Bréhier’s Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande (Paris: Payot, 1921), 
Ricoeur describes Scheler’s “fundamental contribution” to phenomenology as a correction to 
the narrow rationalistic framework of Husserl. In reference to Ricoeur’s position on Scheler’s 
phenomenology, Herbert Spiegelberg states: “Ricoeur accepts Scheler’s general view of the 
nature of values and of their “emotional” givenness. But he also believes that a loyal devotion 
to them in Royce’s sense, as expressed in historical action, is a condition for their presentation. 
Thus, he tries to combine the idea of existential commitment with the phenomenology of a 
priori values.” Cf. Ibid.,  Histoire Vol. 2, p. 566. Spiegelberg adds, “Scheler’s own ideas about the 
function of love in value cognition actually coincide with Ricoeur’s much more than the latter 
seems to realize in this context” (ibid.). In Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur refers to Scheler’s Der 
Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik (Halle: M. Niemyer, 1927) as a work 
which provides him with two key ideas for his own description of the relation between motives 
and values (FN 72), these two ideas are “(1) there is a way between formalism of duty and 
hedonism of the good (that is, utilitarianism and affectively oriented theories in general); (2) 
the material (non-formal) a prioris can reveal themselves only in terms of psychological feelings 
and the unfolding of history” (FN 32).  
94  In The Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur already declares (echoing Cassirer's theory) that “The 
consciousness of self seems to constitute itself at its lowest level by means of symbolism and to 
work out an abstract language only subsequently, by means of a spontaneous hermeneutics of 
its primary symbols” (SE 9). 
95 Cassirer published Die Philosophie der symbolische Formen in three volumes between 1923-
26 (Vol. I Sprache; Vol. II Das Mythische Denken; Vol. III Phenomenologie der 
Erkenntnistheorie). The english translation followed between 1953-1957 (The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, Vol I Language.; Vol. II Mythical  Thought; Vol. III Phenomenology of 
Knowledge. trans.  R. Manheim.  (New Haven: Yale University Press.) The last and fourth volume 
only came out in 1996 under the title Zur Metaphysik der symbolische Formen, Vol. 1 of 
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working towards a critique of culture in which the symbolic form comes to 
denominate all forms of experiences, imagination, and human thought. The 
passage from nature to culture or animal to human is now formulated as a 
conceptual function that pre-determines all forms of human expressions. This 
conceptual function or tool, turning nature into culture and instinct into a 
reflexive ability, is what Cassirer calls the symbolic form. In Ricoeur’s words, 
“symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience” (TN I:57). This 
apparent simple summary of Cassirer’s main thesis opens up a wide area of 
historical, philosophical, linguistic, biological, religious, scientific, and 
anthropological studies that shape the theory of symbolic forms.  
Cassirer builds his philosophy around three main perspectives which he aims 
to synthesize through his symbolic theory: the generative bio-anthropology 
(Uexküll), a linguistic-semiotic theory of language (Humboldt), and a non-
substantialist theory of scientific concepts (Herz).96 In this manner the Kantian 
problem of knowledge expands from the field of cognition and theoretical 
thought towards the field of human experience, imagination, and memory. 
                                               
 
Nachgelassene Manuskripte, ed. J.M. Krois, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1995).  Before publication of 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Cassirer had already written two important books:  Das 
Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaften der neueren Zeit (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 
1906), and Substanzbegriff und Erkenntnisbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der 
Erkenntniskritik (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1910). These books combine a historical, theoretical and 
philosophical treatment of the notion of knowledge and science, examining, in particular, 
functional concepts. The second book is translated as Substance and Function and Einstein’s 
Theory of Relativity (New York: Dover, 1923/1953). Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
presents itself as a history of philosophy, a critical epistemology and a structural examination of 
the symbolic function and how it determines various forms of cultural expressions. Volume I 
treats the phenomenology of linguistic form and the problem of language in the history of 
philosophy. The second volume describes the meaning of myth and its transference to religion; 
the third volume aims to integrate the historical and structural examination of language, myth 
and religion into an overall theory of the symbolic form that results in a developmental theory 
of consciousness, which Cassirer defines as a phenomenology of knowledge. 
96 Although Cassirer’s project is often defined as a philosophy of culture (Kulturphilosophie), his 
philosophy should actually be understood in relation to the post-Hegelian Neo-Kantian 
tradition, which strives for a renewed epistemological clarification of the concepts, categories 
and claims of validity. In Substanzbegriff und Erkenntnisbegriff, which precedes the 
development of the philosophy of symbolic forms, Cassirer sets out to dismantle the classical 
Aristotelian epistemological idea of substance and its representation in a concept. In Aristotle, 
this notion presupposes the existence of an ontology or of substantial forms, which -  through 
logic, abstraction and generalization - can be uncovered, conceptualized and thus cognized. This 
process of conceptualizing the foundation or substance of the world is, according to Cassirer, 
nothing else than a sort of copying of the real into an ideal idea. In this sense, classical 
epistemology was/is a mimetic theory.  
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Alternately, this leads to a comparative and developmental epistemology of 
cultural forms.97  
Cassirer’s original question can be summarized as follows: what constitutes 
the relation between impressions and expressions, experience and apprehension 
and between the empirical and the intelligible? This question takes up and 
renews the problem of the Kantian transcendental synthesis in the famous 
schema-chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. In summary, Cassirer combines 
the Kantian transcendental question with a generative physiological approach. 
This combination not only follows the anthropological shift from metaphysics 
back to biology, due to Darwin’s evolutionary theory, but also develops a 
phenomenology of the linguistic form, influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
ethno-linguistic studies. From this base, Cassirer aims to develop a new scientific 
view of language, which describes the shift from the sensuous, intuitive to the 
conceptual expression of language. This shift brings Cassirer to produce an 
overall renewal of the comparative epistemology of the natural and human 
sciences; cognitive sciences are no longer separated or even opposed to cultural 
sciences. Instead, cognitive sciences are subsumed under cultural sciences 
because it is only through the formalization and conceptualization of thought in 
symbolic forms that we are able to think in causalities and relations and, thus, 
that we are able to develop the concepts of a cognitive science. In Darwinian 
evolutionary terms, the human never escapes the laws of determinism as set by 
nature. From Cassirer's perspective, "evolution" is just another conceptual 
symbolic form articulating a particular idea of knowledge (this implies that 
science, biology in this case, does not primarily validate truth-claims, but rather 
delivers concepts that produce and mediate between knowledge-claims).   
For Cassirer, the “movement from nature to culture represents a movement 
of liberation through symbolic activity.”98 This liberation enables the human to 
withdraw, to distance himself from the immediate pure instinctive or stimulus-
reaction drive, and to intervene in evolutionary laws and become a reflexive and 
moral subject. In the symbolic function, Cassirer discovers the instrument of 
culturalization, which equals liberation. The human, as an animale symbolicum, 
                                               
97 The theory of symbolic forms must be read against the background of Neo-Kantianisms or 
neo-criticisms which, in turn, can be read as a post-metaphysical backlash to Lebensphilosophie 
and, later, Existenzphilosophie. The absolute Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Husserl are 
juxtaposed by a Kantian inspired critical re-examination of the value-systems of science and 
culture. The notion of the symbol and the function of symbolization, in reference to the Kantian 
symbol in the Critiques, are turned into an overall anthropological theory.  
98 S.G. Lofts, Introduction, The Logic of the Cultural Sciences (New Haven: Yale UP, 2000), p. xxii. 
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has created the tool for self-liberation, culture and values .99 Therefore, symbolic 
forms not only mediate between impression and expression, experience and 
articulation, but also function as a common denominator for all fields of human 
cultural production, such as language, mythology, religion, art, science, and so 
on. Although these expressions can be very different or even incommensurable 
(as in the case of science and religion), they all are mediated through symbolic 
forms.100 This means that all knowledge is formalized and conceptualized in a 
similar manner, and this formalization becomes the actual object of 
(anthropological) examination. It is neither nature as such nor culture as such; it 
is, rather, the symbolic form – through which the human articulates experience 
and translates this experience into knowledge – which must be the actual object 
of anthropological research. The creation of (symbolic) forms defines the act 
through which reason structures experience (concepts are not innate but 
instruments for reflexive acts). This perspective combines a generative bio-
anthropological perspective with the Kantian notion of the productive forces of 
the transcendental imagination. 
Cassirer’s bio-anthropological or generative perspective is taken from Jakob 
von Uexküll’s theory of the physiological structures of organisms.101 Uexküll's bio-
anthropology is inspired by Kant’s theory of the categories that determine 
understanding as ultimately bound and dependent on data of the senses and 
perception. This insight, even more valid for animals and their relation to their 
Umwelt, leads Uexküll to a kind of teleological sociology of animals, dividing the 
organism into a receptive (Rezeptivsystem) and an effective system 
(Effektivsystem), which enables the organism to absorb a stimulus and react to 
                                               
99 Ernst Cassirer, Essay on Man (New  Haven: Yale UP, 1944), pp. 68, 27.  
100 The examination of signs, symbols and forms of signification heavily influenced and 
fragmented the post-war philosophical landscape into structuralism, deconstruction, analytical 
and continental perspectives. Signs and symbols are simultaneously the instruments of logic, 
language, cultural expressions and daily practices (among others). Cassirer’s theory must be 
read as an important predecessor of cultural anthropology and the sociology and history of 
science. Within philosophy, the “symbol” and the process of symbolisation intervened and 
intermingled with the vast array of theories of metaphor, allegoric and symbolic meaning-
making processes. 
101 This approach is still topical: bio-cognitivism or socio-biology is nothing more than the 
coming together of generative evolutionary biology (trying to derive “hard” knowledge from 
the body as organism combined with concepts of experience, articulation, embodiment or 
community) and phenomenological-sociological perspectives (although in another vocabulary) 
not unfamiliar to Neo-Kantian and anthropological developments of the early 20th century.  As 
Cassirer shows, natural and cultural sciences have different approaches but similar concepts 
with which to articulate this knowledge.   
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it.102 The actual, perfectly symmetrical cooperation between these two systems is 
what Uexküll calls the “Funktionskreis des Tieres” (functional circle of the 
animal). The human differs from the animal because the human possesses, 
between his receptive and reactive systems, a symbolic system, which functions 
as a mediating agency. This symbolic system interrupts and slows down the 
automatic reaction to the stimulus and allows a form of deliberation and 
decision. The possibility to step out of the pure reception-reaction circle changes 
the relationship between human and world radically, and constitutes a complete 
new dimension of reality that results in the shift from an immediate, instinctive 
and intuitive grasping of the “world“ to a mediated – symbolic – grasping. 
Humans are no longer confronted merely with things/objects, but also with 
meanings, images, interpretations and abstract signs. The symbolic form, as a 
third term between reception and reaction, permits the human to take an 
interpretative distance from its surrounding reality/environment. Therefore, the 
fact that the human differs from animals is mainly ascribable to a capability of 
the human to distance itself from immediateness, from direct instinctive 
reactions to stimuli and to reflect before it reacts. Thus, the passage from animal 
to human is defined as the passage from instinctive reflexes to subjective 
reflexivity. This passage is mediated through/in the symbolic form.  
A symbol differs from sign and signal. Signs can be indicative; for example, 
when “smoke” means “fire.” A signal is a sign that induces a more particular 
reaction, such as when “fire” equals “danger.” As demonstrated by Pavlov’s 
experiments, animals are able to grasp the "meaning" of particular signals and 
adapt the desired behaviour. Animals are also able to "communicate" through 
mimicry, gestures, or sounds. Pure signs stay in the range of an operative 
function (within the stimulus-reaction scheme) whereas symbols have a 
designative function. The meaning of symbols depends on the positing of a 
predicative signification which denominates ("names"). In short, signs and signals 
are still an inherent objective (substantial) part of the structure of events (as 
exemplified by the signifying "chain": smoke-fire-danger), while symbols mark a 
functional relation between a logical-syntactical structure and the spiritual-
intellectual reflexivity of humans.  
According to Uexküll, transferring a signal into a symbol requires a 
“Bedeutungs-Transzendenz” (transcending of meaning)103, which inscribes the 
mental content in the materiality of the sign and turns the sign-symbol into a 
                                               
102 Cf. J. von Uexküll, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (Berlin: Springer, 1921); Theoretische 
Biologie, 2. Ed. (Berlin: Springer, 1938). 
103 Ibid., Die Philosophie der symbolische Formen, Bd. III, p. 376ff. 
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representation of a geistige Bedeutung.104 Cassirer argues that in symbols and 
symbolic systems, signs, signals and affective expressions merge in “verschiedene 
geologische Schichten” (various geological layers).105 The propositional quality of 
language cannot be traced back to the affective expression only, but originates in 
the autonomous principle which constitutes the signifying function. The unity of 
all cultural forms lies in the use of linguistic-semiotic symbolic forms, which 
produces this signifying function: this function is not only the differentiating 
factor distinguishing humans from animals, but is also the hinge between our 
impressions and expressions of experience. For Cassirer, it is this symbolic 
function which defines our entire Wirklichkeitsbezug (relation to reality) and 
every possibility to attain any knowledge about it. This implies that the science of 
nature and the science of culture lead – through the science of the symbolic 
function – to a science of science. 106 
Cassirer’s philosophy suffers from a tension created by the conflation of a 
positivistic biological perspective and a qualitative, subjective and normative 
perspective. The physiological-organic biologism (Uexküll) from which Cassirer’s 
theory takes off seems outdated and perhaps far-fetched as a basis for a cultural 
theory, which actually appears to be mostly a linguistic-semiotic perspective, 
projected upon various cultural forms. In light of the contemporary revival of 
socio-biology, bio-cognition and biogenetics, the collapse of biological and 
cultural “codes” asks for an urgent rethinking of this tradition in its current 
manifestation. But while Cassirer used bio-anthropology to show how culture 
evolves from nature and reveals the unique creative will of the human, the 
current trends wish to reverse this position and reaffirm socio-biology as the 
                                               
104 Cassirer further explains: “Während der Ausdruck affektiver Zustände eher einem 
physiologischen Automatismus folgt, ist die Entstehung eines Symbols durch die bewußte 
Setzung einer prädikativen Bedeutung bedingt.” Ibid., p. 376 
105 The metaphor of archaeology and geology, closely related with the idea that hermeneutical 
understanding unearth hidden layers of meanings, echoes Husserl’s use of the term 
“sedimentation” and will be important in  the work of both Ricoeur and Michel Foucault. 
Ricoeur describes Freud’s work via the model of archaeology vs. teleology, and, as is well 
known, Foucault refers to his theory of science as “archaeology of knowledge”. In both cases 
“to dig” means to reveal deeper meanings of forgotten (or suppressed) knowledge, which 
haunts us from the past. This “deep” hermeneutics is closely related to Walter Benjamin’s 
notion of Rettende Kritik, which aims to recall and revive lost traces of suffering into the Now. 
For Ricoeur, the archaeological concept is part of a threefold hermeneutical path: archaeology-
teleology-eschatology. For Foucault, archaeology signifies the unmasking of structures of 
hegemonic power, which silence particular expressions of subjectivity and alternative 
knowledge. 
106 This connection is affirmed by Cassirer’s statement that “the critique of reason becomes the 
critique of culture,”  The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. I, p. 80. 
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actual determinant of human behaviour and knowledge. The DNA-code as the 
symbolic function used for conceptual formalism shows how the validity-claims 
of positivism still depend on the cultural (human) inventiveness, which symbols 
and practices of symbolization represent.107    
Cassirer’s theory shows that signs and symbols are simultaneously 
instruments of logic, language and cultural expressions as well as daily practices. 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms has not only influenced the development of a 
cultural anthropology but also formed the starting point, together with De 
Saussure’s linguistic theory, of the theories of symbolism, metaphor, allegories 
and signs, and the division of language philosophy into analytical, semiological, 
structural, functional, hermeneutical and deconstructive perspectives. While 
Cassirer turns the “symbolic form” into a comparative Kulturphilosophie, 
Ricoeur’s inquiry into the meaning of the symbol forms the basis of his entire 
hermeneutical perspective. Although Cassirer's theory is not formulated as a 
hermeneutics, but rather as a particular neo-Kantian comparative epistemology 
in combination with a linguistic-semiotic structuralism, it is the basic theory from 
which Ricoeur’s own theory of symbolic mediation starts. The importance of 
Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms for Ricoeur’s understanding of hermeneutic 
mediation cannot be overestimated if we read: “There is no self-understanding 
which is not mediated through signs, symbols, and texts” (FTA 29). What 
“symbolic form” represents in Cassirer’s work is comparable to what “symbolic 
mediation”, “surplus of meaning”, “vivid metaphor” or “narrative” stand for in 
Ricoeur’s work: symbol, metaphor or narrative are all forms through which 
meaning, interpretation and signification are mediated.108  Ricoeur summarizes 
his "hermeneutic turn" in The Symbolism of Evil with the following programmatic 
statement: “the symbol gives rise to thought” (SE 251).109  
                                               
107 I do not claim that DNA studies or bio-cognitive research have no value or that they bring no 
merit to humanity – on the contrary. The problem is with claims made outside the field of 
physical causalities, which link biology to concepts of mind, to thought, attitude and 
perceptions, while avoiding the consequence that all knowledge-claims are ultimately linguistic 
and, consequently, pre-coded.  
108 Ricoeur considers Cassirer’s theory of the symbolic function as both too wide and too static: 
wide because it universalizes the symbol as the main mediator between humans and their 
reality; too static because the relation between the symbol and its meaning/sense is described 
as a pure formal analogy and not, as Ricoeur would have it, a dynamic relation. For Ricoeur, it is 
the dynamic, innovative aspect of symbolic mediation which enables the ongoing adjustment of 
symbolic meaning to the symbolized. Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy,  p. 22. 
109 Besides The Symbolism of Evil, Freud and Philosophy and Time and Narrative also start with 
descriptions of the importance of “symbolic mediation”, formulated as an interpretation of 
Cassirer’s symbolic function (FP 10-11, 13, 18, 21-22); (TN 54, 57). 
   
 
2. THE COLLEGE OF CONTEMPORARIES  
 
 
Besides the "traditional" influence of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, the work of 
Ricoeur’s contemporaries Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers and Jean Nabert is crucial 
for any understanding of Ricoeur’s early anthropological project, the Philosophy 
of the Will. The combination of the existential phenomenology of Marcel and 
Jaspers with Nabert’s anthropology of human reflexivity offers an alternative to 
the themes of negation, Sein-zum-Tode and perceptive aestheticism found in the 
(existential) phenomenology of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. It is in 
Marcel and Jaspers that Ricoeur finds access to a description of the human 
condition as a concrete, existential, embodied condition marked by experiences 
of fundamental limitedness and exigency. Nabert offers a renewal of the 
Cartesian and Kantian reflective tradition, moving away from reflection as pure 
epistemology, and working towards reflection as a fundamental ability to affirm 
our desire to be. Marcel and Nabert, in particular, leave systematic traces in 
Ricoeur’s entire work, culminating in the concept of attestation, which is 
Ricoeur’s translation and extension of Nabert’s concept of primary affirmation. 
 
Existential and Reflective Anthropology   
In Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur states that “meditation on the work of Gabriel 
Marcel is in fact at the root of the analyses in this work” (FN 15) and declares that 
Marcel’s work gave him a “decisive philosophical shock”. Equally important is the 
work of Karl Jaspers, as Ricoeur recalls:  “Karl Jaspers was to become, a few years 
later during my captivity, my silent interlocutor”.110 A year after the comparative 
study on Marcel and Jaspers, a separate work solely on Jaspers’ 
Existenzphilosophie appears (co-authored with Mikel Dufrenne).111 Ricoeur’s 
comparison of Marcel and Jaspers is the first work to systematically reconstruct  
the fragmented writings of Marcel, whose philosophy is mainly expressed in 
essays, diaries, meditations, plays, lectures and his Journal Métaphysique (1927). 
What Ricoeur takes from these early influences will become the fundamental 
dialectic of his entire anthropology: the human dichotomy between a primary 
                                               
110 The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Ed. Hahn, Lewis Edwin. The Library of Living Philosophers 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1995), p. 7. 
111 Mikel Dufrenne & Paul Ricoeur, Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence (Paris: Gallimard 
Paris, 1947). 
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tragic condition – a combination of Marcel’s brokenness, Jaspers’ Scheitern and 
Nabert’s fault – and an evenly fundamental human effort and desire to be (which 
echoes both Spinoza’s conatus and Nabert’s renewal of this term as primary 
affirmation). This dialectic between the experience of a primary fault/fragility 
and an even primary affirmation/capability is the often invisible but permanent 
core of all subsequent phenomenological, ontological, and hermeneutic studies 
Ricoeur undertakes. The existential tension and dialectical unity of this condition 
determine our experience of being as embodied consciousness or, in a 
formulation closer to Marcel and Nabert, incarnated reflexivity. 
  
Gabriel Marcel: The Exigency of Being  
Despite  his writings having had a phenomenological tone, Marcel dismissed 
Husserl’s idealism and was mainly influenced by Scheler. A short overview of the 
main themes of Marcel’s philosophy shows immediately how his work echoes in 
Ricoeur’s anthropology: the incarnate body (corps proper) as the main source of 
our experience; the dialectic between "having" and "being" a body as 
determining our fundamental commitment (engagement) and participation 
towards and in Being; Being as witnessing (témoignage) instead of mere 
experiencing; the availability (disponibilité) and unavailability of the existing 
individual; "belonging" (appartenance), in particular in the way in which 
individuals belong to each other; "creative fidelity", as in the stability of the 
promise made; and encounter (rencontre) as marking the phenomenon of Thou-
ness. For each of these topics, we can find an equivalent in Ricoeur’s project, 
albeit worked out in a much more rigorous and systematic manner. 
Marcel once labelled his work as Christian existentialism but, after the 
atheist domination (mainly by Sartre) of existentialism, he preferred to call it 
Neo-Socratic. Marcel’s Neo-Socratic project is a metaphysical anthropology of 
concrete existence, for which our being-in-a-situation and being-with-others is 
essential. Central to Marcel’s thought is the problem of the "mystery of being", 
which refers to “something in which I am myself involved (engagé), and which 
consequently is not thinkable except as a sphere in which the distinction of what 
is in me from what is before me loses its meaning and its initial value”.112 This also 
means that we cannot escape the fact that we engage, participate, and commit 
in and to our Being. This state is what Marcel calls the "exigency of being". 
                                               
112 Gabriel Marcel, Être et Avoir (Paris: Aubier, 1968), p. 169). Cit. in: Ibid., Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement, Vol 2., p. 426 (emphasis added).  
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Besides the inescapable participation in Being, we are simultaneously 
haunted by our total singularity (thus, our question: “What am I?”), and an 
inescapable relation to others: our Being is a being-in-a-situation. We participate 
in this situation, and being is always already a being-with-others. These two 
experiences of existence are fundamental to the constitution of our selfhood. It is 
easy to see how this philosophy of concrete existence, focusing on the 
(mysterious) experience of our participation in "Being and beings," echoes in 
Ricoeur’s late anthropology (in particular in the last study, Ontology in View of 
Oneself as Another). Underlying the "exigency of being" is a metaphysical 
expression of our "longing to be" (appétit d’être), which strives for a 
reorientation, away from idealism and rationalism and towards the ontological 
mystery of being, and the experience of the body as the centre of metaphysical 
thought.    
Our involvement in being leads to a crisis of the modern world which, as 
Marcel writes, is broken (cassé) because it lost “the ontological mystery”. This 
diagnosis of being is very much in line with the typical mood or tendency in both 
the pre-war and post-war philosophical anthropology: the subject is 
disenchanted, homeless, suffers from a lack, is incomplete and, in Marcel’s view, 
lives in a “broken world”. To restore the broken world, we need a new form of 
reflection, a Second Reflection. While the First Reflection is the reflection of 
empiricism, idealism, and positivism, the Second Reflection “has as its main 
function to break up the rigid division between that which is before us as an 
objective problem and that which is within us as a “mystery'.”113 For Marcel, this 
Second Reflection is an "act of recovery" (recueillement), signifying the urgent 
need “to recollect oneself”. 
The urgency to recollect oneself returns in Ricoeur’s concept of 
reconfiguration (as worked out in Time and Narrative I) and attestation (in 
Oneself as Another): both the dynamic reconfiguration at work in our narrative 
identity, and the binding of idem-identity and ipse-identity in attestation show 
the concrete intertwinement of our embodied, reflexive and social selfhood. In a 
similar fashion, Ricoeur translates Marcel’s notion of a monde cassé into the fault 
which represents the “drama of a divided man” (FN 21), marking the subject’s 
fragility and fallibility. Other ideas of Marcel that return in Ricoeur are invocation, 
the beyond (au delà) and hope. Invocation does not refer to prayer but to an 
appeal: the appeal to oneself or to others that brings us closer to the ontological 
mystery. In Ricoeur’s late anthropology the "appeal of invocation" becomes an 
"ontology of the response": various forms of this appeal return in promising, 
                                               
113 Ibid., Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, Vol 2., p. 432. 
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forgiving, pardoning, giving and receiving. Ricoeur seems to start from Marcel, to 
open up a dialogue with Levinas leading to a reformulation of the Other that is 
closer to Aristotle and Arendt. The "beyond" refers to the metaphysical status of 
Being as transcendent and, although always incarnate, directs us towards Hope 
and dynamic renewal.  
 
Karl Jaspers: Existenzerhellung  
The key to Jaspers’ philosophy is the all-important term Grenzsituation which 
determines all levels of our existential condition. This concept is Jaspers’ 
adaptation of Nietzsche’s Grenzpunkte (boundary points) taken from the Geburt 
der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik.114 For Nietzsche, once we reach the 
limits of logic and knowledge, we stare into the "Unaufhellbare" (unfathomable). 
As a consequence, we are forced to gain a new level of self-knowledge, which is a 
tragic knowledge, a knowledge that can only be reconciled with life through art. 
It is in particular the idea of Grenzpunkte, together with Nietzsche's metaphor of 
Shipwreck, which shapes Jasper’s particular anthropological existentialism, in 
which all real philosophical questions originate in human Grenzerfahrungen.115 
Because we cannot conceptualize these experiences or explain them through 
reason, they can only be illuminated (erhellt) by philosophical reflection and, 
subsequently, be communicated and shared with others. The illumination of 
existence (Existenzerhellung) aims to reassure oneself (Selbstvergewisserung) 
and hopes for an existential "awakening" (wach werden). This process is the only 
remedy against the permanent threat of human failure (Scheitern) evoked by 
confrontation with death, suffering, guilt and our historicity.  
Although Jaspers’ existentialism is not solely based in negation (Sartre) or in 
a brokenness of the world (Marcel), he does consider the negative experiences of 
death, suffering and guilt as absolute.116 The negativity of these experiences can 
never be overcome.117 This is the reason that in daily life we obscure the 
unavoidability of our existential limits and the permanent unreliability of the 
being of the world (Unzuverlässigkeit allen Weltseins). Both experiences confront 
us with the finitude of reason’s explanatory force. This leads Jaspers to formulate 
                                               
114 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche Werke, Volume 3.1, ed. Giorgio Colli 
and Mazzino Montinari,  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1972), § 15, p. 97. 
115 Cf. Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Ed. Hahn, (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), p. 474. 
116 Cf. “ich muß sterben, ich muß leiden, ich muß kämpfen, ich bin dem Zufall unterworfen, ich 
verstricke mich unausweichlich in Schuld.” Karl Jaspers, Einführung in die Philosophie (München: 
Sammlung Piper, 1966), p. 20. 
117 Cf. These are Grenzsituationen “über die wir nicht hinaus können, die wir nicht ändern 
können”. Ibid., p. 22.  
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the goal of philosophy not as either a perfection of our reasoning or an extension 
of our epistemological knowledge but rather as a process of overcoming failure 
and a becoming of oneself in light of limit experiences.118 We respond to the 
"unreliability of the world" with a longing for credibility, trust and the supporting 
ground (tragende Grund) of the cradle, home, family, friends, traditions, 
language, belief, art and poetry.  
While limit experiences and, in particular, our failure to grasp and overcome 
these experiences determine our existential situatedness, the inner schism 
between subject and object turns all objects of consciousness into something 
that is in opposition to the object or to the subject. But besides the schism in the 
object/subject, a second split occurs: every object can only be thought of in 
contrast to what it is not. Being can only be thought of in relation to Non-Being 
or Nothingness. This double rupture – object/subject; object/non-object – 
conjures the question of what it is that holds – notwithstanding the fundamental 
rupture – everything together: what is the binding force of Being?119 Jaspers’ 
answer (often dismissed as mysticism) is that what “in dieser Spaltung zum 
Erscheinung kommt” points to the all-encompassing (das Umgreifende)120, which 
manifests itself in three different modes: “the total encompassing of the world, 
the encompassing that is the empirical world of ordinary and scientific 
experience, and the encompassing that is one’s own self”.121 For Jaspers, I and 
the world coincide in the encompassing because it is here that the rupture 
between object and subject disappears; the encompassing encompasses all being 
and all variations within this being. The encompassing presents itself through 
analogical predication or symbols, which Jaspers calls ciphers (Chiffren), a term 
that he borrows from Pascal and calls the "footsteps of God":122   
 
                                               
118 Ibid., p. 23. Our experiences of failure evoke the “Grundantrieb, im Scheitern den Weg zum 
Sein zu gewinnen. (…) Wie er sein Scheitern erfährt, das begründet, wozu der Mensch wird.” 
The drive towards a becoming (“wozu der Mensch wird”) points to the human wish for Erlösung 
(Salvation) of the unavoidable; this need for salvation is what motivates the work of 
Existenzerhellung. Every human must “find in one’s own origins, what Certainty, Being, 
Reliability can be to him” (aus eigenem Ursprung finden, was ihm Gewißheit, Sein, 
Verläßlichkeit ist). Ibid. 
119 Jaspers: “Was ist aber das eigentliche Sein, das heißt das Sein, das alles zusammenhält, allem 
zugrunde liegt, aus dem alles, was ist, hervorgeht?“, Ibid., p. 28. 
120 Ibid., p. 30. Jaspers defines this ‚Umgreifende’ as, “das, was sich im Gedachtsein immer nur 
ankündigt. Es ist das, was nicht selbst, sondern worin alles andere uns vorkommt” Ibid., p. 31. 
121 Ibid., p. 257.  
122 Ibid., p. 257. 
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The encompassing is like the horizon that is the perennial goal of the 
sailor: it always shows itself and yet is forever inaccessible. The major 
purpose of metaphysics is the disclosure of the ciphers that manifest 
encompassing, but in the end, metaphysical elucidation of the ciphers is 
a highly personal undertaking. Ciphers may appear [as] an overwhelming 
mountain. They may appear in art forms, in religious myths and dogma, 
and in theological disputations; they may become manifest in the 
symbolism of the history of philosophy and its metaphysical systems; 
and, finally, they may appear through reflection on the mystery of being, 
as well as on the death that awaits every man.123  
 
Through this ”Umgreifende”, our existence transcends (for Jaspers all 
transcending happens ultimately towards God), by means of which objects 
become Chiffren and symbols of this transcending.124 In a last step, this 
transcending enables philosophical self-clarity and freedom of thought. Here 
Jaspers’ existential anthropology becomes a transcendental, ultimately religious 
anthropology.  
Although Ricoeur wrote two books on Jaspers’ philosophy, Jasper’s 
influence disappears entirely from Ricoeur’s later writings. There are various 
explanations for this exclusion. After his work on Jaspers, Ricoeur discovered 
Heidegger’s existential philosophy and realized that this provided a much 
stronger break with classical metaphysics. David Pellauer concludes that, in 
Jaspers, even “freedom ends up as a cipher to be contemplated and so Ricoeur’s 
underlying concern for action and ethics is lost”.125 What Ricoeur does maintain 
from Jaspers is “the idea of Transcendence in the sense of the Other who breaks 
with self-sufficient existence”126. I agree with Kemps that in Ricoeur’s later work 
Jaspers idea of the "other as transcendence" is replaced with Levinas’ Other. This 
                                               
123 Ibid. 
124 Jaspers explains the relation between Got and existences as, “Als Existenz sind wir auf Gott – 
die Transzendenz – bezogen und dies durch sie Sprache der Dinge, die sie zu Chiffren oder 
Symbolen werden lässt. (…) Es muß genügen, zu sagen, dass das Umgreifende, gedacht als das 
Sein selbst, Transzendenz (Gott) und die Welt genannt wird, als das, was wir selber sind: Dasein, 
Bewusstsein überhaupt, geist und Existenz”., Ibid., 32ff. And further, “Der Sturz aus den 
Festigkeiten, die doch trügerisch waren, wird Schwebenkönnen, - was Abgrund schien, wird 
Raum der Freiheit, - das scheinbare Nichts verwandelt sich in das, woraus das eigentliche Sein 
zu uns spricht.” Ibid., p. 37. 
125 David Pellauer, The Symbol Gave Rise To Thought, in The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur, ed. E. L. 
Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), p. 117. 
126 Peter Kemps in his Ricoeur between Heidegger and Lévinas, in The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur, ed. E. L. Hahn  (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), p. 117.  
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marks a crucial shift. While in Jaspers the "Other as Transcendence" represents 
an interior process mediated through the revelation of symbolic figures 
(Chiffren), in Lévinas the notion of the Other “comes from the outside, without 
mediation, as a command inscribed in the epiphany, or the face of the other”.127 
Kemp suggests that Ricoeur’s particular dialectic between Lévinas and Heidegger, 
crucial for his ontology of testimony, must be understood in the context of his 
early working through of Jaspers’ notion of "human existence as living before 
transcendence".  
After this early work, Ricoeur only returns to Jaspers’ once, in The Relation 
of Jaspers’ work to Religion.128 Here, he criticizes how Jaspers replaces religious 
faith with philosophical faith and his conflation of finitude and guilt, and, in 
particular, Jaspers’ view of guilt as something that can never be overcome. This is 
unacceptable to Ricoeur: “one may ask whether Jaspers has not simply 
juxtaposed a philosophy of unreconciled tragedy and a lyric philosophy which 
tends toward a disquieting aestheticism”.129 I agree with Anderson’s assessment 
that for Ricoeur,  
 
transcendence is experienced as the possibility and hope of a 
restoration of life’s original innocence. In contrast, for Jaspers, 
transcendence is experienced as an obscure ground of the self, hidden in 
the depth of life’s failures. According to Jaspers’ account, human 
existence is, then, not structured by an original innocence but rather by 
a profound guilt. In apparent opposition to Jasper’s philosophical 
account of humankind’s fundamental condition, Ricoeur contends that 
goodness, innocence, and freedom must be seen as more original than 
evil, guilt, and unfreedom.130  
 
Although Ricoeur dismisses Jaspers’ transcendental notion of guilt as an all-
encompassing element of being, he does value and use Jaspers’ concrete political 
categories of guilt in the context of the German history of genocide.131 Other 
traces of Jaspers’ influence are his thoughts concerning the paradox of man (his 
                                               
127 Ibid., p. 42. 
128 The Relation of Jaspers work to Religion. The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers: A Critical Analysis 
and Evaluation. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1957), p. 611-42. 
129 Ibid., p. 638.  
130 Pamela Sue Anderson, Ricoeur and Kant. Philosophy of the Will (Atlante: Scholars Press, 
1993), p. 17-18. 
131  In his Epilogue on forgiveness in Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur restores “in its full 
conceptual scope” the four categories of guilt worked out in Die Schuldfrage (The Question of 
German Guilt) Cf. (M  470).  
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finiteness and infiniteness) which Ricoeur adapts in Freedom and Nature, while 
the notion of failure (together with Marcel’s fault) returns in the analysis of the 
subjects fallibility (in Fallible Man). Jaspers’ idea of Chiffre signifies both the 
paradox of immanence and transcendence, and the poetic Ur-sprung (innate 
leap) of all inspiration. 
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the symbols and myths of evil through an 
interpretation of the meaning of defilement, guilt and sin in the monotheistic 
religions clearly takes up Jaspers’ "disclosure of ciphers" as the main road to 
elucidate the mystery of being. Together with Cassirer’s notion of the symbolic 
form, Jaspers’ concept of ciphers is the point of departure for Ricoeur’s turn 
towards a hermeneutics of symbolic-mythical language. In The Symbolism of Evil 
Ricoeur connects this deciphering of the religious worldview with the "becoming 
oneself": “Cosmos and Psyche are the two poles of the same ‘expressivity’, I 
express myself in expressing the world; I explore my own sacrality in deciphering 
that of the world” (SE 13). If the world presents itself through symbolic and 
mythological ciphers, the reading of these ciphers opens up our understanding of 
this world and, thus, our self-understanding. And, finally, the importance of limit 
experiences that place us “in front of Transcendence”132 echoes through in 
Ricoeur’s translation of Husserl's idea that consciousness is always consciousness 
of something into the idea that consciousness is always a consciousness in front 
of the world. It is also further extended in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as the reader 
who is "in front of the text"; and in his concept of identity as the self who is 
always already "in front of the Other". This, our always already in front of and 
"within" Otherness, determines Ricoeur's final turn towards an anthropological 
ethics. 
 
Jean Nabert: Primary Affirmation   
While Kant defines reflection through the modes of epistemological justification, 
and Husserl through the pure structures of the phenomenological cogito, Jean 
Nabert found in reflection a primary affirmation or recovery of our desire-to-be 
and our effort-to-exist: in reflection, we create meaning, reach self-
understanding and enable “puissance de soi”.133 Nabert considers the Cartesian 
Cogito as a fundamental but empty concept, because the actuality of the Cogito 
can only be constituted as a thetic manifestation of reflexivity and act. This act 
                                               
132 Peter Kemp, Ricoeur between Heidegger and Levinas, in Paul Ricoeur The Hermeneutics of 
Action, ed. Richard Kearney (London: Sage, 1996), p. 43. 
133 Jean Nabert, Le Désir de Dieu (Paris: Aubier-Montagne , 1996), p. 32. 
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binds the abstract structures of reflexivity to the concrete manifestations of the 
"I". Ricoeur aptly summarizes the main problem Nabert examines as the difficulty 
of the relationships “between the act whereby consciousness posits and 
produces itself and the signs wherein consciousness represents to itself the 
meaning of its action”(CI 207). In short, the problem of the “objectivity of idea, 
representation, [and] understanding” is subordinate to the “founding act of 
consciousness, regardless of whether this act is called will, appetite, or action”. 
The subordination of representation under a founding act means that 
representation no longer holds a primary function: “Representation is no longer 
what brings about understanding but what must be understood”. Ricoeur takes 
from Nabert the idea that the act of reflection goes beyond the Kantian 
epistemological justification; reflection does not just signify a desire for 
knowledge but, far more profoundly, it marks an original affirmation of our 
desire to be, to exist; in reflection we “re-grasp” the unity of our being through 
understanding (signifying our feelings and experiences).134  
In his Eléments pour une Éthique, Nabert starts from a negative 
anthropological diagnosis portraying the human condition as suffering from a 
feeling of fault, failure and solitude.135 But in contrast to Marcel and Jaspers, 
these experiences do not lock the subject into a basic existential or 
phenomenological pre-condition of negativity. Although these emotions mark a 
“fundamental feeling” of the “inadequacy of ourselves to ourselves”, it is exactly 
this feeling of internal rupture that evokes a desire to grasp and reflect on this 
emotion. Thus, reflection departs not from reason but from emotions of fault 
and failure, which we experience as our inadequacy. In Nabert’s philosophy, this 
experience of human inadequacy is not the final point but initiates and enables 
the desire for reflective self-understanding. The realization of this desire in 
reflection is the act that reunifies our experiences of subject as subjected to 
emotions of internal rupture, and our grasping of selfhood.  
In Fallible Man Ricoeur translates Nabert’s idea of inadequacy into the 
central theme of his early anthropology, that is, that the human suffers from a 
                                               
134 In his last book, Course of Recognition, Ricoeur makes the idea of “grasping” the center of 
the first meaning of his triple explanation and analysis of the concept of “recognition”: to re-
cognize something signifies first our foremost ability to grasp something as something.    
135 The first part of Elements for an Ethics (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1963) called “The 
Givens of Reflection” examines the experience of fault, the meaning of failure and the 
deepening of solitude. In the second part “Primary Affirmation” Nabert’s concepts of pure 
consciousness and the promotion of values is explained. In the third section, “Existence,” the 
“works” of existence come to counter the problem of fault and failure through acts of 
liberation, for which the “veneration” for life, exemplified by acts of greatness, is the highest 
value. 
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“disproportion between subject and self”. This internal inadequacy or 
disproportion defines the subject as broken, wounded, fragile, fallible and 
vulnerable. For Nabert, it is through reflection that we “save ourselves”136; 
reflection is the “act by which consciousness takes possession of itself”. 
Reflection unifies the act of consciousness and the act of signifying; on the level 
of human existence reflection counters the feelings of human failure with the 
desire to live, enabling a deep veneration for life. Hence, in Nabert’s philosophy, 
our reflective potential points to a "primary affirmation" (affirmation originaire) 
– this, of course, recalls Spinoza’s conatus; primary affirmation through reflective 
unification synthesizes both the potential (as force) to exist and the potential (as 
capability) to reflect; through our capacity to reflect the self testifies to its desire 
to be and endure. This constitutive desire “makes existence, in immanence, open 
for Transcendence”.137  
Ricoeur only wrote two introductions to Nabert’s work and one short article 
on the notion of act and sign. However, even though Nabert appears less 
prominent in Ricoeur’s publications, especially compared to the prominence of 
Marcel and Jaspers, his influence on Ricoeur seems far more profound.138 Ricoeur 
not only connects phenomenology and hermeneutics to Nabert’s Spinozian and 
Fichtian reformulation of the reflective tradition, but also uses the notion of 
primary affirmation to counter the negative anthropological diagnosis described 
earlier. Nabert offers Ricoeur a way out of negative existentialism. This sets him 
on the path, after his hermeneutic work on symbol, text, metaphor and 
narrative, towards his late anthropology on the relation between action, ethics, 
and self-reflexivity. The ethically informed concept of attestation and testimony, 
which forms the core of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, recalls Nabert’s 
conceptualization of the relation between reflexive affirmation and ethics.139 For 
                                               
136 Jean Nabert, Eléments pour une Éthique (Paris: Presse Universitaires de France, 1943), p. 10. 
137 Peter Kemp, Ricoeur between Heidegger and Levinas, in Paul Ricoeur, The Hermeneutics of 
Action, ed. Richard Kearney, (London: Sage, 1996), p. 44. 
138 Ricoeur wrote substantive introductions both to Nabert’s most important work,  Eléments 
pour une éthique (1943) as well as to his Essai sur le Mal (1955). He commented further on 
Nabert’s theory of signs in the article Nabert on Act and Sign (CI, 207-219). While Ricoeur 
dedicates Freedom and Nature to Gabriel Marcel, the second volume, Fallible Man, in which 
Ricoeur borrows Nabert’s concept of the fault, is dedicated to Jean Nabert. In History and Truth, 
Ricoeur argues against Sartrean and Hegelian negativity with the concept of primary/originary 
affirmation taken from Nabert’s work.  In the introduction to his Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, Ricoeur states that his early work connects to the reflective tradition through the 
work of Kant, Husserl, and Nabert. Ibid., p. 34. 
139 Dieter Teichert shows very convincingly the many traces of Nabert’s work in Ricoeur’s ethics. 
Fallible Man and Oneself as Another, in particular, show a strong, although only implicit echo of 
some core concepts of Nabert’s work. Spuren des Denkens von Jean Nabert in Paul Ricoeur’s 
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Ricoeur, following Nabert, ethics is not a normative or imperative rule, set apart 
from our existential self-understanding, but an inherent part of “our effort to 
exist”.140 Both Nabert’s primary affirmation and Ricoeur’s attestation revitalize 
Spinoza’s conatus as the actual potential and force to act, attest, exist and affirm 
our self and the values and virtues that define our existence.141 In Ricoeur, this 
primary self-affirmation refers to a moral selfhood that testifies to an existence 
desiring to be "with oneself and others in just institutions".    
 
Conclusion  
Although surely not intended, the renewal of Philosophical Anthropology by 
Gehlen and Scheler (and to a lesser extend Plessner) also spurred its crisis. The 
human appeared as strongly determined by a “natural” defect or lack which it 
sought to find compensation for. Gehlen’s anthropology aimed to resolve the 
perceptive Reizüberfluting of the human Mängelwesen with a regime of self-
control as cultivation; Scheler dissolved the neediness of the human as "das 
kranke Tier" (the sick animal) with an affective intentionality that enables a 
transcendence towards Others, the community and, finally, God. Cassirer’s 
theory of symbolic function is the programmatic predecessor of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of mediation. The symbol opens the realm of representation, 
signification and meaning-making processes while simultaneously showing the 
constitutive potentiality of the poetic will.  
Ricoeur’s early anthropology reacts to Husserl’s idealism by returning to the 
importance of our experiences of historicity, embodiment, and ontology. It is 
here that the influences of Gabriel Marcel’s idea of an incarnate ontology, Karl 
Jaspers existential Grenze, Heidegger’s notion of Geworfenheit and Dasein, and 
Jean Nabert’s notion of la faute enter Ricoeur’s work. These notions shape the 
diagnosis upon which Ricoeur, in Freedom and Nature, sets out to reveal the 
                                               
 
“kleiner Ethik”, in Das Herausgeforderte Selbst. Perspektiven auf Paul Ricoeurs Ethik, (ed.) 
Andris Breitling, Stefan Orth, Birgit Schaaf (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1999), p. 
59.   
140 Paul Ricoeur, Preface, Elements for an Ethic, p. xxi 
141 In Emmanuel Lévinas: Thinker of Testimony Ricoeur places Nabert’s ethical thought between 
Heidegger and Levinas. Here Ricoeur refers to what he considers Nabert’s “philosophy of 
testimony” as worked out in Le Desire de Dieu, where the question of evil as the unjustifiable is 
central. This means that the link between Levinas and Nabert takes place in the conjunction of 
the ethics and hermeneutics of testimony: “The self’s negation of others is itself negated by the 
original affirmation of the desire to exist with the other and the experience of a present 
community” (FS 118).  
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“fundamental possibilities” of “human willing” (FN 3). In particular, the notion of 
the fault pointing  to “the pathological distortion of existence” (FN xvii) and the 
“disproportion between subject and self” define Ricoeur’s idea of the cogito brisé 
(wounded cogito). This wounded-ness refers to what the nature/culture split 
means for the internal or immanent experience of freedom. In short, for Ricoeur, 
the nature/human or nature/culture divide appears in particular as a division 
between nature and freedom: while nature binds us to the involuntary and finite 
aspects of the human condition (like death, the body, character, suffering), the 
voluntary or infinite aspects of this condition open up a potential for experiences 
of freedom (through the enactment of our imagination and capability to act). 
Like Sartre, Ricoeur develops his notion of freedom in reaction to Husserl, 
but replaces the focus on nothingness with the affirmative force of reflection, 
action and the imagination enabling us to transcend the experiences of the 
broken world and the wounded cogito. As such, Ricoeur’s early anthropology 
offers a fundamental reaction to Husserl, a systematization of Marcel’s work and 
an extension of Nabert’s reflective and ethical restoration of Spinoza’s idea of 
conatus. The ideas on the incarnate body, concrete existence and primary 
affirmation are synthesized in the renewal of the anthropological viewpoint 
which counters the negative anthropological diagnosis of the condition of lack, 
defect and finiteness with a more fundamental belief in a potential and capability 
for self-affirmation and creative revitalization. Philosophical Anthropology went 
from a theological cosmology to a pragmatic anthropology and to an ontological 
existentialism: from the human as part of a religious order to an onto-teleological 
striving to realize one’s own humanity. Underlying the anthropological project is 
a humanistic project in which human self-understanding and an ethical striving 
for self-determination, freedom, equality, and justice coincide. For Ricoeur, the 
"good life" as the project of a philosophical anthropology can only be realized if it 
defines itself as a project of human dignity. Since dignity and respect are inter-
subjective concepts, they ground Ricoeur’s anthropological project in one’s 
confrontation with the Other as the original constitutive moment of self-
recognition. Ricoeur’s most basic intention is to save the anthropological and 
humanistic project and re-affirm the subject as a capable and moral self “with 
Others in just institutions”. The human is an animal that can speak, narrate, 
respond, act, promise, remember, commemorate, judge, in short, attest to being 
a subject that is able to say: me, voici.  
For Ricoeur "capability" is "the basic concept of philosophical anthropology", 
and this is why he took the "risk of putting [his] hermeneutical phenomenology 
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under the heading of a philosophical anthropology governed by the concept of 
capability, and this, in turn, under the aegis of an ontology of actuality and 
potentiality".142 After this historical contextualization of the often forgotten 
anthropological tradition from which Ricoeur's hermeneutic-phenomenology 
originates, I leap-frog to the later part of his philosophy in which the question of 
time, identity, memory and ethics culminate in a renewal of philosophical 
anthropology. This renewal aims to prove that the question "who is the human?" 
is more fundamental than the classical Kantian question "what is the human?". In 
the end, our attestation to what we "stand for" leads Ricoeur to an original and 
highly complex reconceptualization of the capable moral self 
.
                                               
142 Paul Ricoeur, Ethics and Human Capability, in Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral 
Thought, ed. John Wall, William Schweiker and W. David Hall (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 
282. 
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POETICS 
 
Ricoeur’s search for a Hermeneutics of Human Self-Understanding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
. NARRATIVE TIME 
 
 
 
Es gilt zu zeigen, wie das Dasein als Zeitlichkeit ein Verhalten zeitigt, das 
sich in der Weise zur Zeit verhält, daß es ihr Rechnung trägt. 
 
Heidegger (1977: 405) 
 
Two questions frame this section: What does it mean to say that narratives 
articulate the human experience of time? And what is the role of the poetic will 
in our economy of being?  
 
In the last decades of the 20th century, a remarkable “narrative turn” occurs in 
various corners of the philosophical landscape.143 This turn does not only clarify 
the underlying narrative aspects of philosophy and science,144 but also makes it 
its goal to show that narrative forms and structures have an ontological effect, 
which shapes our knowledge and identity. In other words, the being we are is 
told in narratives. Hence, after the linguistic, interpretative and performative 
turns, Ricoeur’s three-volume Time and Narrative ignites a philosophy of 
                                               
143 Pol Vandervelde summarizes Ricoeur's “turn” to narrative as follows;  “The configuring task 
of the narrative, discourse, or language, that Ricoeur has forcefully manifested, seems to 
represent one of those rare points of encounter between different ‘trends of thought’ of our 
finishing century: Heidegger, Gadamer, deconstructionism, postmodernism, French and 
American literary criticism, and a brand of analytical philosophy (Searle, MacIntyre) came to 
grant narratives an ontological impact.” Vandervelde, Pol., Introduction, in Paul Ricoeur: A Key 
to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996), p. 21. 
144 Ricoeur's examination of metaphor and symbols can easily be placed within the fields of the 
philosophy of language, or semiotics, structuralist and anthropological interest in myths and 
“origins” as well as within theories of speech and writing. In contrast, narrative theories are 
usually examined within literary theory, and are sometimes relevant in particular areas of 
psychology (life-stories) or historiography (oral history). The postmodern dismantling of “grand 
narratives” (in its metaphysical aspects) seems to devalue the general human need for 
narratives as actually signifying a false desire for coherence and consistency. Early 20th century 
novels, from James Joyce to Andre Breton, Marcel Proust to Virginia Woolf and in particular, 
Robert Musil’s Mann ohne Eigenschaften, already deconstructed the classical structure of 
beginning, middle and end. Discontinuity and fragmentation became literary instruments long 
before the postmodern end-of-narrative-narrative was declared (the classical example here is 
Laurence Sterne’s magnificent novel Tristram Shandy, first published in 1759). 
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narrative (which, in a less sophisticated manner, began with MacIntyre’s After 
Virtue).145 
Ricoeur’s examination of narrative serves two main purposes. First, it 
extends his research into the poetic will, or into the relation between semantic 
innovations, human action and the Kantian transcendental imagination. The 
examination of narrative thus forms a logical sequel to his earlier work on symbol 
and metaphor. Although metaphor belongs to the theory of tropes, and narrative 
to the literary theory of genre, both theories “belong to the same basic 
phenomenon of semantic innovation” (TN 1: ix). In metaphors, this innovation 
refers to their “semantic pertinence”, produced by an “impertinent attribution”, 
which survives the “literal incongruity of the attribution” in ordinary language. In 
contrast, the semantic innovation of narratives refers to the invention of a 
different form of synthesis: the plot. Second, Ricoeur's narrative project is a 
response (not a solution!) to the aporetic character and speculative nature of the 
notions of time in the work of Augustine, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. While for 
Kant time (together with space) is an a priori intuition, something that we know 
but that is unknowable in itself and which unifies a manifold under a single 
concept (time), for Augustine, Husserl and Heidegger, time—although equally 
unknown as such—exists as a phenomenological perception and experience, 
which can be described as a structure of memory, consciousness or Being (for 
example as an experience of dispersion, duration or anxiety).  Our references to 
time suggest its absence or presence, which we hope to grasp in descriptions 
such as the present, the past and the future; we use narrower expressions, such 
as today, yesterday and tomorrow, the not yet and the no longer. We speak of 
"having no time" or "times past" or "times to come", even of "time-
management" and so on (Cf. TN 1:7). Time is an experience that always seems to 
slip away, because “the future does not exist, because it has not happened yet; 
the past does not exist, because it is not happening now; and now does not exist, 
because it is never now.”146 Language translates, transfigures and fixates these 
vague depictions within representative metaphors and narrative structures 
                                               
145 The courageous act of developing a philosophical theory of narrative as a poetic of the 
human experience of time (replacing Heidegger’s “Being” for “Narrative”) is, almost 30 years 
after its first volume was published, perhaps less tangible. In the meantime, Ricoeur’s work on 
narrative has become enormously influential. In particular, its extension of narrative theory 
onto “narrative identity” and “narrative ethics” has gained great importance in psychological, 
philosophical, medical or sociological research concerned with questions of identity, agency, 
race, ethics, professional practices, existential coherence and decision making. Cf. Practical 
Identity and Narrative Agency, Ed. MacKenzie, C., Atkins, K., (Routledge: New York & London, 
2008). 
146 Karl Simms, Paul Ricoeur (Routledge: New York & London, 2003), p. 82. 
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(calendar, dates, centuries). This aims to capture and mirror our sense of 
temporality.  
Any objective knowledge about what time “is” lies beyond our reach. 
Ricoeur acknowledges this in a preamble, 
 
A constant thesis of this book will be that speculation on time is an 
inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity can only respond. 
Not that this activity solves the aporias through substitution. If it does 
resolve them, it is in a poetical and not a theoretical sense of the word. 
Emplotment ... replies to the speculative aporia with a poetic making of 
something capable, certainly, of clarifying the aporia ... but not of 
resolving it theoretically (TN 1:6). 
 
Thus, while narrative structures and their meaning-making function can be 
concretely described and analyzed, the actual aporia of time cannot be resolved. 
That aside, the “poetic making of something” may help us in “clarifying the 
aporia”. For Ricoeur, poetic clarification serves as an alternative for a belief in 
epistemological truth; when the essence of things cannot be known, the question 
of meaning becomes the only actual question answerable.  
On a methodological level, Ricoeur’s project interlocks three different 
perspectives: a phenomenological description of our experience of within-time-
ness, the synthesizing power of narrative emplotment, and a hermeneutics of 
reading. Together, these perspectives show how our experience of time has a 
reverse correlation with the meaning of narrative in mythic, historical and 
fictional stories. It is a reverse correlation, because time unfolds in the 
discordance of past, present and future while narratives aim to synthesize 
heterogeneous events in a concordant plot. In other words, while time disperses 
through the Now in an infinite past and future, narrative binds all scattered 
events together in a meaningful unity. This leads to the main insight that carries 
the entire theory of Time and Narrative:  
 
time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a 
condition of temporal existence (TN 1:52, Italics in original).  
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Ricoeur declares that his thesis — although “undeniably circular“ (TN 1:3)147 — 
reveals a “transcultural form of necessity” (TN 1:52).148 In order to examine the 
inner structure of this necessity, Ricoeur chooses two reciprocal “points of 
access”: the concept of distentio animi, taken from Augustin’s Confessions; and 
the notion of emplotment or mythos, developed in Aristotle’s Poetica. Despite 
the fact that Augustine’s theory of time excludes the notion of narrative and 
Aristotle’s theory of plot overlooks the notion of  time (which is treated in his 
Physics), Ricoeur’s entire aim is to show how, through hermeneutic 
interpretation, the experience of the dispersion of time is transformed into a 
poetic unity that binds narrative mimēsis with a meaning-making structure (the 
plot). A prime presupposition of this transformation is that both the unifying 
force of the narrative plot and the extensiveness of time pose an “inverse 
relationship” (TN 1:4). While narratives unify our experiences, time disperses 
them. If we follow Ricoeur’s line of thought, we can only understand both 
structures in their actual complementariness; narratives are not just literary or 
historical forms, they reflect an existential temporal structure. Time cannot be 
grasped in itself, but only through our experience and subjective articulation of it. 
The anthropological aspect of time (which asks what the human experience of 
time is, what time means to us and how we express this experience) shows that 
there is a fundamental correlation between how we “narrate” the events and 
actions of our lives and how we experience and interpret time. Accordingly, 
Ricoeur argues that “narrated time” equals “human time”.149  
Ricoeur’s main argument, therefore, is that time is objectively unknowable 
while subjectively experienced as a diffusion in past, present, and future (through 
                                               
147 cf. “The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. (...) time 
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; 
narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
existence” (TN 1:3). Ricoeur hopes to demonstrate that “the circle of narrativity and 
temporality is not a vicious but a healthy circle” (ibid.).    
148 Here “necessity” of course refers to the Kantian universal as a shared human cognitive 
precondition foregoing all judgments.  
149 Ricoeur develops his narrative theory in three volumes. In the first volume, the problem of 
the aporia of time is exemplified through a description of the famous  11th book  (on memory) 
of Augustine’s Confessions. This is followed by the emplotment theory of Aristotle in the 
poetics. In order to show the interrelation between time and action, Ricoeur proposes a three-
fold mimetic theory (mimēsis1-3) which extends his hermeneutic model; this is connected with 
an examination of the relations between history and narrative and, in volume two, between 
time and fiction. Volume three returns to the question of the aporetics of time (Augustine, 
Husserl, Kant, Heidegger) and concludes, in a long final chapter, to the “Poetics of Narrative”. In 
a final reflection  Ricoeur states that the relation between time and narrative actually depends 
on answering the question “who narrates?,” thus, on a “narrative identity”. This last issue, this 
“remainder” sets the task for the research on identity and self in Oneself as Another.  
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the intentionality of memory, attention, and expectation); narratives unify 
human action and heterogeneous events in meaningful plots. Philosophical 
definitions of time diverge into two main perspectives: a cosmological (objective) 
perspective, on the one hand, and a phenomenological (subjective) occurrence, 
on the other. Narratives also present themselves in two main categories: in a 
historical (objective) category and in a fictional (subjective) one. The objective-
subjective dialectic of time and narrative determines how humans express their 
temporal experience through narratives (which form a mixture of “historic 
fiction” or “fictive histories”). The transformation of time in narrative follows an 
interpretative passage (the hermeneutic “operation”) through a threefold 
mimetic trajectory (mimēsis1-3) exemplifying the three explanatory phases of 
prefiguration, configuration and refiguration. In Ricoeur's words, “We are 
following therefore the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured 
time through the mediation of a configured time” (TN 1:54).150 Although these 
three phases of a temporal passage produce a retrospective narrative unity, this 
unity keeps being haunted by an “unstable mixture” since the “elusive character 
of real life” can only be “em-ploted” in a fictional or historical narrative 
provisionally.151 The existential-anthropological background of this hermeneutic 
operation is aptly summarized by Karl Simms:  
 
we understand our own lives—our own selves and our own places in the 
world—by interpreting our lives as if they were narratives, or, more 
precisely, through the work of interpreting our lives we turn them into 
narratives, and life understood as narrative constitutes self-
understanding.152  
 
Thus, our poetic response to time, besides offering a meaningful unity that 
orders the dispersion of time and the heterogeneity of events and human 
actions, also reflects the affirmative potential and reflexivity through which 
human self-understanding counters the anxiety caused by our fragility and 
finitude. The poetic will is, thus, the prime source for self-realization. 
                                               
150 To these circular statements Ricoeur adds the hope that, in the end, they will not just appear 
to be a “dead tautology” or “a vicious circle that haunts my whole analysis” (TN I: 60). 
151 Ricoeur clarifies further: “As for the notion of the narrative unity of a life, it must be seen as 
an unstable mixture of fabulation and actual experience. It is precisely because of the elusive 
character of real life that we need the help of fiction to organize life retrospectively, after the 
fact, prepared to take as provisional and open to revision any figure of emplotment borrowed 
from fiction or from history” (OA 162). 
152 Ibid., Simms, Paul Ricoeur, p. 80. 
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Simultaneously, the hermeneutic examination of time and narrative also points 
back, as always in Ricoeur’s work, to an actual affirmative desire underlying all 
acts of human self-understanding. The human capability for poetic creation and 
innovation not only allows us to articulate, express and interpret our experience 
of time but also turns our reflexivity into a narrative mode of coherent self-
understanding. This conceptualization of time also echoes and expands Dilthey’s 
concept of Lebenszusammenhang (primordial life-nexus).   
  
The Mimētic Structure of Narrative Time  
In his attempt to establish the correlation between the “activity of narrating a 
story” and the “temporal character of human experience” (TN 1:52), Ricoeur 
turns to a hermeneutic “operation”, 
 
It is the task of hermeneutics … to reconstruct the set of operations by 
which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and 
suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby 
change their acting. … Hermeneutics … is concerned with reconstructing 
the entire arc of operations by which practical experience provides itself 
with works, authors and readers. ... What is at stake, therefore, is the 
concrete process by which the textual configuration mediates between 
the prefiguration of the practical field and its refiguration through the 
reception of the work (TN 1:53).  
 
Instead of the “set of operations” that reveal the meaning of the text, Ricoeur 
now sets out to reveal the relation between time and narrative. The question, 
thus, is not how to reconstruct the text, but rather how our experience of “time” 
(or, rather, the aporia of time) can be reconstructed as a practical experience 
and, subsequently, hermeneutically understood. One could say that we read 
“time” similar to how we read texts. Time as text is read, interpreted, reflected 
upon and – in the process – turns into a truthful articulation, a poetic expression, 
of our human experience of time. In his threefold conceptualization of mimēsis, 
Ricoeur distinguishes between the “prefiguration of the practical field” 
(mimēsis1), the “reception of the work” described as re-figuration (mimēsis3) 
and the “faculty of mediation” (mimēsis2), which refers to the act of emplotment 
(TN 1:53).  
Although Time and Narrative is clearly an anthropological examination of 
our experience of temporality, Ricoeur presents the basic structure of his 
narrative theory as an extension of his “hermeneutics of praxis” (following the 
“text as action” model). While the text is taken as the sedimentation of practical 
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experiences of the author in the world, it can, in reverse, also evoke new actions 
by the reader in the world. This particular hermeneutical mediation between text 
and praxis (praxis as text/text as praxis) is now applied to the “text” of the 
“temporal character of human experience”, in which “action is that aspect of 
human doing that calls for narration” (OA 58).  
 
Mimēsis1  
The human capability to compose a (narrative) plot is anchored in a “preliminary 
competence” to understand the structural, symbolic and temporal aspects of the 
world in which we live.  We are able to react and situate ourselves in the events 
of the surrounding world before we have made a conscious reflection upon it, 
and thus we do have a pre-understanding of “the world of action, its meaningful 
structures, its symbolic resources and its temporal character” (TN 1:54). The 
structural, symbolic and temporal semantics of this pre-understanding makes up 
what Ricoeur calls mimēsis1.  
The structural competence starts with our cognitive ability to distinguish 
“the domain of action from that of physical movement” (TN 1:55). Action, 
understood as “what someone does”, is part of a network of goals and motives; 
actions are undertaken by agents “who do and can do things which are taken as 
their work, or their deed” (TN 1:55). Agents are connected to the consequences 
of their actions, to a responsibility. In our daily lives we further distinguish pure 
physical events from the movements of something: in actions undertaken by 
agents the questions “why?” (why does X happen?) and “who?” (who did/caused 
it?) merge. While physical events seem to just occur (unless you believe in the all-
controlling power of a Divinity), human action understands itself as an 
intervention, albeit a situated intervention, because “agents act and suffer in 
circumstances they did not make that nevertheless do belong to the practical 
field” (TN 1:55). Our situatedness implies that we always act “with” others, this 
can be in forms of cooperation, competition or struggle. This pre-understanding 
of human actions, as interventions undertaken by accountable agents, shows 
that we have a practical understanding of the conceptual network through the 
capability of identification: we know “who” an agent is and “why” the 
intervention takes place.  
The transformation of our practical understanding into a narrative 
understanding evolves through the reordering of presuppositions: this reordering 
can be minimal, as in the action-sentence “X did A to B because of Z”, or 
complex, as in Aristotle’s notion of tragedy, where the plot aims to reveal the 
depth of human suffering and to evoke pity, through which it hopes to trigger a 
moral effect in its audience and in the polis at large. Besides the practical 
70  |   Chapter Three 
 
understanding of the conceptual network, there are discursive features, which 
are exemplified by the paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects of action and 
narrative. Ricoeur explains that:  
 
In passing from the paradigmatic order of action to the syntagmatic 
order of narrative, the terms of the semantics of action acquire 
integration and actuality. Actuality, because the terms, which had only a 
virtual signification in the paradigmatic order, that is, a pure capacity to 
be used, receive an actual [effective] signification thanks to the 
sequential interconnections the plot confers on the agents, their deeds, 
and their sufferings. Integration, because terms as heterogeneous as 
agents, motives, and circumstances are rendered compatible and work 
together in actual temporal wholes. It is in this sense that the twofold 
relation between rules of emplotment and action-terms constitutes 
both a relation of presupposition and one of transformation. To 
understand a story is to understand both the language of ‘doing 
something’ and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology 
of plots (TN 1:56-7).  
 
After the meaningful structures of action, agents and the paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic features, which are present in our pre-understanding, Ricoeur turns 
to the signs, rules and norms that form the symbolic resources of the practical 
field. Every form of human action is “always already symbolically mediated” (TN 
1:57), since symbolic forms, following Cassirer, “are cultural processes that 
articulate experience” (TN 1:57). Ricoeur redefines Cassirer’s “symbolic form” as 
“symbolic mediation” to distinguish from “among symbols of a cultural nature, 
the ones that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, before 
autonomous symbolic wholes dependent upon speaking or writing become 
detached from the practical level. In this sense we might speak of an implicit or 
immanent symbolism, in opposition to an explicit or autonomous one”. (TN 1:57) 
Similarly to Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Culture, Ricoeur asserts that 
“culture is public because meaning is” (1:57). Symbolism does not just take place 
in the mind (Husserl) or functions as a guide for psychological operations (Freud), 
but is “a meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other 
actors in the social interplay” (TN 1:57). Symbolic mediation also signals the 
importance of symbolic systems as “systems of interacting symbols” or “patterns 
of interworking meanings”. Hence,  
 
[b]efore being a text, symbolic mediation has a texture. To understand a 
ritual act is to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by 
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degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions 
that make up the symbolic framework of a culture. A symbolic system 
thus furnishes a descriptive context for particular actions. In other 
words, it is “as a function of” such a symbolic convention that we can 
interpret this gesture as meaning this or that (TN 1:58). 
 
If we raise an arm, this may signify the wish to greet someone, to hail a taxi or to 
vote. Before we interpret the ”sign” as such or such, the symbol is already part of 
some action. This means that “symbolism confers an initial readability on action” 
(TN 1:58). Action can be read as a quasi-text “insofar as the symbols, understood 
as interpretants, provide the rules of meaning as a function of which this or that 
behaviour can be interpreted”. In short, as cultural codes, symbols operate as 
"‘programs’ for behaviour” evoking norms, rules and social regulations. For an 
example we only need to look at the “symbol” called “Holocaust”, which, by 
reminding us of human evil, simultaneously evokes such a strong moral 
framework that we hope the repetition of the symbol through time will prevent 
the “action” it symbolizes from ever happening again (more precisely: it is the 
“word” Holocaust that “stands-for” a range of acts and practices and 
consequently symbolizes a historic and moral “text”). Symbolic content of 
cultural codes is never impartial. Cultural codes steer behaviour, and behaviour is 
valued on scales of worth (between the poles of good or bad). A symbol, as 
carrier of the cultural code, includes an “ethical substance”, able to set the norms 
of our manners and customs. This recalls Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit which, as 
Ricoeur argues, is “prior to any Moralität of a reflective order” (TN 1: 58). In 
short, each culture has immanent norms, both actions and agents are evaluated 
according to these norms and judged as good or bad on “a scale of moral 
preferences”. The first mimetic phase, mimēsis1, consists not only of pre-figured 
linguistic (symbols, metaphors, narratives), social and historical structures but 
also of a vast set of “ethical presuppositions”, which authors share with their 
audiences.153 Mediation of human action through symbols and narratives can 
never be “ethically neutral” (TN 1:59), because:  
 
The very project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical 
quality of action on the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself 
                                               
153 Although traditional art is considered free from morality because its main aim is to fulfil a 
pure aesthetic striving for beauty, it has also been classical art’s function – as Greek tragedies 
and theatre in general exemplify – to be an “ethical laboratory” working through (in “as if” 
situations) a “hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles” (TN 1: 59).  
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only a corollary of the major characteristic of action, that it is always 
symbolically mediated (TN 1:59).  
 
After examining the structural and symbolic aspects of our pre-understanding, 
Ricoeur turns to the third, temporal, aspect, which is closely related to 
Heidegger’s notion of care (Sorge), as developed in Being and Time. Ricoeur 
argues that Heidegger’s “ontological breakthrough” (TN 1:61) depends on the 
“thematic concept” of care, which reveals a “structure of being-in-the-world … 
more fundamental than any relation of a subject to an object”. While Heidegger 
avoids any description of actual practices of care, these are central to Ricoeur. 
The description of the pivotal role of care for our existential self-awareness 
occurs only in the very last chapter of Being and Time because, as Ricoeur argues, 
Heidegger struggles with answering  the question “What makes Dasein a unity?” 
– a question that needs to be answered before any description of our “care” for 
the finiteness of this unity makes any sense. Our care for the possible unity and 
coherence of our lives is what motivates Ricoeur to extend his narrative theory 
towards a theory of “narrative identity” as worked out in Oneself as Another. 
Hence, Heidegger’s notion of care, just like Ricoeur’s notion of narrative, mimics 
our existential, ontological pre-understanding of temporality as an experience in 
which we care, worry, about what comes, was and is. Together, this threefold 
temporality constitutes our experience of being-in-time, of a “within-time-ness”. 
To translate this experience into a reflexive ”as if” is the function of narrative.154 
In a severely reductive manner I conclude that Ricoeur reformulates the 
relation of “Being and Time” as “Narrated Time”. Thus, “care” is what connects 
Heidegger’s ontology with Ricoeur’s figuration of narrative self-understanding. 
Because we care about our existence, we narrate our life as a story and we even 
begin to live the stories of “who (we think) we are”, narrative’s internal structure 
                                               
154 Whereas Heidegger develops his answer from the deep ontological structures of Being, 
Ricoeur responds to this question (“what makes Being a unity?”) by examining the relation 
between particular practices, experiences of time and a particular poetic articulation, namely, 
fictional and historical narratives. As is well known, for Heidegger “Dasein is the ‘place’ where 
the being that we are is constituted through its capacity of posing the question of Being or the 
meaning of Being” (TN 1:61). The question of being is a question situated in time, because “to 
be” refers to the temporal condition of existence. Thus, our sense of being depends on a sense 
of temporality. We do reckon with time before we measure it; the subjective sense dominates 
the objectification of time (in categories such as seconds, minutes, hours, days, years and so 
on). Even if we live according to the objectification of time (pull out your diary!) the 
fundamental subjective feature of our within-time-ness (finitude, anxiety, care) represents a 
crucial break with the linearity of time as a “simple succession of nows”. (1:63) This opens up a 
bridge to the narrative order of time because narrative “configurations and …temporality 
….share the same foundation of within-time-ness” (TN 1:64). 
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(beginning, middle, end) already indicates to us a “sense of an ending” which 
desires fulfilment (don’t we all need goals in life?). Ontology and poetics share a 
teleology of care; the process of narrative figuration evokes the question “who 
narrates?” and, in the final study of Oneself as Another, culminates in an 
ontology of “narrative attestation”155, marking the ethical endurance and 
stability of the self (this can easily be recoginized as Ricoeur's version of the 
“unity of Dasein”). 
 In sum, while for Heidegger the unity of Dasein is closely related to our Care 
(Sorge) for Being, Ricoeur describes how this Care is poetically translated in 
narratives, which, mediated by a threefold figurative act of hermeneutic 
interpretation, evoke a narrative unity of life. Because we care for our being we 
are in need of telling and narrating our lives. Thus, in narratives we tell ourselves 
and others “who” we are.  
 
Mimēsis2 
After the first phase, in which pre-narrative temporal, symbolic and structural 
features presuppose a basic understanding of the practices of daily life, the 
second phase of mimetic understanding explains how our not-yet narrative pre-
understanding develops into a narrative understanding. This transformative 
operation, from mimēsis1 to mimēsis2, is the configurative act which signifies the 
“grasping together” of a “manifold of events [into] the unity of one temporal 
whole” (TN 1:66). The source of our ability to ”grasp together” recalls two key 
concepts of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: first, the “operation of judging” which 
places an “intuitive manifold under the concept of a rule”, and, secondly, the 
synthetic power of the productive transcendental imagination (worked out in the 
famous Schema-chapter on the categories) (TN 1:66). Ricoeur states that he 
cannot “overemphasize the kinship” between the Kantian concepts and the 
narrative structure: 
 
Emplotment, too engenders a mixed intelligibility between what has 
been called the point, theme, or thought of a story, and the intuitive 
presentation of circumstances, characters, episodes, and changes of 
fortune that make up the denouement. In this way, we may speak of a 
schematism of the narrative function (TN 1:68).  
 
                                               
155 Jean Greisch, Testimony and Attestation, in Paul Ricoeur. The Hermeneutics of Action. Ed. 
Richard Kearney (London: Sage, 1996), p. 90. 
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The “schematism of the narrative function” adds another layer to Ricoeur's 
examination of the poetic will. Similarly to the symbol and metaphor in his 
previous work, the narrative function is an imaginative re-description, creating a 
new structure of meaning. Again, Ricoeur emphasizes human self-affirmation 
through the capability to create and innovate: we are not just “entangled” in 
stories (Wilhelm Schnapp) or imprisoned in hegemonic discourses, but are also 
able in addition, to act and produce new forms of articulation, meaning and self-
understanding.156 In mediating between event and story, the act of emplotment 
“extracts a configuration from a succession”, and on the temporal level “reveals 
itself to the listener or the reader in the story’s capacity to be followed” (TN 
1:66). Besides the “synthesis of the manifold” this “followability” is crucial for the 
successful configuration of our narrative self-understanding,   
 
To understand the story is to understand how and why the successive 
episodes led to this conclusion, which, far from being foreseeable, must 
finally be acceptable, as congruent with the episodes brought together 
by the story. It is this “followability” of a story that constitutes the 
poetic solution to the paradox of distention and intention. The fact that 
the story can be followed converts the paradox in a living dialectic (TN 
1:67). 
 
Followability combines the notion of “expectation” with that of a “conclusion”, 
which gives the story an “endpoint” (in Frank Kermode’s words: a “sense of an 
ending”). In narrative, this endpoint produces a “whole” retrospectively (as the 
tragic plot does via the sudden reversal or peripeteia). Besides this 
expectation/conclusion, the episodic dimension reflects the linear line, the 
“then…and then” of a story (its function is to answer the question “and then 
what?”). This episodic character mirrors the “irreversible order of time common 
to physical and human events” (TN 1:67). While the linear dimension is episodic, 
the configurational dimension reassembles the various episodes into “one 
meaningful whole” (TN 1:67). This whole provides the narrative with a “thought,” 
“point” or “theme” (like: “A woman in trouble” or “The good guys catch the bad 
guys”) and constitutes the “followability” of narratives. If there is a dead body at 
the beginning of the movie, we immediately assume that it would be followed by 
a search for the person “who did it” (particular signs – which we “read” - create 
                                               
156 As such, Ricoeur's “narrative turn” stands in clear opposition to the structuralist and post-
structuralist passive decentring and subjection of the self. Cf. Kim Atkins, Narrative Identity: 
Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity, Continental Philosophy Review, (2004), 37, 343.  
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narrative expectations, which we follow till they are fulfilled). If the outcome of a 
story is already well known – as in folktales, recurrent personal or collective 
narratives and national myths – it is not the telling but the re-telling that 
apprehends the coming closure in each episode. If we repeat a story, the end is 
known in advance and, thus, we are “reading the ending in the beginning and the 
beginning in the end” (TN 1:67). This also reverses the temporal character, 
because we understand what happened “backwards, as the recapitulation of the 
initial conditions of a course in its terminal consequences”. While the mimetic 
configuration (mimēsis2), through the imaginative force of the “as-if”, 
recomposes our actions and perceptions into a narrative plot, it is only in its 
reception and effect upon the hearer or reader that “the traversal of mimēsis 
reaches its fulfilment” (TN 1:71).  A story that is neither told nor heard or read 
cannot fulfil the intention of the author, nor can it evoke a meaning-effect 
(intended or non-intended) or influence new forms of human action.157 
This step from mimēsis2 (configuration) to mimēsis3, (reconfiguration) leads 
Ricoeur to the importance of reading. Reading, here, means the reading and 
knowledge of prior narrative traditions and innovations, by which tradition, 
argues Ricoeur, is “constituted by the interplay of innovation and sedimentation” 
and functions as an archive of paradigms whose “genesis has been covered over” 
(TN 1:68). The “ordering of events” seems a universal paradigm at work in all 
narratives (and here Ricoeur might narrowly escape the criticism that his 
narrative theory is only valid for Western narratives). Although the ordering 
paradigm depends on  particular cultural traditions, the desire to order events 
and actions in narratives seems to be a universal practice (and of course ordering 
here can be considered as another term for a process of meaning-making),  
 
[t]o the extent that in the ordering of events the causal connection (one 
thing as a cause of another) prevails over pure succession (one thing 
after another), a universal emerges that is, as we have interpreted it, the 
ordering itself erected as a type (TN 1:69). 
 
This universal “ordering of events” emerges in many different forms, genres, and 
types; their paradigmatic quality (hymne, rhyme, poetry, muthus, tragedy, 
                                               
157 It is in “the hearer or reader that the traversal of mimēsis reaches its fulfilment” (TN 1:71); 
narrative only reaches “its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and suffering in 
mimēsis3” (TN 1:70). This fulfilment of the narrative refers to the actualization of meaning 
through hearing and reading; if we “receive” the narrative, it is actualized through the 
understanding and influence it attains within my/our concrete world, now and here at this 
moment. 
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comedy, novel and so on) refers both to the original productive 
imagination/creation of the paradigm, and to the force of sedimentation, which 
constitutes the paradigm by turning the rules of the new genre into a new 
tradition. Consequently, the paradigm establishes a “rule-governed behaviour” 
(akin to the rule according to which narratives require a beginning, a middle and 
an end) forcing any attempt to create a new paradigm to become a “deviation” 
from this rule (this, Ricoeur calls “rule-governed deformation”). As a result, there 
can be an antinovel or postmodern novel – but only in relation to the traditional 
or modern novel. The question is, when is a variation to the rule able to break 
with the rule and open up an entire new field, and as a result, create the world 
anew?158  
 
Mimēsis3  
Mimēsis3 is drawn from Aristotle’s notion of purgation and Gadamer’s idea of 
application. The mimēsis of human action in the tragedy, representing human 
pity and fear, “effects the purgation of these emotions” (TN 1:70).  Gadamer’s 
notion of application refers to how interpretations influence and return to the 
practical field once we apply new understandings to our actions. Ricoeur's own 
version of the hermeneutical circle – the dialectic between distantiation and 
appropriation – informs the “narrative arc” of prefiguration, refiguration and 
configuration. The hermeneutic circle of the text is now included in a “larger 
circle of a poetics of narrative and an aporetics of time” (TN 1:86). A core aspect 
of Mimēsis3 is that it signifies the, 
 
[i]ntersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or 
reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world configured by the poem 
and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific 
temporality (TN 1:71).  
 
Our reception of the text not only affects our understanding of the world, but 
also motivates future actions; narratives react to (temporal) experiences that we 
                                               
158 Cf. “Rule-governed deformation constitutes the axis around which the various applications 
are arranged. It is this variety of applications which confers a history on the productive 
imagination and which, in counterpoint to sedimentation, makes a narrative tradition possible. 
This is the final enrichment by which the relationship of narrative to time is augmented at the 
level of mimēsis2” (TN 1:70). True renewal must create difference. Marcel Proust wrote that 
“masterpieces are written in a kind of foreign language”. This seems a most adequate 
description of true innovation – it generates a new paradigm. 
Narrative Time   |  77 
 
 
 
have in the world and, after hearing or reading these narratives, the sense they 
provide again is “actualized” within this world. Only if we hear or read the 
narrative, offering a new meaning of the world, does it fulfill its intention and, 
thus, brings the narrative arc of mimēsis to a closure. This closure does not point 
to a narrative circularity. Rather, as Ricoeur emphasizes, the movement of 
mimēsis1-3 equals an “endless spiral” (TN 1:72), which carries the “meditation 
past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes”. By bringing 
the two “points of access” – distentio animi and the plot – into confrontation 
with various theories of narrative and time, Ricoeur succeeds in spiralling the 
complex correlation between time and narrative onto higher levels  (of their 
interweaving relation). This is not just an internal process but also an external 
one. The hermeneutic circle and narrative arc react to something outside the text 
and, as a result, the unifying meaning (its “narrative plot”) returns, through 
“reading,” to an outside. This “outside the text” stands for how we ontologically 
inhabit the world in which we care  for our lives and those of others, and in which 
we act upon and react to the events and meanings that occur in our concrete 
existence. We reflect our within-time-ness (that we are part of a temporal 
process, that we live in time) by living according to a calendar, a diary and other 
time-rituals, such as birthdays or new year’s celebrations, marking points-in-time 
relating to our human self-understanding. We care about our temporality also 
because of its two absolute limits, those of our “beginning” and “ending”. Each 
narrative knows a beginning and ending, mirroring the human condition of 
“being-born” (Arendt’s “natality” captures this very well) and existence as a 
Being-upon-Death (Sein-zum-Tode). 
 
Because we are in the world and are affected by situations, we try to 
orient ourselves in them by means of understanding; we also have 
something to say, an experience to bring to language and to share. This 
is the ontological presupposition of reference, a presupposition 
reflected inside language itself as a postulate lacking any immanent 
justification. Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its 
Other. The attestation of this otherness arises from language’s 
reflexivity with regard to itself, whereby it knows itself as being in being 
in order to bear on being (TN 1:78). 
 
Thus, there are two main moments of reference. The first is the reference of the 
composition of the narrative to what this composition aims to signify in the 
concrete world. The second reference is that of the established narrative to the 
world of the reader who, to understand the narrative, must be able to place it 
back, actualize it, within the meaning-structure of its world. At the end of his 
78  |   Chapter Three 
 
examination of mimēsis3 Ricoeur returns to the actual anthropological question 
underlying his theory of time and narrative. In response to Heidegger’s direction 
of all levels of being towards the finite temporality of death (instead of “upon 
eternity”) Ricoeur asks,  
 
Are we to think that only a mortal can form the plan of “giving the things 
of life a dignity that makes them eternal”? Can the eternity that works 
of art oppose to the fugacity of things be constituted only in a history? 
And does this history in turn remain historical only if, going beyond 
death, it guards against the forgetfulness of death and the dead, and 
remains a recollection of death and a remembrance of the dead? The 
most  serious question this work may be able to pose is to what degree a 
philosophical reflection on narrativity and time may aid us in thinking 
about eternity and death at the same time (TN 1:87).159 
  
The question which Ricoeur will pursue now is how this “thinking about eternity 
and death at the same time” occurs in the intentionality of fiction and history and 
in the particular narrative response they both offer to the aporetics of time.  
 
History and Fiction   
Both history and fiction are stories written and told in narratives. While history 
claims to reconstruct and explain “what was,” fiction opens up a new 
imaginative, possible world. In contrast to fiction, historical accounts aim to 
explain “events” in reference to evidence, proof, and witnesses; the historian 
offers a credible and reasonable causality. But the problem Ricoeur detects is 
that the reality historians explain refers to a “having been” that is a re-
construction, a “seeing as” instead of a documentary analogy to what was. Our 
view of the past is never a neutral representation, but rather a  subjective 
recounting, a document that we interpret or a picture we “read”. When 
constructing the ”real” of the past, historians dig out “traces” that “stand-for” 
and take “the place of” this memorable past (deciding, in the process, which 
parts of the past are memorable or not). The core of the historians’ credibility is 
the claim that their reconstruction of the past tells events “as” they actually 
happened. Reminiscent of the metaphoric nature of ”seeing as”, this means that 
historical narratives do not describe but, rather, re-describe: to re-describe the 
past as it happened is to merge a factual claim with a metaphorical analogy. The 
                                               
159 My emphasis. 
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particular order in which the historian arranges the past constitutes a model or 
icon, which then comes to represent it (like the “Hundred Years War,” or the 
“Enlightenment”). This metaphorical analogy synthesizes a narrative 
understanding of the past with a proposal for the meaning of the past in the 
present. Because the past “itself” does not offer a narrative order, explanatory 
model or meaning, any form of historical retelling mixes forms of discovery 
(manuscripts, witnesses and so on) and forms of creative imitation and 
imagination:  
 
Here we reach the point where discovering and inventing are 
indistinguishable, the point, therefore, where the notion of reference no 
longer works, no more than does that of redescription. The point where, 
in order to signify something like a productive reference in the sense in 
which, following Kant, we speak of a productive imagination, the 
problematic of refiguration must free itself, once and for all, from the 
vocabulary of reference. (TN 3:158). 
 
Besides the plot (as the source of historical sense-making), the narrative 
structuring of  the historian draws, just like fiction, from the productive 
imagination to construct a mimetic analogy with what “has been”. The shift 
Ricoeur proposes—signifying the breakdown of the usual referential “as if” 
structure—is that the story of the past no longer represents ”the past as it 
actually happened” but rather what the story/history (as we come to see it) 
actually “stands for”: the events in Paris in 1792 stand for our idea of the “French 
Revolution,” the title “Second World War” stands for what we consider the 
second violent clash of various countries representing the “world”. Our meaning-
making of the past is filtered, composed and narrated. It can even make for great 
literature and, once new documents or witnesses have eroded the “history”, its 
metaphoric figuration (“seeing as”) may survive the no longer accepted historic 
reconstruction.160 This is what history shares with the fiction of literature: even 
as virtual, imaginative story it represents a particular idea or fantasy of human 
action and experiences. The line between the “real” and “unreal” is, in both 
cases, very thin. 
                                               
160 Examples of  “histories” in which the “metaphoric” meaning survives its actual content is 
Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der 
Weltgeschichte (Wien: Baumuller, 1918); or, its more contemporary equivalent, Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
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Fiction offers both a refiguration of reality and of time. Fiction as an  
imaginative reordering uses the “unreal” to show variations of the real or the 
not-yet-thought. In doing so, it explores the gap between cosmic time and finite 
time. It is in novels that the exploration and expression of human time – both in 
analogy and as a pure fictive description – comes closest to our actual temporal 
experiences. Our play with time in novels constitutes a “transcendence-
immanent in the text” (TN 2:101). The fictional play/game with time – both as 
”tales of time” and “tales about time” (TN 2:101) – not only explores the 
discordance between cosmic and mortal time, but also shows how we inhabit or 
fantasize time. For Ricoeur, fictional narratives give “human time” its most 
truthful, exact expression (without the restrictions of historical proof or 
chronology). Fiction also knows a historical component and does not escape a 
level of historization. Because the narrative voice recounts what took place (all 
novels, in endless variations, start with “once upon a time....”), we can say that 
even fiction refers to a “quasi-past”. In Ricoeur's words,  
 
A voice speaks, recounting what for it has taken place. To enter into 
reading is to include in the pact between the reader and the author the 
belief that the events reported by the narrative voice belong to the past 
of that voice. If this hypothesis stands up, we can say that fiction is 
quasi-historical, just as much as history is quasi-fictive once the quasi-
presence of events placed “before the eyes of” the reader by a lively 
narrative supplements through its intuitiveness, its vividness, the elusive 
character of the pastness of the past, which is illustrated by the paradox 
of standing-for. Fictional narrative is quasi-historical to the extent that 
the unreal events that it relates are past facts for the narrative voice 
that addresses itself to the reader. It is in this that they resemble past 
events and that fiction resembles history. The relationship is, moreover, 
circular. It is, we might say as quasi-historical that fiction gives the past 
the vivid evocation that makes a great book of history a literary 
masterpiece (TN 3:190).    
 
The result of Ricoeur's analysis is the insight that fictional and historical 
narratives both root in a temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous. In history, we 
recount the past in the present, through a narrative structure that always 
beholds a fictional, as-if, aspect. Reading fiction means participating in a possible 
present, which the narrative voice declares took place somewhere, sometime. In 
the end,  
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the interweaving of history and fiction in the refiguration of time rest … 
upon the reciprocal overlapping, the quasi-historical moment of fiction 
changing places with the quasi-fictive moment of history. In this 
interweaving, this reciprocal overlapping, this exchange of places, 
originates what is commonly called human time, where the standing-for 
the past in history is united with the imaginative variations of fiction 
against the background of the aporias of the phenomenology of time 
(TN 3:192).  
 
The tension between this “human time” and the aporias of the phenomenology 
of time lead Ricoeur to re-examine the relation between the narrative text and 
acts of reading by asking the question: to “whom” does the narrative order, after 
reading, relate? Thus, if we want to understand the relation between the “act of 
narrative,” the “act of refiguring time” and the “act of reading”, we must ask: 
who is narrating, refiguring, reading? (TN 3:246). If the interweaving of 
cosmological and phenomenological time in historical and fictional narratives 
evokes a “human time”, then the subject appears as a “narrative being” or, in 
Ricoeur's phrase, a “narrative identity” (which – as Ricoeur states himself – 
“crowns” his entire analysis) (TN 3:305).161 In analogy to the narrative plot, our 
narrative identity enables (or enforces!) a synthesis of the heterogeneous: life 
narratives, often changing over time, have many fictional and historical elements 
and are motivated by the desire for cohesion and unity, while permanently 
threatening to be destabilized by the ongoing process of time, in which new 
events and stories occur. Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity, further 
elaborated in Oneself as Another, renews and combines both Aristotle’s claim for 
the examined life and Dilthey’s idea of Lebenszusammenhang. A life examined is 
a life narrated, and a narrated life fulfils the wish for inner coherence.162 Of 
course, destabilizations – in the form of the awareness of mortality, experiences 
of suffering, unexpected events and new understandings of one’s life – always 
                                               
161 The act of humanizing time through narratives of time shows that we are narrative beings as 
long as we are temporal beings. This is the anthropological assumption of Ricoeur’s narrative 
theory. 
162 Cf. “This connection between self-constancy and narrative identity confirms one of my 
oldest convictions, namely, that the self of self-knowledge is not the egoistical and narcissistic 
ego whose hypocrisy and naiveté the hermeneutics of suspicion have denounced, along with its 
aspects of an ideological superstructure and infantile and neurotic archaism. The self of self-
knowledge is the fruit of an examined life, to recall Socrates’ phrase in the Apology. And an 
examined life is, in large part, one purged, one clarified by the cathartic effects of the 
narratives, be they historical or fictional, conveyed by our culture. So self-constancy refers to a 
self instructed by the works of a culture that it has applied to itself” (TN 3: 247ff). 
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loom around the corner! Furthermore, the order of narrative and the order of life 
seldom coincide: there is “always more order in what we narrate than in what we 
have actually already lived.”163 This disproportion between a narrative order and 
the “elusive character of real life” points simultaneously to the surplus of 
meaning of life-as-such, as well as to the philosophical “remainder” left by an 
insufficient response to an aporetic question (“what is time?”). In the end, we 
must conclude with Ricoeur that we are always already “entangled in stories”, 
subjected to a pre-history that determines much of our own narrative voice – 
that the search for our narrative voice has no original beginning. Thus, the 
challenge of finding one’s own narrative voice lies in our potential and ability to 
read, speak, write and tell differently and, thus, to develop a singular variation of 
the stories in which we live and in whose context we examine our lives; this 
stimulates us to hope that one day our own life will create its very own “web of 
stories”, in which our entanglement would mimic exactly what we wish to “stand 
for”, enabling us to tell “who” we are.  
 
Conclusion 
The configuring activity of the narrative plot has three main aspects: it has a 
“concordant discordant” structure, it “synthesizes the manifold,” and it evokes a 
“followability”. Through the mediating force of narrative composition our 
imagination creates a poetic response, effecting human practices, to a theoretical 
problem. Although this response suffices the practical problem, it still harbours 
the unresolved theoretical question (the enigma of time). Thus, narrative 
symbolizes, again, a “third term” that reconciles without synthesis (because it 
does not resolve the theoretical problem): Ricoeur offers an anthropological 
answer to an epistemological enigma, turning the question “what is time?” into 
an anthropological enquiry, which we can summarize by the question: “how do 
humans articulate (come to terms with) their aporetic experience of 
temporality?”. Ricoeur answers that the experience of time (whatever it is!) 
evokes in humans a need for narration:164 our self-understanding reflects the 
                                               
163 A Ricoeur Reader. Reflection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.  468. 
164 Narrative as a poetic response to the speculative aspect of time leads Ricoeur to juxtapose 
the complementary position of two dialectics: The dialectic between the productive 
imagination at work in fictional and historical narratives on one side, and the dialectic between 
cosmological (objective) and phenomenological (subjective) concepts of time on the other. It is 
the dynamic and supplementary relation of these four positions that enables a hermeneutic 
translation (the interpretative circle or mimēsis1-3) of an anthropological equation:  
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condition of a narrative being-ness. This wish not only reveals an ontological 
necessity but, on an ethical level, also refers to the history of suffering: “We tell 
stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated. 
This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the 
history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for 
vengeance and calls for narrative” (TN 1:75). Here, Ricoeur’s position echoes 
Walter Benjamin’s notion of Rettende Kritik, in which saving the dead, and in 
particular the victims of history, from forgetfulness becomes the actual task of 
any critical awareness. This is not just a forgetfulness of Being but of lived 
narratives. The concept of “narrative identity” is perhaps the main outcome of 
Ricoeur’s narrative theory of time: it is our alternative route to attaining 
autonomy (but, perhaps, our only route – if we regard metaphysical 
substantialism to be impossible). This “autonomy”, the autonomy of narrating 
our own life-story, performs the mixture of a historical fiction and a fictive 
history. It connects the hermeneutic act of interpretation with our experience of 
existential temporality. In this way, our knowledge of the world and our 
knowledge of who we are coincide. The outcome of this process is a narrative 
self-understanding, or narrative identity, which Ricoeur considers so crucial that 
he pleads for “an education to a narrative coherence”: 
  
To learn how to tell the same story in another way, how to allow our 
story to be told by others, how to submit the narrative of a life to the 
historian’s critique, are all practices applicable to the paradox of 
autonomy and fragility. Let us say therefore that a subject capable of 
leading his or her life in agreement with the idea of narrative coherence 
is an autonomous subject.165  
                                               
 
Objective:       Subjective: 
Cosmological Time      Fiction  
                     Human/Narrative Time 
History                              Phenomenological Time 
 
In this schema, the diagonal passage from cosmological time to phenomenological time passes 
the diagonal line between historical narrative and fictional narrative. In the crossing-point or 
convergence, a dialectique de l’entrecroisement (TR 3:442) points to a “third time”, which 
reflects the temporality of lived experience. Here, our temporal experience becomes humanized 
through narrative structures. Our “human time” reverberates between the poles of historical 
and fictional narratives on one side, and our experience of a cosmological or phenomenological 
time on the other. 
165 Paul Ricoeur, “Autonomy and Vulnerability”, in Reflections on the Just (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2007),  p. 80. 
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The concepts and questions surrounding narrative identity open up a whole 
range of new questions about, for example, the significance of naming and 
designating someone with a proper name; describing an action to a person; 
maintaining an accountable self throughout life; the relation between self and 
other and the manner that the “ethical self” comes to stand-for and attest to this 
self. Ricoeur’s theory of narrative also sets the stage for a philosophy of 
promising, of attestation and, in particular, of the performative force of 
testimony as an ethical narrative/narrative ethics. Here, the work of Heidegger 
and Lévinas are confronted critically with an ethics of testimony representing 
“oneself with others in just institutions”. In his last impressive work Memory, 
History, Forgetting, Ricoeur makes a final extension to his theory of narrative by 
exploring the relation between history, time and narrative as the anthropology of 
our capability to remember.  
In the end, we need to return to the beginning. Thus, what does it mean to 
say that narratives articulate the human experience of temporality? Perhaps it 
means that narratives offer a poetic, human response to an irresolvable 
epistemological problem. We discover that the epistemological question (“what 
is time?”) is not the crucial question. The actual question is not what time is, but 
how as humans we articulate this aporetic experience and what it means for us. 
Narratives provide one answer to these questions, a poetic answer. According to 
Ricoeur once “narrative time” equals “human time” it helps us to overcome 
absence, negation, and affirms us as capable beings. More importantly, 
narratives provide the possibility to reconfigure and re-narrate what has pre-
constituted us and to create a new connection between meaning and action. 
After examining how we experience time, Ricoeur sets out to look at how 
humans experience, articulate and give meaning to their identity as an aporetic 
condition of sameness and difference, as determined by what is “own” and what 
is “other”. This is the theme of our next chapter.   
 
 
4. ATTESTED SELFHOOD  
 
 
 
Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being. 
 
Spinoza (1951: 136) 
 
 
What does it mean to attest of oneself?; what does it mean for a human to state 
“Here I am”?; and what does this statement mean for the ones to whom it is 
addressed?  
 
One could also ask: what kind of coherence is needed before we can say “Here I 
am” and ask who is the one able to make, perform, this statement?; what kind of 
internal and external connections do we need to enable us stating “Here I am”? 
The biggest problem, Ricoeur argues, is to overcome the “gap that separates the 
hermeneutics of the self from the philosophies of the cogito”. This gap exists 
because “[t]o say self is not to say I. The I is posited—or is deposed. The self is 
implied reflexively in the operations, the analysis of which precedes the return 
toward this self” (OA 18).   
 In Oneself as Another Ricoeur starts with the simultaneous dismissal of 
Husserl’s absolute cogito and Nietzsche’s anti-cogito. In his view, both positions 
from radically different angles, deny the subject the capability to develop a self-
referential, self-reflexive and ethical committed self that endures over time. 
Ricoeur’s earlier “turn” to hermeneutics, action and narrative, the relation 
between the poetic will and a theory of action, is now applied to the question of 
identity and ethics leading him towards a philosophy of attestation and 
testimony. Widely recognized as his magnum opus Oneself as Another presents 
not only an impressive synthesis of Ricoeur’s entire philosophical project but also 
offers a new, original clarification for the relation between self, action and ethics 
formulated as an “anthropological quest for self-affirmation”.167  
Methodologically Ricoeur sets out to create an “alliance” (OA 113) between 
the analytic tradition and a phenomenological-hermeneutics of selfhood. For this 
aim he juxtaposes the linguistic, semantic, and pragmatic objectifications of 
identity (as sameness) with the temporal, ontological and ethical understanding 
                                               
167 Isaac Venema, Identifying Selfhood. Imagination, Narrative, and Hermeneutics in the 
Thought of Paul Ricoeur (SUNY New York: 2000), p. 124.  
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of identity (as selfhood). This alliance is constructed to develop a new 
understanding of identity as ethical selfhood. Central to this self is the capability 
to attest (Selbstbezeugung) itself. Together with the concept of narrative identity 
attestation bridges two poles of identity which the philosophies of the subject 
still separate: idem-identity or sameness and ipse-identity or selfhood. To 
understand how and why these two identity-poles belong together Ricoeur 
replaces the empirical question “what is identity?” by the fourfold question 
“Who is speaking? Who is acting? Who is recounting himself or herself? Who is 
the moral subject of imputation?” (OA 16). These questions examine various 
forms of self-ascription by asking whether “there [is] a form of permanence in 
time that is a reply to the question ‘Who am I?’” (OA 118). With this shift Ricoeur 
raises, as mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the question “who 
narrates?”. 
By extending and answering this question Ricoeur bridges the pole of 
identity as sameness (that dominates analytical philosophy) and the pole of 
identity as selfhood (that forms the core of his own phenomenological-
hermeneutical philosophy). While in Time and Narrative the “synthesis of the 
heterogeneous” binds time and narrative together, in Oneself as Another the 
binding of idem- and ipse-identity is at stake. While the "plot" stabilizes our 
dispersed experiences, it is through attestation that the self presents a 
comprehensible, and trustworthy shape of its identity as a unified voice and a 
“permanence in time”. To attest our “self” signifies the emplotment of the 
plurality of subjective experiences in a singular person who is able to testify of its 
"self" towards others. But just as our interpretations of narratives are never 
completed and are always dynamic, so is any particular configuration of “self” 
always changable. Moreover, we are permanently in danger of losing a stable self 
through suffering (as a consequence of physical or mental illness, grief, social, 
cultural and political dehumanization and, finally, death). In short, as there is no 
absolute narrative, there can be no absolute self.   
With Oneself as Another Ricoeur also complements the analysis of human 
fallibility and evil of his early work with an analysis of human capability and moral 
selfhood. Our consent to the involuntary aspects of life, as an acceptance of 
negativity and finiteness (aspects central to Freedom and Nature), now turns into 
a more forceful form of self-affirmation beyond consent and acceptance, our 
fundamental belief in the perseverance of being.168 Ricoeur’s ethical intention is 
                                               
168 In Oneself as Another the binding of consent to the involuntary is modified to the binding 
force of the poetic will: it is through the reflexive-affirmation of narrative identity and, 
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to develop a theory of identity in which “the Other is not only the counterpart of 
the Same but belongs to the intimate constitution of its sense” (OA 329).169 This 
“intimate constitution” is evoked by a constitutive reciprocity of self and other as 
expressed in Ricoeur's title: Oneself as Another. The passage from the analytical 
to a hermeneutic, dialogical, narrative and ethical selfhood culminates in a 
philosophy of hope and affirmation (excluding the negativity of the philosophy of 
suspicion and the solipsism of absolute idealism).170  
Oneself as Another is set up as a discursive (studies one and two), practical 
(studies three and four), narrative (studies five and six) and prescriptive (studies 
seven to nine) analysis under the “three-step rhythm: describing, narrating, 
prescribing” (OA 20). This triad redeploys a similar mediating function as the 
configurative mimēsis in the examination of narrative. Isaac Venema justly 
remarks that “the order or presentation in Oneself as Another duplicated the 
narrative arc: just as narrative configuration is preceded by prefiguration and 
followed by refiguration, the development of the analogical unity of selfhood 
begins with the descriptive features of self-sameness and then ends with a 
prescription for selfhood that is intended to refigure self-sameness by way of 
self-constancy”.171 In the tenth and final study the question of what kind of being 
the self presents leads Ricoeur to the binding of ontology, embodiment and 
                                               
 
ultimately, in the attested ontology of a “commitment to being” that we give our consent to 
“who” we are. 
169 In his introduction to Oneself as Another Ricoeur explains his program as the “convergence” 
of  “three major philosophical intentions” (OA 1); first, in opposition to the immediacy of the “I 
think” or “I can” of the philosophies of the subject Ricoeur wants to “indicate the primacy of 
reflective meditation’ (OA 1). Secondly, Ricoeur intends to distinguish between the notion of 
“identity” on the one side and “self” on the other  by clarifying whether identity actually refers 
to idem-identity or sameness or rather to ipse-identity or selfhood. The third intention shows in 
which manner ipse-identity “involves a dialectic complementary to that of selfhood and 
sameness, namely the dialectic of self and other than self” (OA 3).  
170 The dualism suspicion-hope can also be named, following the title of a book of interviews 
with Ricoeur, “critique and conviction”. The main difference between Ricoeur's hermeneutic 
approach to questions of identity and the analytical perspective is marked by the 
conceptualization of (and the criteria for what we call) coherency or consistency (of bodies, 
persons, mental states and so on). Our experience of Being produces fragmentation and 
dispersion but simultaneously a desire for inner stability and coherence. For Ricoeur the 
attestation of selfhood replaces Being as substance for a dynamic dialectic between idem- and 
ipse-identity, self and other, discordance and concordance, plurality and unity. This dialectic 
constitutes an analogical unity of action, narrative identity, attestation and accountability. 
Ricoeur's “attested Self” responds as “lived body” and reflexive subject in and to the 
world, through language and history towards and with others.  
171 Venema, Identifying Selfhood, p. 130. 
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Otherness in attestation. In other words, it is in what the person stands for (for-
itself) and towards others that the subject finds the “assurance of being oneself 
acting and suffering” (OA 22). This re-assurance, experienced as an ontological 
commitment and reflexive affirmation, offers the final and synthesizing response 
to all previous who-questions: who speaks, who acts, who recounts, who 
responds. This “who” is the question to which one responds with “it is me, 
here!”. Attestation as self-affirmation, as a belief-in my potential to act and 
persevere, is the subject’s “ultimate recourse against all suspicion” (OA 22). The 
“power to be self-constant”,172 the desire to be, and the potential to act 
culminates in a capability to state me, voici (a term Ricoeur borrows from 
Lévinas) which symbolizes the complexity of the “I can” while preserving the 
centrality of the question “who?”. This synthesis translates the “I” in a selfhood 
able to declare: “I” am the “self” who can speak, who can act, who can recount, 
who can respond, who can promise, and so forth.   
The ten studies that make up Oneself as Another show different registers or 
languages in which we speak, in terms of identity, about the being/ person of the 
subject.173 In an ideal manner the ten reflexive operations pass along the same 
question (who?) various times whereas the topical detours feed a spiral of 
explanation that aims to reach a richer level of understanding with each new 
sequence.174 This spiral moves through the analytical philosophies of language 
and action towards a hermeneutics and ethics of selfhood.175 In the final part it is 
in attestation, in what I stand for now and here, that Ricoeur finds a viable 
alternative for the epistemological and empirical “putative logic of verification”; 
the truth of the self roots in a faith in veracity, credence and truthfulness (in 
                                               
172 Ibid., p. 147.   
173 In the original Gifford Lectures, from which Oneself as Another draws, Ricoeur presents two 
lectures on “naming God” and the “mandated Self” which examined the relation between the 
“narratives of vacation” and the summoning of “the call and response” (OA 23) of the Other. 
Because the religious aspects of Ricoeur's anthropology are excluded from this study I have to 
ignore this aspect.   
174 Instead of the “hermeneutic circle” Ricoeur rather speaks of an “endless spiral that would 
carry the meditation past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes” (TN 1: 
72). This method is applied exactly to his “meditations” on identity.  
175 Its overall motive returns to the anthropological duality typical for Ricoeur's entire project, 
namely, that of a dialectic between the rupture in and fragmentation of Being on one side, and 
our desire and potential for (a self-affirmative) coherence and unity on the other side. The self’s 
unity and continuity can no longer be retrieved as part of a metaphysical principle like 
substance, instead, a poetic, reflective unity (narrative identity) and an ethical informed 
testimonial ontology (attestation) recaptures “the meaning of being as act and potentiality” 
(OA 20). 
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contrast to a self set in the truth of an absolute, foundational knowledge or 
empirical positivism).   
I agree with Christopher Watkin’s remark that Ricoeur uses Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of the "I can" but shifts his "polysemy of seeing" to a "polysemy of being". 
This polysemy amounts to a "constellation" of various perspectives on the self 
which are “tensional as well as sequential and progressive”176 since these 
sequences all circle around questions of self-ascription. What do we say, who do 
we mean, when we say “I”? This Kantian problematic (the problem of our 
"apperceptive unity") gets radicalized in Derek Parfit’s, by now, classical work 
Reasons and Persons.177 But before examining Ricoeur's confrontation with his 
biggest analytical adversary we need to return to the Kantian and Heidegerian 
problematization of identity which, without doubt, informs all levels of Ricoeur's 
examination of our "selfhood".  
 
The Kantian Problematic 
Parfit argues that "identity is not what matters" if we wish to describe the 
processes of coherence and continuity that binds us as persons. Behind this 
radical position lies an unresolved Kantian problematic concerning the 
apperceptive unity and “mine-ness” of self-consciousness in relation to our first-
person perspective (“I”). In the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding 
(CPR §15) Kant declares,   
 
I would assign to this act of understanding the general name synthesis, 
in order to point out at the same time: that we can not present anything 
as combined in the object without ourselves’ having combined it 
beforehand; and that, among all presentations, combination is the only 
one that cannot be given through objects, but—being an act of the 
subjects’s self-activity—can be performed only by the subject himself (B 
130). 
 
                                               
176 Christopher Watkin, Phenomenology or Deconstruction? The Question of Ontology in 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburg: 2009), p. 84-85.  
177 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). In his 
seminal work Parfit  seems to almost ridicule any need for self-ascription and ethics (if the 
proposition “I did it” is illogical accountability becomes untraceable). Because Parfit’s position, 
standing in the empirical tradition of Hume and Locke, forms the biggest threat to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of selfhood, it is directly and indirectly, the main “partner in dialogue” for this 
chapter. 
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To be followed in §16 with the famous remark,  
 
The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations. For 
otherwise something would be presented to me that could not be 
thought at all—which is equivalent to saying that the presentation 
either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. 
Presentation that can be given prior to all thought is called intuition. 
Hence everything manifold in intuition has a necessary reference to the I 
think in the same subject in whom this manifold is found (B 132).  
 
Consciousness must always be self-consciousness because, as Kim Atkins points 
out, we always ascribe “all of one’s thoughts to oneself as their single logical 
subject: the ‘I’ whose thoughts they are. It is from the perspective of such an ‘I’ 
that the unity of a single consciousness is demonstrated. The proof that my 
consciousness is unified is a practical proof; it lies in my capacity for self-
ascription.”178 Atkins clarifies (following the Kant interpretation of Quassim 
Cassam) that concerning the problem of the “mine-ness” and unity of 
consciousness we should differentiate between the internal question – “what, 
within a given mental life, underpins experience?” – and the external question – 
“what does the unity of consciousness in a given life consist of?” (a question 
looking at consciousness).179 
While Parfit’s impersonalism denies that identity plays any role in answering 
the first question, Cassam points out that a given mental life experience actually 
must include a form of self-ascription. Put differently, for Parfit, experiences and 
thoughts have no owners, they occur as bodily and psychological events, and 
while they do establish forms of coherence and continuity they cannot be 
labelled as “mine”. In the Kantian understanding of apperception though, “my 
grasping (of) my various thoughts and states as mine ‘from the inside’ … is itself 
an objective feature of consciousness per se“.180  
Questioning the idea that I “own” my experiences and thoughts seems 
superfluous, because our first-person perspective is an “objective feature of 
consciousness” itself; the “I” who thinks cannot be separated from the one who 
unifies its experiences and thoughts. I know that I am the “I”/ person having 
these experiences and thoughts, thus, the thoughts that “I” have are always 
                                               
178 Kim Atkins, Personal Identity and the Importance of One’s Own Body: A response to Derek 
Parfit, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 8 (3), p. 331.  
179 Ibid., 332. 
180 Ibid., 331. 
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already “mine”.181 For Kant, the proof of the unity of consciousness is 
demonstrated by the ability to ascribe this consciousness to my self. The “I” 
cannot simultaneously state that certain thoughts belong to the “I think” and 
others do not. The form in which thoughts occur is unity: this unity demonstrates 
itself in the “I think”. I cannot depart from the unifying apperception of my 
“own” perspective in which the possibility for the objective thought and the 
subjective experience of this thought coincide. In reference to the Kantian 
problematic Béatrice Longueness writes,  
 
On the one hand, we are self-conscious subjects; on the other hand, we 
are conscious of ourselves as objects, where both subject and object are 
to be understood as subjects and objects of thought and experience. For 
Kant, as a subject of thought and experience, I am conscious of myself as 
the subject, or perhaps better the agent, of a pure spontaneity or self-
determining activity, ordering given representations so that any object 
of representation at all, including myself, can be perceived, recognized, 
thought about. As an object of thought and experience I am, like any 
other object, represented to myself by way of that very activity of 
ordering representations which make possible the representation of any 
and all objects of representation. Therefore, Kant argues, as the active 
thinking subject, I cannot be an object for myself. For any representation 
of an object presupposes that activity, whose subject thus cannot itself 
be represented as an object.182  
 
This Kantian problem forms the background to Ricoeur's examination of the 
semantic aspects of reference and agency and the pragmatic aspects of speaking 
and action while his concepts of narrative identity and attestation represent the 
“self-determining activity” that unifies the objective and subjective position in 
the “I” as Self. Here, the question seems to be how is the subject as a first-person 
“I” connected (in an ascriptive, descriptive and prescriptive manner) to the 
                                               
181 Cf. “... in virtue of the apperceptive quality of consciousness the claim that consciousness is 
unified is actually sustained on evidence of a personal, or first-person kind, namely, that one 
can ascribe all of one’s thoughts to oneself as their single logical subject: the ‘I’ whose thoughts 
they are.” Ibid., Atkins, p. 331. 
182 Béatrice Longuenesse, Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of One’s Own Body: Variations 
on a Kantian Theme, Philosophical Topics, Vol. 34, Nos 1 &2, 2006, 283. Longuenesse’s 
argument explains – as Atkins and also Ricoeur shows – that the notion of mine-ness does in 
particular refer to the embodied state of the processes of consciousness; the experience of 
seeing the outside weather change is an event in my consciousness because the state of the 
weather occurs/happens to me through a physical and embodied self-consciousness.  
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subject as a self-referential and reflexive “me”? This question points to the 
problem of the unity and continuity of physical and mental acts as my “own” and 
as acts that carry my identity over time (let “it” endure).183  
In Oneself as Another the Kantian “I” is split in three grammatical features, 
namely, the use “of se and soi in indirect cases, the splitting of “same” into the 
domains of idem and ipse, and the correlation between the self and the other 
than self”. These three grammatical levels correspond with the dialectic between 
selfhood and sameness and selfhood and otherness. The important analytical 
shift that Ricoeur proposes is to replace the questions of “what is the I?” or “why 
does the I act?” (what is the causality behind the acts of the “I”?) with the 
questions of “who?”: “Who is speaking? Who is acting? Who is recounting 
himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of imputation?” (OA 16).184  
From the what to the who 
This shift from the "what" questions to the "who" questions stems from 
Heidegger’s investigation of the “Wer des Daseins” which is marked by the 
existential relation between Sorge and Selbstheit as developed in Sein und Zeit 
(1927).185 Heidegger formulates the who-question as:  
 
Frage: wer ist es, der in der Alltäglichkeit das Dasein ist? Alle 
Seinstrukturen des Daseins, mithin auch das Phänomen, das auf diese 
Wer-frage antwortet, sind Weisen seines Seins. Ihre ontologische 
Charakteristik ist eine existentiale (SZ 114).  
 
The answer to the Wer-frage, according to Heidegger, is : “mit dem In-der-Welt-
sein gleich ursprünglich” which means that Dasein equals Mitsein and Mitdasein. 
Crucial to Ricoeur’s own answer to the Wer-frage of Being is Heidegger's remark,  
                                               
183 Departing from the detour through the analytic perspective of the semantic and pragmatic 
features of identity (Strawson, Davidson, Parfit), Ricoeur develops his hermeneutics of the self 
as a reflexive response to the analytical deadlock just mentioned. The starting point is that both 
the exaltation of the subject by Husserl and its humiliation in Nietzsche have left the “I” of the 
philosophy of the subject in an atopical temporal-spatial vacuum, an “atopos” (OA 16). It is 
Ricoeur's aim to show that both the Kantian aporia of the ‘I’ and the atopical place of the 
subject can be resolved by his hermeneutical understanding of the self.      
184 Ricoeur illustrates that the one speaking is a subject in which the idem- and ipse- aspects of 
identity strives for a stable, coherent unity able to endure over time and attest of its positions 
and promises towards others. This self is not grounded in absolute truth or suspicion but in 
trust, credence, self-esteem and truthfulness. As already mentioned, the question “Who is 
speaking?” finds a final answer in the declarative statement of self-attestation: “It is me, here” 
(me, voici).  
185 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Klosterman, 1993), in following cit. (SZ) 
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Dasein ist Seiendes, das je ich selbst bin, das Sein ist je meines. Diese 
Bestimmung zeigt eine ontologische Verfassung an, aber auch nur das 
(…) Das Wer beantworte sich aus dem Ich selbst, dem ‘Subjekt’ dem 
‘Selbst’. Das Wer ist das, was sich im Wechsel der Verhaltungen und 
Erlebnisse als Identisches durchhält und sich dabei auf diese 
Mannigfaltigkeit bezieht (SZ 114). 
 
The Self is a “je meines” that refers to an ontological condition, a condition which 
endures the “Wechsel der Verhaltungen und Erlebnisse”. Both mine-ness and 
“permanence in time” are forms of “sameness over time” without being pure 
“substance”. In §64 of Sein und Zeit the central concept of Sorge underlines the 
temporal existential direction of the self as fundamentally troubled by our 
finiteness and fragility. Hannah Arendt’s examination of the “who of action” 
complements the existential perspective with a pragmatic relation between the 
“who” of identity as determined through the definition of its actions. Thus, 
Heidegger’s existential who of Dasein and Arendt’s who of action form the actual 
background to Ricoeur's hermeneutic opposition to the analytical theories of 
identity (which are determined by the continuity of sameness). In other words, 
Ricoeur returns to the anthropology of the self of his early work through a 
“hermeneutical reorganization” of the question regarding the cogito and 
anticogito, which is the problem of the “cogito in search of its other”.186  
  
The Problem of Self-Ascription   
How do my experiences belong to me; how do we experience our experiences as 
our "own"? Derek Parfit argues that there is only a single type of ownership 
whereas Ricoeur sees a difference between what I have and who I am.187 For 
                                               
186 Venema, Identifying Selfhood,  p. 124.  
187 It is remarkable that from the seven studies in Oneself as Another (we exclude here the 
studies seven till nine dedicated to the ethics of the self) that make up the hermeneutics of the 
self of four are entirely devoted to the analytical philosophy of language, action and identity. 
Instead of discussing the absolute cogito of Husserl or the anti-cogito of Nietzsche, Ricoeur 
chooses the analytical authors as his main partners in dialogue because analytical paradoxes 
show a “crisis within selfhood” (OA 138). For an extensive discussion of the analytical notion of 
personal identity see, Stefaan E. Cuypers, Persoonlijke Identiteit in de analytische Wijsbegeerte, 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 84 (1992), 194-205; Idem., Onpersoonlijke 
Persoonsidentiteit. Over de fictie van het Ik, in De Uil van Minerva, 9 (1992), 33-48.  In relation 
to Ricoeur’s reading of Parfit, see: H.J. Adriaanse, Mienneté et moment de la dépossession de 
soi, le debat de Ricoeur avec Derek Parfit, in Paul Ricoeur: l'herméneutique à l'école de la 
phénoménologie, ed. Jean Greisch (Paris: Beauchesne, 1995), p. 3-15. 
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Parfit the first type implies the second one while for Ricoeur the second includes 
the first. When the question of whether I have an identity cannot be answered 
for Parfit, this means that we should have the courage to abolish the question 
itself. For Ricoeur, questioning whether we do have an identity reveals a deep 
“crisis within selfhood” (OA 138) since it exposes the terms in an“ambiguous 
sense” and provoks the question of whether it actually is “a moment of self-
dispossession [that is] essential to authentic selfhood?” (OA 138). The fact that 
identity is not abolished even if we know we are unable to answer the question 
“what are we?” needs to be seen as a subcategory of the overall ontological 
question of who we are. To answer the question “who am I?” we first need to 
answer the question of what sort of self-reference is evoked by the question 
“what am I?”. Because for Parfit the first question always ends in speculation, it is 
only the second question that actually needs to be answered. For Parfit “what we 
are” depends on the possibilities for mental continuity and sameness of our 
consciousness and memory. Not surprisingly, the aim of Oneself as Another is to 
counter this position: for Ricoeur identity as selfhood cannot be reduced to the 
question of sameness, rather, the question of our sameness (through time) 
concerns what “change” and “belonging” actually means to us; how, why, and 
when does an experience, reflection or event “belong” to “me”; how do I create 
an identity I come to call my “own”? These questions can be summarized as: how 
do I ascribe particular properties to my Self? This question of self-ascription is at 
the very heart of Ricoeur’s examination of the analytical theories of identity that 
culiminate in Parfit’s conclusion that “identity is not what matters”. I, thus, 
understand Oneself as Another as one long argument against Parfit’s position and 
its ethical implications.   
Because Ricoeur's commentary of Parfit’s position is based on his previous 
“working through” of the analytical concepts of semantic and pragmatic self-
ascription I shall briefly summarize its main assumptions.  
 
The Semantics of Self-Reference 
Starting from the philosophy of language, Ricoeur examines the semantic and 
pragmatic aspects of the question “of whom” do we speak when we refer to 
persons (as distinct from things)?; And who is the one speaking as a “locutor”? 
How do we get from what a person is to whom a person is? and, from there, to 
the speaking subject (who speaks? what is said when we speak?). Ricoeur’s key-
question becomes how the “semantics of self-reference” is connected to the 
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“pragmatics of reflexive self-designation in the act of utterance”?188 In other 
words, to know what or who a person is, we need to know how we identify 
(recognize) the difference between a thing and a person. Consequently, we need 
to know which properties differentiate a person from a thing. Do we identify 
something as a person because we individualize a body by naming “it” a person 
(a body is not just that organism there but immediately a person I see, hear, 
smell, touch, speak to or respond to)? 
Ricoeur's first step towards answering these questions is to shift from 
identifying to individualization, emphasizing the process of designation itself. 
Individualization marks a movement that is the opposite of classification, which 
refers to generalization. We all belong to the human species but, as a person, “I” 
designates an individual singular entity within this classification. Because both 
individualization and classification are forms of conceptualization, the actual 
individuality of each person is lost in the linguistic attempt of describing a form of 
otherness or difference (a person as different from a thing). Although “Paul 
Ricoeur” is the name of a particular person, different from other names, the 
name itself can be given to any person. If we say “Neil Armstrong is the first man 
on the moon” there can be only one body/person meant by this, but, there will 
be other persons carrying the name Neil Armstrong. Other names like “Socrates” 
or “Rembrandt” also indicate, in colloquial language, just one particular person.  
If I point to you or you to me, the person in question is an individual in one 
specific time-place position. The central issue is how the designation of a 
particular body (“the first body on the moon”) and the designation of a person 
are connected. Put differently: while my particular name functions as a public 
identity, my self-consciousness refers to a private, inner identity and physical 
body. What is their relation? According to Ricoeur, the identifying reference 
conceals selfhood with a sameness of the body (labelled with my name): I 
recognize that body X is the same as the body I saw yesterday; I will say “today 
and yesterday I saw Neil Armstrong, the man on the moon”. But this recognition 
of physical sameness obscures the actual “self” present in that body; I do not say: 
“the ’self’ I see now was here yesterday as well”. Ricoeur wonders how sameness 
(a “what”category) and selfhood (a “who”category) may refer to the same 
entity.189  
                                               
188 Cf. “Semantic self-reference and pragmatic self-designation are combined to form the first 
level of self-identification”. Ibid., Venema, Identifying Selfhood, p. 130. 
189 Re-identification defined as sameness obscures the mental state of the mind. In contrast, 
selfhood includes embodied reflexivity, self-consciousness and speaking towards Others (thus, 
designating our social interrelatedness), and sameness only refers to physical properties and an 
observed Other instead of a sensed sameness of one-self. 
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The semantic designation of persons in the sense of “same-ness” privileges 
the physical and public re-identification; the predicates which I use to designate 
myself can also be used to describe somebody else, just as my body is a body 
among other bodies. The semantic structure of self-designation makes even my 
mental states a form of “mental states among other mental states”. Physical 
similitude is not mental similitude because, as just mentioned, what is observed 
and what is sensed cannot be collapsed into the semantic sameness of 
personhood. What is felt and observed is in the analytical conception of semantic 
reference attached to the same properties. This establishes, in Ricoeur's view, a 
crucial misconception of personal identity.  
 
The Pragmatics of Interlocution 
Ricoeur shifts from the semantics of the identifying reference to the pragmatics 
of interlocution. A shift which he considers to be not just acts of communication 
but also  the “act of speaking itself, which designates the speaker reflexively” (OA 
40). This shift from the referential to the reflexive level transfers the examination 
from the one spoken about (third person) to the one speaking (first person). The 
act of speaking, following the performative speech-act theory, belongs to the 
pragmatics of action (just like reading and human action coincide in Ricoeur's 
hermeneutic theory of textuality): illocution leads to allocution; utterances are 
exchanges of intentionalities (of concrete reflexive persons). Ricoeur’s  main 
critique on the performative approach is that it detaches the factuality of the 
event of utterances from the reflexivity of the person speaking. Ricoeur aspires 
to reconnect the identifying reference with the reflexivity of the utterance. Both 
the person speaking (as “basic particular”) and the person spoken to, lack the 
third person position who has become “a nonperson” (OA 52). The capacity for 
self-designation is related not just to mental attributes (“my-self” as first person 
speaker or as second person listener) but primarily to the anchoring of this 
attribution in a spatio-temporal (“here” and “now”) observable body that 
constitutes the sphere of “mine-ness”. In short, the “assimilation of the person of 
identifying reference to the reflexive” character of “I” (as a one-self) must be 
“founded on a more fundamental reality”. This reality is the lived body as “once a 
fact belonging to the world and the organ of a subject that does not belong to 
the objects of which it speaks. (…) The strange status of one’s own body arises 
out of a wider problematic, where the stakes are the ontological status of the 
being that we ourselves are, a being that comes into the world in the mode of 
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incarnation” (OA 55).190 Hence, on the semantic level the Kantian dilemma of 
apperception and attribution reoccurs and, in Ricoeur's understanding, expands 
to the ontological status of the lived body (as incarnated self).    
Thus, the question “who acts?” must be split into two questions: “what 
counts as an action?” (this concerns the semantics of action), on the one side and 
“to whom can we ascribe an action?” (this concerns the relation between the 
semantics, ascription and pragmatics of agency) on the other. The first problem is 
how we differentiate between an event and an action; if events are “just” actions 
that happen “what make[s] things happen” (OA 61). We usually ask “what 
happened?” followed by “why?”, suggesting a clear causality; there must be a 
reason (why?) for an action that took place (what happened?). This leads to a 
“dissociation of the ‘what?’ and the ‘who?’, resulting in the shift of the 
problematic of action to the side of an ontology of the anonymous event” (OA 
61). It seems as though “action and its motives on one side, and events and its 
causes on the other side” belong – according to Wittgenstein – to two different 
“language games” (OA 64) which should not be confused with each other. 
Instead of confusing, Ricoeur wishes to show the mutual independence of these 
“languages”  because “the major issue reside[s] less in determining what 
distinguishes actions from other events occurring in the world than in 
determining what specifies the self, implied in the power-to-do at the junction of 
acting and the agent” (OA 113). This power-to-do refers back to the “I can” of 
both the creative initiative of the poetic will and the capacity to act, to do as 
such. How do we attribute and ascribe actions to agents? This question leads 
Ricoeur back to a pragmatics of action in which the question “who acts?” regains 
a central position since the analytics of events (and their causes) needs agents 
(and their intentions-to).  
Aristotle was the first to differentiate between actions performed despite 
oneself, performed freely, and those performed as preferential choice after a 
process of deliberation (OA 89). The most important feature of this 
categorization is the definition of the agent as the principle (arkhē) of the act; the 
agent posits/ determines the law/ principle of the action, and as such the agent is 
the one who-acts-according-to-her-own-will/law.  The agent is the one who is 
able to reflect, decide and act; the act is the performance of the former decision, 
                                               
190 Ricoeur adds, “This strange constitution of the lived body extends from the subject of 
utterance to the very act of utterance: as a voice proffered outside by breath and articulated by 
phonics and gesticulation, the utterance shares the fate of all material bodies. As the 
expression of a sense intended by a speaking subject, the voice is the vehicle of the act of 
utterance insofar as it refers to an “I,” the irreplaceable centre of perspective on the world” (OA 
55). 
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the performance shows that I owe my decision; if I decide to turn left at the 
cross-road my actual turning left shows I possess the power-to-do according to 
my mental and physical initiative. The act done affirms a synthesis of my power-
to-do (it is in my power to act), my intention and my initiative.191  
Crucial for Ricoeur's opposition to the anonymousness of action in the 
analytical approach (Davidson, Strawson, Danto) is his own notion of 
interpretation in which relating “an action to a set of motives is like interpreting a 
text or part of a text in accordance with its context” (OA 64). A text has an author 
but the meaning of the text depends on my appropriation of this meaning, 
through interpretation, within my own existential and historical situation and 
therefore, the meaning of the text opens up a distance to its author and his or 
her original intention. There is no direct relation between what the author meant 
and my act of reading the text. The same counts for actions. Although actors act, 
the significance of these acts depends on (cultural, historical) structures of 
meaning and interpretation that are beyond the reach and intention of the actor. 
I can hold up my arm to say “hello” to a person approaching me while a taxi-
driver thinks I need a ride. An action has, like gestures and texts, multiple 
meanings that oscillate in a hermeneutical space between my intentions and 
interpretations of others; it is not just my own intention but the wider web of 
meaning in which the action takes place (an approaching taxi or friend?) that 
evokes a particular signification of the “act”.192  
After examining the semantic and pragmatic aspects of self-designation, 
agency and action, Ricoeur turns to the core problem of current analytical 
theories of the self: how to think the continuity and coherency of identity from 
its temporal, mental and social aspects? In Oneself as Another this amounts to 
the question of how identity as sameness over time (idem-identity) and identity 
as change over time (ipse-identity) inter relate. Ricoeur examines this 
relationship by asking if there is a form of permanence in time that answers the 
question of “who am I?”.  
On the level of self-reference what we call one’s character and the keeping 
of one’s word usually designate two forms of permanence in time in which 
identity as sameness and identity as dynamic site overlap. While character 
presents a strong set of habits that inscribe and sediment itself in a person, the 
“keeping of one’s word” represents a form of faithfulness and loyalty to the word 
                                               
191 Together they represent the “reappropriation by the agent of his or her own deliberation: 
making up one’s mind is cutting short the debate by making one of the options contemplated 
one’s own” (OA 95).   
192 Cf. Ricoeur, From Text to Action, p. 144-67.   
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we give to others. It, therefore, stands for the self as a constancy towards oneself 
and others; although I change over time I keep the promise I made to others. The 
kept promise evokes a trust in the stability of language and identity. Making a 
promise implies that I am loyal to my statements over time even if I might change 
(over time), it says: trust me! For Ricoeur character and the keeping of our 
promise represent an ontological reconciliation between the idem- and ipse-
aspects of my identity. It is this ontological reconciliation between change and 
stability (sameness) that is at stake in the empirical and analytical tradition to 
which I will now turn. 
 
Parfit’s Puzzling Persons 
It was Locke who first introduced the criteria of psychological sameness over 
time in contrast to the, in his time, usual criteria of a bodily sameness. It was no 
longer just our body but our memory-consciousness that needed to be the same 
as it was yesterday. Locke’s psychological criteria thus replace the unity of self-
reflexivity for the need for a unity of memory over time; the paradox of memory – 
namely that we forget and get fooled by “our” memory – provides the proof for 
the actual empirical inconsistencies of the relation between consciousness, 
reflexivity and ontology. Locke’s logic suggests that a person can exist only 
insofar as its memory-capacity is sufficiently connected and shows a non-
interrupted continuity. To test his arguments, Locke introduces the so-called 
“puzzling cases”. The implications of these cases, aiming to dismantle our false 
epistemological assumptions, still fill many journals of analytic philosophy. 
Locke’s most famous example is of the cobbler: does a cobbler, implanted with 
the entire memory of a prince, remain a cobbler or become a prince? In Locke’s 
theory the cobbler, due to its new prince-like memory, becomes a prince because 
memory-traces prevail over (even embodied) social habits and self-
understanding. In short, I am a cogito not because I am able to think but because 
I have a memory, and it is this memory that determines who I am (or: who I think 
I am). For Ricoeur Locke’s example of the cobbler is undecidable. We can neither 
be just memory nor can we be just a physical body with habitual behaviour.193 It 
                                               
193 Locke’s empirical intervention in the relation between memory and reflexivity is followed by 
Hume’s undermining the relation between perception and experience.  The main problem with 
the empirical positions is that the “who?” of identity is always reduced to “what is identity?” to 
which the answer is: identity is the quantity of our memory in which our “identity” is based only 
on the logic of our perception (of identity). To quote David Hume’s famous d ismissal of the 
notion of Self in A Treatise on Human Nature (1740): “There are some philosophers, who 
imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel in 
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is at this point that Ricoeur brings up Parfit’s impersonalism as the ultimate test 
for his notion of selfhood as the mine-ness of identity. Ricoeur considers Parfits 
reductionism as the biggest adversary of his hermeneutics of selfhood in which 
the mine-ness of our embodied, concrete existence in a here and now is central. 
In short, Locke and Hume focus on the empirical inconsistency of identity as 
sameness caused by our mistaken/ false understanding of the interrelation 
between self-reflexivity, memory, perception, experience and consciousness. 
Parfit renews this problem by simply asking whether we actually need identity to 
be persons while considering persons to be nothing but a bundle of mental and 
psychological events (thus he shifts from the question of what defines identity to 
the even more fundamental question if we do actually need something called 
“identity”). The “carriers” of these mental events, persons, cannot be observed. 
An embodied owner (identitified as “mine”) constituting my personhood is 
speculative and not necessary for a material, ontological understanding of 
mental awareness. What is crucial for mental awareness is a sense of coherence 
and continuity. The painful loss of coherence and continuity in self- awareness, 
for example, in dementia, shows the importance of inner connectedness. Here, 
the question underlying the impersonal position is: do we need an additional 
ongoing mental connectedness to be a person? Such as, a soul, a self, or a 
spiritual being? Summarizing the argument of his opponents, Parfit states:  
 
[T]hese writers claim that we cannot refer to particular experiences, or 
describe the connections between them, unless we refer to the person 
who has these experiences. On their view, the unity of a mental life 
cannot be explained in an impersonal way. (...) we could not have 
                                               
 
existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a 
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. (...) It must be some impression that 
gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our 
several impressions of self are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the 
idea of the self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of 
our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist in that manner. But there is no impression constant and  
invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and 
never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from 
any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea.” And, the 
other famous passage, “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never 
can observe any thing but the perception”. David Hume, An inquiry concerning human 
understanding: with a supplement, An abstract of a treatise of human nature. Ed. C. W. Hendel 
(London: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 52. 
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knowledge of the world about us unless we believe ourselves to be 
persons, with an awareness of our identity over time (RP 225). 
 
Parfit rejects this position. To clearly define the field of testing Parfit splits the 
theories of identity into two views:  a Reductionist View (RV) and a Non-
Reductionist View (NRV). The RV is interested only in the manners in which 
continuity and causal connectedness of physical and mental events exist within 
bodies. Here personal identity is nothing but  "various kinds of psychological 
continuity, with the right kind of cause"(RP 220). This implies:  
 
(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the 
holding of certain more particular facts, and, (2) that these facts can be 
described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or 
explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are had by 
this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These 
facts can be described in an impersonal way (RP 210).194 
 
In opposition to the Reductionist-View there are two kinds of Non-Reductionist 
Views: the first holds “the view that we are separately exiting entities”. According 
to this view, “personal identity over time does not consist of physical and/or 
psychological continuity. It is rather a separate, further fact” (RP 210). This view 
claims that persons are, besides brains and bodies “separately existing” entities, 
for example “spiritual substance” (or the Cartesian immaterial Pure Ego). This is 
the reason why Parfit calls NRV the Further Fact View (RP 210). There is a 
“further fact” which makes us refer to persons as identities/selves beyond the 
simple connectedness and continuity of physical and mental events. Parfit would 
subordinate Ricoeur’s notion of “narrative identity” (which can be read as an 
application of the “surplus of meaning” central to his hermeneutics to the 
concept of personhood) under his Further-Fact-View. In short, Parfit dismisses all 
Non-Reductionist Views of identity as purely hypothetical.  
Hence, for Parfit the sameness of persons over time depends solely on the 
question whether there is enough continuity with and connectedness to an 
earlier state of this person. The underlying assumption is that the thoughts of 
persons and their relations can fully be described without the necessity of a 
                                               
194 Parfit continues: “It may seem that (2) could not be true. When we describe the 
psychological continuity that unifies some person’s mental life, we must mention this person, 
and many other people, in describing the content of many thoughts, desires, intentions, and 
other mental states. But mentioning this person in this way does not involve asserting that 
these mental states are had by this person  or asserting that this person exists” (RP 210).  
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personhood as the actual “carrier” of these thoughts or relations; we do not 
need an identity or self to be able to give a full description of these internal 
processes. What in daily language we call “identity” is just a “transitive relation” 
(RP 206). Instead of asking what identity signifies, we need to ask what the 
correct criteria are for this transitive relation.195 Parfit argues that a transitive 
relation is established by enough continuity and connectedness of the physical 
and psychological person. On the physical level he recalls another famous 
example given by Locke: if all the parts of a ship are renewed over time with 
qualitative identical parts does this mean that the ship is still the same original 
vessel? If my watch is taken apart and reassembled later on, can we consider it as 
the same watch? These questions can be asked in relation to the human body of 
which most cells are permanently renewed. Since the body, by growing and 
ageing, changes constantly, the question asked is whether I can be the same 
person in a different body?  
To be (and remain) the same person we only need to keep the flow of 
events going, which means more accurately that we need enough physical and 
psychological continuity and connectedness. Here, memory is the core capability 
that makes us aware of our inner continuity and connectedness. In his memory-
theory Parfit differentiates between direct memory connections and a continuity 
of memory. Direct memory connections refer to our conscious memory which is 
the memory of our consciousness (the fact that we have memories). An example 
of this is our so-called experience-memory: people who suffer from amnesia 
usually do not remember particular past experiences but they still know how to 
speak, walk or swim. For Locke, it this experience-memory which provides the 
main criteria for identity. If I genuinely do not remember that I committed a 
crime yesterday I should not be punished because my current identity (and thus 
my current responsibility) is disconnected from the identity that committed the 
crime.  If we forget our experiences, our identity is lost as well and, thus, cannot 
be held responsible for something this forgotten identity once did. The juridical 
tradition that children are less accountable for their deeds is based on the same 
notion: they lack “full” personal identity. This implies that each time we forget 
                                               
195 If “Personal identity is a transitive relation” (RP 206), we need to ask what defines (what are 
the right criteria for) a transitive relation. I may have a strong relation (memory)  with my-self 
of yesterday and the day before and so on, but I can lack a memory of or a sense of relationship 
with the self I was twenty years ago. The connection between my-self now and my-self twenty 
years ago can be very weak although the continuity between these moments (each day I had a 
continuous connection with the person I was the day before) can be strong (and vice versa). 
Thus: “Strong connectedness is not a transitive relation” (RP 206). 
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something we actually loose part of our identity (each discontinuity becomes 
fatal!).  
But, according to Parfit, Locke’s claim is false. Actually, we are not physically 
and mentally able to remember everything, as we even need (biologically and 
existentially) to continuously forget large parts of our daily experiences. Instead 
of “direct memory connection” (I remember what I did twenty years ago) we 
usually just have a “continuity of memory”. Although we do not remember 
everything that happened during the past twenty years, we did during the last 
twenty years probably remember what happened on the previous day. We do 
possess a continuity of memories that forms an “overlapping chain of direct 
memories” (RP 205). A transitive relation between continuity and connectedness 
of memory is Parfit’s main criteria to describe all psychological relations of a 
person. This relation is impersonal which means there is no need for a self-
referential ownership named identity.196  
If I do not care about past moments and I am satisfied with living in the 
extreme present of my amnesia, then this psychological disconnection has no 
influence on my feeling of identity. Here the issue of the will returns: perhaps I 
do not care about what happened yesterday but if I do care and notice that I am 
unable to remember the events of the previous day, this will probably deeply 
trouble “me”.197 Our memory often plays games with us but this seldom 
                                               
196 Parfit now divides the continuity of the transitive relation into direct psychological 
connection and strong psychological connectedness. Strong connectedness is provided if, “the 
number of connections, over any day, is at least half the number of direct connections that 
hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person. When there are enough direct 
connections, there is, what I call, strong connectedness” (RP 206). This means that I may lose 
my psychological continuity if I do not remember at least one event which occurred the 
previous day, loosing this continuity of my psychological process influences the unity of this 
process. This is true only as long as it belongs to my feeling of self-identity to know what I did 
yesterday. Because here quantity means quality the question seems: what is (a) “half”? 
Memories seem predominantly determined by the “impact” they have. This impact can relate 
to only a fraction of the entire “event”; this fraction represents the “whole”. The question is 
when is this “whole” enough “half” to count as proof of the continuity-thesis?  
197 The connectedness of memories seems a crucial element of the subject’s relationship to 
oneself: I want to know/remember what I did yesterday. If I do not remember what I did 
yesterday it troubles me deeply, it means I can no longer construct a continuous life-story or 
feel a continuity over time. From Parfits’s perspective we only need connectedness for the 
psychological and physical continuity and coherence as a person, and this does not prove we 
actually need identity. We do not “own” our memories.  Like mental amnesia, also physical 
paralysis can destroy my feeling of unity and continuity. For example, if the brain sends out 
signals to raise my arm but nothing happens. The active body suddenly experiences a 
disconnection and, subsequently, an alienation that fundamentally changes my self-
representation as a coherent embodied self; a rupture occurs between the connectedness and 
continuity of the physical and psychological state of personhood. Continuity seems less 
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influences how we experience or understand our own identity. Thus, there is 
somebody who might be troubled by the possible failure of the transitive relation 
between “my” present and “my” past. If our experiences are impersonal “who” is 
the one troubled? This is Ricoeur's main argument against Parfit’s impersonalism. 
Ricoeur’s critique on Parfit points to an incommensurable gap between 
Parfit’s disjunctive syllogism’s and his own attempt of dialectical mediations. For 
Ricoeur this gap is evoked by the ontology of “mineness/ ownness”.198 
Accordingly, the question of mineness stays “superfluous” because mine-ness 
does not belong to “the range of facts, to the epistemology of observable 
entities, and …to the ontology of events” (OA 132). This implies a neutralization 
of the “mineness of experience” and a denial of the possibility of “my own body”. 
Due to Parfit’s concept of an impersonal body all questions of identity become 
exclusively questions of the brain (as “mind”). This is the reason why the 
question of “mineness” has no importance for Parfit because the brain is, as 
                                               
 
important for unity as connectedness. Our daily forgetfulness does only seldom harm our sense 
of personal continuity. If I only have two very distant memory-moments, one of twenty years 
ago and one of yesterday, while everything in between is blank, I might lose my internal unity if 
these two moments seem to belong to two entirely different persons (perhaps I turned 
religious in the meantime and I cannot identify/connect with the earlier memory-trace of being 
secular). I can also ascribe an experience to a memory-trace which actually did not happen and 
thus, does not belong to “me” but does become part of my mental continuity. This implies that 
even if the transitive relation on the level of continuity and connectedness seems fulfilled, this 
might be caused by an inconsistent (fake) memory transition. In short, Parfit questions the 
notion of memory which is normally seen as the necessary binding element for our ordinary 
notion of personal identity. If our memory is not only highly selective but also based on false 
memories, what does this mean for the facticity of our identity? The lack of continuity evokes a 
lack of connectedness which causes a lack of unity. Thus, the question is: when do we have 
enough physical and/or psychological connectedness, continuity or unity to refer to ourselves 
as the same person over time? How much continuity is needed to stay connected, how much 
connectedness is needed to stay a unity, how much unity is sufficient to eliminate identity but 
to stay a person? It is clear that Parfit replaces the notion of identity as the unifying “carrier” of 
my experiences and thoughts with an impersonal process of inner connectedness and 
continuity which just need to be sufficient to keep the flow (the sense of mental unity) going. 
The only thing we need is an ongoing flow of inner connectedness. This is what Parfit calls 
Relation R. Thus, what matters is “Relation R: psychological connectedness and/ or continuity 
with the right kind of cause (…) the right kind of cause could be any cause” (RP 215). Here again 
Parfit questions the causality needed for the NRV of identity. Our memory often plays games 
with us but this seldom influences how we experience or understand our ‘own’ identity.  
198 The source of this gap is the term “criterion”: a criterion assumes the possibility to test all 
questions of identity within a methodology fixated on verification or falsification defined in 
categories of relation called “as” (Is the person I clone the same as the replica?). Analytical 
questions of identity are tested by the relational “as” of causality while phenomenological and 
hermeneutical questions of identity ask how the body, memory and experiences can be “mine”.  
Attested Selfhood   |  105 
 
 
 
Ricoeur aptly puts it, a “nonexperienced interiority” (OA 133). Strictly speaking 
we have no experience of “our” brain, it has no phenomenological status and 
gives no traits of belonging; the remark “I possess my brain” is nonsense. My 
brain is the closest distanced object which I “have” but which I am unable to 
perceive (as something I possess). If I cannot perceive my brain, does this imply I 
do not own it? Because the brain is impersonal, Parfit concludes that all mental 
and psychological phenomena must be understood as impersonal.199 In short, we 
do not possess our brain, and thus, we do not possess our mental and 
psychological perceptions and experiences.  
This is the reason why Parfit opposes the Cartesian Pure Ego, this ego still 
proclaims to be an “I”, a person. If it is impossible to say “I am my brain” 
(compared to the possible utterance: look, this is my hand!)200, then all other 
phenomena we attribute to the brain, like “our” memory, become impersonal as 
well. If this is true, “one would genuinely be rid of the trait of belonging to me – 
in short, of ‘one’s own’” (OA 133). If memory is disconnected from mineness 
there is only a chemical cerebral trace, an impersonal causal connection between 
a distant imprint in my brain and the present state of a mind in which this imprint 
reoccurs as a memory-image or thought. Ricoeur objects to the idea that 
memory is only a particular psychological combination of continuity and 
connectedness by asking “can what is one’s own be a particular case of the 
impersonal?”. The same question was raised as Parfit substituted Descartes’ 
ergo, cogito sum for Lichtenberg’s less famous: “It is thought: thinking is going 
on”. Ricoeur assures, in reference to Strawson, that “self-ascription and other-
ascription (...) seem untranslatable into the terms of impersonal description” (OA 
133).  One could ask: who does the thinking? Could one ask: is thought going on 
in “me”? In the same manner I can say: pain is going on in my head. The process 
that causes a different state in my head — pain — than the state yesterday is not 
something I own. It is rather the subject that experiences a process of pain who 
can call this experience something that constitutes (among other experiences) its 
sense of “mine”. It is me who is in pain, it is me who suffers (not just something 
                                               
199  The “expression “my brain” has no meaning, at least not directly. Literally speaking, there is 
a brain in my skull, but I do not sense it. It is only through the detour by way of my body 
inasmuch as the brain is contained in this body, that I can say: “my brain”(but does the 
statement “my brain is having a headache” make sense?).  
200 But this notions of mineness refers only to visuality, thus to the material perception of my 
embodiedness. What does it mean when I say: “Look at this text –  it is my brain?” Or do I need 
to open up my skull and point to the brain – like to the pumping heart – to make a causal 
connection between the “mineness” of my brain and a self-referential visualization which 
others may experience when seeing “me”?  
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somewhere in the body-vessel in which “I” dwell). I do not own my tooth-ache 
but it is me who “has” the tooth-ache and not my neighbour.  
According to Ricoeur the failure of Parfit’s reductionism lies in a basic 
misrecognition of the actual mine-ness of my body as the fundamental 
precondition of our embodied condition. Our embodied being always already 
actualizes itself as a “body among other bodies” and as part of my rootedness on 
this earth. These aspects of our person seem irreducible to a flow of mental 
phenomena.201 Do these objections prove that Parfit is wrong or do they only 
show that Ricoeur thinks an impersonal description of identity is impossible as 
long as we are rooted in ourselves, the others and the earth?202 Parfit’s person 
only “works” if this person knows no fear for tomorrow, if it has no interest 
whatsoever in knowing if “it” will still be fully alive on the next day. The 
fundamental sense of care for our survival stands in exact opposition to the care-
free-ness that is crucial in Parfit’s reductionism. Ricoeur states that “if 
indecidability seems unacceptable to us, it is because it troubles us” (OA 136). To 
be troubled means to ask “What is going to happen to me?”. This fear for the 
indeterminacy of our future signifies the relation between self-reference as the 
Heideggerian notion of Sorge (care) and the Foucaultian “souci de soi” (care for 
one-self). In short. while Parfit wishes to clarify “what sort of entities persons 
are” (OA 137), Ricoeur overrules this question by asking: who is the sort of 
person who is troubled by this question?; 
 
As far as I am concerned, what the reducionist thesis reduces is not only, 
nor even primarily, the mineness of experience but, more 
fundamentally, that of my own body. The impersonal character of the 
event marks above all the neutralization of one’s own body. Thereafter, 
the true difference between the nonreductionist thesis and the 
                                               
201 Both human rootedness to the earth and the corporeal rootedness of self in the body form 
the bases of mineness in Ricoeur’s philosophy: “in virtue of the mediating function of the body 
as one’s own in the structure of being in the world, the feature of selfhood belonging to 
corporeality is extended to that of the world as it is inhabited corporeally. This feature defines 
the terrestrial condition as such and gives to the Earth the existential signification attributed to 
it in various ways by Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. The Earth here is something different, 
and something more, than a planet: it is the mythical name of our corporeal anchoring in the 
world” (OA 150). Now the question is: if the anchoring is mythical, is it more than just another 
narrative? Is the metaphor of anchoring or terrestrial a meaning-making practice or an 
articulation of an actual existential experience? 
202 Besides this, the manipulations of the science-fiction cases developed by Parfit are, 
according to Ricoeur, “technological manipulations performed on the brain and taken as 
equivalent to the person” from which “the question of selfhood has been eliminated as a 
matter of principle” (OA 135).  
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reductionist thesis in no way coincedes with the so-called dualism 
between spiritual substance and corporeal substance, but between my 
own possesion and impersonal description (OA 132).  
 
This verdict will not bother Parfit who does not entirely neglect the notion of 
“ownness” but questions this term on the basis of his verification of the 
possibility of continuity and connectedness of physical and psychological 
relations. This means that he does not agree with Ricoeur’s assumption that our 
Leiblichkeit (embodiment) automatically grounds and binds an ontological 
connection of our inner processes through time. Also Parfit could claim that we 
have a body which is “its own”; although we have a body which is our own 
(because we live “in” it), this does not mean that ownness is a reality within this 
body. Dreams happen in my brain but I do not “own” them, and I have little 
control over “my” dreams. I can say that “I am” part of this body having dreams. I 
cannot say that the dreams that this body has are “mine”. I can only say: I 
consider this body having dreams as mine.  
Parfit’s theory of identity as a question of continuity and connectedness 
(what is the smallest amount of memory I still need to stay a person if “identity is 
not what matters”?) is now confronted with the widest possible temporary 
connection: narrative. Ricoeur is not just reclaiming the space occupied by Parfit, 
but rather he says: It does not matter that identity (as the question of sameness) 
does not matter, because it is “narrative identity” (as ipse) that really matters!203 
While Parfit reduces identity to an impersonal connectedness, Ricoeur defines 
identity as a poetic, narrative, connectedness. Although life is lived and narratives 
are recounted it is only in narratives that our reflexive connectedness over time 
finds an adequate articulation. In Oneself as Another narrative identity functions 
as the hinge between a descriptive analysis of identity (as formulated in analytical 
and pragmatic philosophy) and a prescriptive formulation of ethics (in a post-
Hegelian-Kantian tone). It, thus, mediates “between the constitution of action 
and the constitution of the self” (OA 115). The central question in need of an 
answer becomes: “Is there a form of permanence in time that is a reply to the 
question ’Who am I?’” (OA 118). To answer this question Ricoeur’s examines the 
                                               
203 In a footnote about Parfit Ricoeur states, “Later we shall ask whether a certain convergence 
of the literary fictions which I assign to selfhood and those of science fiction (which, in my 
opinion, concern sameness) is not reconstituted when one takes into account the ethical 
implications of narrativity. There is perhaps for us, too, a way of saying that identity is not what 
matters” (OA 151). What Ricoeur aims at is to say that there is more at stake than just a 
definition of identity. If something within us “cares” it means that, beyond the definition of 
identity there are ethical implications as well.    
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potential of narrative identity as an ontology of attestation symbolized by the act 
of “keeping one’s word”. In their synthesis this leads to a narrative ontology 
which, in its core, harbours a narrative ethics.  
Ricoeur finalizes his multi-layered poetic anthropology – narrative 
temporality, narrative identity, narrative ontology and narrative ethics – in his 
concept of attestation. The shift from the question of identity as sameness to the 
question of identity as selfhood signifies a shift from absolute self-reference as 
the quest for a cognitive core to a quest for hermeneutical self-expression – a 
“surplus of meaning” we can attest to. It is not just the symbol that “gives” but 
also the “self” that we attest to  gives : it gives a story of who it is and, thus, it 
gives us what it “stands for”.   
 
Attestation 
The trajectory from identity as sameness to identity as selfhood, from analytical 
reductionism to a hermeneutics of narrative and ethical identity spirals around 
the core question “what kind of being is the self?”, which Ricoeur translated into 
the set of questions “who speaks?”, “who acts?”, “who recounts?”, and “who is 
the subject of imputation?”. To these a final one is added: “who is the being that 
stands for the self?” The latter refers to the “province of attestation” (OA 129).204 
It is our “selfhood” which is the synthesis of all the manners in which we attest of 
our ontological commitments (the ontological is, thus, not posited but 
attested).205 Ricoeur places attestation alongside the Aristotelian categories of 
                                               
204 Since Ricoeur wishes the discussion on identity to shift from the level of idem to ipse he also 
needs to transform the false/ true criterion of identity to a “truth test of another order than the 
test of verification or falsification” (OA 129). This order is one of attestation in which the 
verification of my identity as selfhood consists in “keeping the promise” by stating: “Here I am!” 
Parfit questions the connectedness of the one who makes the promise to the one who will be 
asked, at another point in time, to act on the promise. In short, the commitment is not pre-
given but always needs to be re-established. Ricoeur sees this commitment-over-time as 
inherently part of our narrative identity. Parfit wants a more specific formulation which he 
expresses as a very general claim: “I and all of my later selves will promise to help all people” 
(or: I will help you although you have completely changed), Cf. (RP 327). Parfit assumes the 
possible disconnectedness of successive selves. In many cases people change their thoughts, 
wishes, habits or character to such an extent (as a result of changed views, sickness or aging) 
that commitments may - without any trace of bad faith -  indeed become impossible to fulfil. 
Parfit’s paradoxical syllogisms do, in this case, show a weak spot in Ricoeur’s use of attestation 
and the “kept promise”. Even selfhood made by intense self-reflection (as narrative identity) is 
not free of traumatic experiences or new insights which result in the re-evaluation of all values. 
Cf. (RP 327-329), see particular Chapter 110 on Commitments. 
205 Aristotle’s notion of being-true and being-false and Heidegger’s notion of care (Sorge) and 
conscience (Gewissen) frame Ricoeur's attempt to connect his concept of attestation with 
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being-true or being-false which validate being instead of verifying it. Not a 
philosophy of absolute knowledge but a hermeneutics of testimony, not facts 
and substances but a belief-in and trust in what the ‘I’ as “self” ultimately stands 
for. Self-attestation marks our belief-in something (for example, our belief-in the 
statements of the witness). There is no ontological ground of attestation as such, 
but rather attestation that validates my commitment to my selfhood as a quasi-
ontological condition. But attestation as an “ontology in view”, as Ricoeur calls 
his final study of Oneself as Another, is not arbitrary, as it avoids only the 
inappropriate criteria of certainty (both in its Cartesian and positivist version). I 
agree with Christopher Watkin who argues that, “the fragility of the attested self 
is accompanied by the fragility of attestation, the attestation of the broken cogito 
with an attestation which is itself broken” (OA 318).206 It is clear that for Ricoeur 
attestation and suspicion belong together; suspicion haunts attestation, 
attestation reaffirms our self-trust and self-worth. We recall here the figure of a 
spiral hermeneutic understanding which by explaining more – after each spiral of 
analysis – understands more and thus, overcomes suspicion and critique (but we 
cannot escape that more knowledge might evoke even more suspicion; critique 
only to be overcome by more critique).  
It is at this point that the act of promising and the Ruf (the calling of our 
conscious,  Gewissen, or the face or voice of the Other) brings us back to the 
otherness of any one-self revealing the dialogical relation at the heart of all 
attestation. Even if attestation seems circular (narratives retell other narratives, 
testimony evokes other testimony and so on), it is always directed to an 
exteriority by which it is evoked – this exteriority “prevents the self being 
reduced to a transcendental subjectivity in full possession of itself. The self can 
never be posited, present, perfect, if it is structured as a promise which never has 
the status of epistemic certainty”.207 Although this promise is not attached to 
self-certainty it does bind temporal self-endurance (maintenance-de-soi) to self-
reflexivity, self-understanding with the recognition that the other (as language, 
culture, history or the Otherness of others) is inescapably part of our selfhood.   
                                               
 
ontological categories: as such attestation (Selbstbezeugung) binds our existential experience of 
being-in-the-world with care and being oneself. But Ricoeur finds the best description of the 
“ground of Being” that connects a phenomenology of the suffering and acting self with life’s 
potentiality, power and productivity in Spinoza’s notion of conatus as the effort to persevere in 
being enabling the affirmation of the self as an primordial being.  
206 Ibid., Watkin, Phenomenology or Deconstruction?, p. 88. Attestation falls prey to suspicion 
because “[n]othing is attested but the attestation itself, and nothing can attest to attestation 
but more attestation”. Ibid., p. 89. 
207 Ibid., p. 91. 
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Just like the infinite openness of narrative (recurring in narrative identity) 
signifies a fragile dynamic (all narratives can be rewritten and, thus, loose their 
worth and credibility), and, in a similar manner, all attestation can break down 
(all attestation can be challenged, marginalized). In the words of Paul Celan, 
“Niemand zeugt für den Zeugen”.208 My credibility and self-worth can be 
discredited, even without credible testimony. As such, my attestation signifies a 
“notwithstanding” – a belief-in as a final recourse against all impossibilities to 
attest  an (im)possible self.  
Attestation – our “here I stand for” – gathers all registers and languages of 
all my selves, of “my” personal plurality of selves, in order to force out a sense of 
commitment towards my own statements and others; attestation represents a 
self-declared fidelity to our sense of enduring selfhood in the presence of the 
other. This “gathering gesture”209 is comparable to what Derrida calls the 
“signature” in which a subject “multiplies itself in its iterability and gathers its 
own iterations”210. But while for Ricoeur the gesture of attestation beholds a 
response to the other, a response-bility, the “signature”, in Derrida’s 
understanding, “is the highest responsibility in a deep irresponsibility….it is 
instead what I cannot appropriate, and cannot make my own”.211 For Derrida, 
what I cannot appropriate undermines all attempts for full responsibility; if I 
cannot appropriate the “one” who should be responsible, how can the divided 
“self” be expected to claim a unified accountability? Simultaneously, the claim 
for a justified irresponsibility is unacceptable. Ricoeur turns this tragic suspicion 
(leading to an impossible deadlock of our relations to others) into the positive 
awareness that the subject’s self-referential and self-reflexive options are open 
and never final. Here, it is important to remember that Ricoeur applies his own 
hermeneutic model of “distantiation–appropriation” to the concept of selfhood. 
As such, the fact that we (and others) can never absolutely grasp “who we are” 
turns the self into a dynamic site; this creates a possibility for change, new forms 
of self-appropriation and self-affirmations.  
Our “standing for” is a “notwithstanding”, an echo of hope, in a situation of 
fragility, precariousness or even despair; if, in the end, there is no stable identity, 
                                               
208 Cit. from Watkin, Phenomenology, p. 93. This statement, like the questions (“How can we 
arbitrate between different witnesses? Who will witness for the witness?”), stand for the “legal 
register” at the heart of the question of justice to which we will turn in the final part of this 
study. 
209 Asja Szafraniec, Beckett, Derrida and the Event of Literature (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), p. 137. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid., p. 137. 
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even if there is no unified coherent self, we do have the capability to “stand for 
something” and, thus, respond, promise, and attest as ethical beings. But does 
the subject’s “standing for something” amount to its “standing for its own self”? 
For Ricoeur it does so because the “gathering gesture” is rooted in our “mine-
ness”, a mine-ness which equals an ontological commitment to my body, my 
relation to others, time, language, and, the earth. Our ontological commitments 
evoke an “attested self”. This self bridges idem- and ipse-identity, binds “oneself 
to another” and finally, the self desires to affirm its “own” perseverance over 
time. 
 
Conclusion 
Oneself as Another is Ricoeur's attempt to formulate an anthropology of self-
affirmation in attestation. Just like the mimēsis of reality in fictional or historical 
stories is synthesized in narratives, so identity as idem and ipse is synthesized in 
attestation. Narratives and attestation symbolize the “third term” of an open, 
dynamic dialectic that resolves the aporia of time and identity. Oneself as 
Another moves beyond the classical dichotomies (for which Husserl’s and 
Nietzsche’s notions of the subject were taken as exemplary) towards a 
hermeneutic and ontological understanding of the manners in which we bind and 
attest of our experiences of time, narrative, identity and otherness. 
  Parfit will not feel a need to react to Ricoeur, because from his point of 
view, narrative identity and moral selfhood are, ultimately, just forms of 
speculative philosophy.212 Ricoeur is not able to resolve Parfits’ impersonalism. 
As a result, his dismissal of impersonalism just shifts the sameness of identity into 
another register: from a pure material ontology of sameness, continuity and 
coherence to a phenomenological-hermeneutic ontology of embodiment, 
temporality and otherness. Oneself as Another appears mainly as a multi-layered 
description of the “power-to-do of agency” which has four variations: power-to-
do and act (OA 220, 113), power-over (OA 220), power-in-common (OA 220, 257) 
and power-as-productivity (OA 315). These powers can stabilize identity because 
they create, do and enforce our selfhood but they can also destabilize identity 
                                               
212 According to Dieter Teichert Ricoeur attempts to connect two levels of analyses ( idem- and 
ipse–identity) which could never merge. Thus, Ricoeur’s wish to integrate Parfit’s reductionism 
into his concept of selfhood must fail: hermeneutical selfhood and analytical identity are 
incommensurable discourses. Cf. Dieter Teichert, „Von der Feststellung der Identität zur 
Explikation von Personalität - Ricoeurs Kritik an Derek Parfit”, in Das Herausgeforderte Selbst. 
Perspektiven auf Paul Ricoeurs Ethik (ed.) Andris Breitling, Stefan Orth, Birgit Schaaf (Würzburg: 
Königshausen und Neumann 1999), p. 131-143.  
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through their destructive potential. For Ricoeur these powers are “mine”, they 
belong to me and evoke commitments of which I can attest towards others. 
Fundamentally, Oneself as Another must be understood as an examination into 
the question of how identity as selfhood can both transcend the plurality of 
meaning and the polysemy of being by including both in a stable ontological 
commitment. This commitment to oneself as/ and an-other is firmly rooted in 
our embodied being, narrative self-understanding and accountability. This is, 
ultimately, an ethical rather than an empirical or hermeneutic definition of what 
identity means for “our-selves”.  
In Oneself as Another, the Kantian theme of the “unity of experience”213 
returns as a key-theme to Ricoeur's entire project. After the narrative unification 
of our temporal experiences, it is in attestation that the dualism of idem- and 
ipse-identity is reconnected and it remains in our sense of historicity, as the next 
chapter tries to show, that our affectedness by the past, present and future is 
unified. Dialectic tensions — as discordant concordance in Time and Narrative, as 
idem- and ipse identity in Oneself as Another, and as remembering and forgetting 
in Memory, History, Forgetting — echo the fundamental anthropological rupture 
between our finiteness and infinite freedom. These dualities form the source of 
the human as an “unstable equilibrium”. Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology of 
suffering and acting, of a fallible but capable human being, offers a fundamental 
understanding of the deep paradoxes and aporias underlying our destabilizing 
inner forces and fears, on the one hand, and the capability and hope for human 
acts able to re-establish a mental equilibrium, on the other. Our ongoing desire 
to escape this dialectic evokes the necessity for a finite but (nonetheless) 
accountable self bound by a common striving “for the good life with others in 
just institutions”.   
To briefly recollect Ricoeur's trajectory; the “hermeneutics of the self” 
responds to the semantic, pragmatic and analytical fixation on identity as 
signifying the ascription of sameness to persons. Ricoeur’s response to the 
analytical challenge integrates sameness or mêmeté (idem-identity) with ipséité 
(ipse-identity) in a concept of narrative identity which Ricoeur extends towards 
an ontological and ethical commitment to self-attestation (which the German 
term Selbstbezeugung covers so well). While sameness mainly referred to 
quantitative predicates (Eigenschaftsmerkmalen), “selfhood” refers to the 
qualitative aspects of our embodied and temporal experiences and reflects the 
intersubjective and ethical features of being a “person among other persons”. 
                                               
213 Paul Ricoeur, “History and Hermeneutics”, in Philosophy and History of Action, ed. Yirmiahu 
Yovel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978), p. 10.  
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Ricoeur’s main objection to the analytical perspective is the “conceptual reversal 
in which selfhood was silently substituted for sameness” (OA 126). Oneself as 
Another should be understood as Ricoeur’s highly complex attempt to reverse 
this reversal.  
Because selfhood also includes otherness as the need for my self to attest 
who I am and what I stand for towards all others, the question of selfhood leads 
necessarily to the realm of ethics, justice and recognition – these are the topics 
of our very last chapter. 

  
5. PRESENT PAST 
 
 
 
C’est la mémoire qui atteste que le soi est même que lui-même  
et non un autre.. 
 
Ricoeur (2004: 25) 
 
 
The central anthropological aporia of Ricoeur’s focus on the relation between 
remembering and forgetting raises questions such as:  how can the absent past 
be present?; Why do humans desire to retrieve this absent past?; How do we 
articulate this desire? 
 
Memory, History, Forgetting reorganizes Ricoeur's central themes around a 
philosophy of historical consciousness which he examines as a phenomenology of 
memory, an epistemology of the historical operation, and finally, as a 
hermeneutics of historicity. Underlying this three-step process is a dialectical 
arch of memory that connects the active and passive aspects of remembering 
and forgetting. In his preface Ricoeur gives three short motivations – private, 
professional and public – to write Memory, History, Forgetting.214 The private 
motivation is his discovery of a “lacuna” between Time and Narrative and Oneself 
as Another, namely, the need for an examination of memory and forgetting. 
Professionally, the project aims to complete his thinking on the experience of 
history and the work of the historian that started with Histoire et Verité. The 
public motivation refers to the problem of a “too much” of history in some places 
and too much forgetting in other places.  
While our permanent forgetting is involuntary and undermines all feelings of 
wholeness of self and history, it is the capability to remember, both 
spontaneously and actively, which evokes a "happy" experience when we realize 
                                               
214 Hayden White rightfully remarks that “Oblivion” seems a better translation for the French 
‘l’oubli’ because “the section dealing with “forgetting” lines up with “the historical condition,” 
and the historical condition requires us to mediate between remembering and forgetting over 
against the impulse simply to “obliviate”. According to White “this long and difficult book” 
shows the typical Ricoeurian “intellectual generosity” and an “exquisite historical sensibility to 
the singularity of ‘our modernity’.” Hayden White, Guilty of History? The Long Durée of Paul 
Ricoeur, in: History and Theory 46.2 (2007), 241- 249.  
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that the past "that was" is not entirely lost but can be recalled.215 Its reciprocal 
relation of "consent" is simple: We accept forgetting because we know we are 
also able to remember. While forgetting seems a shortcoming, a failure, the act 
of remembering is a capability of Joy, it gives us the gift to retrieve what seems 
lost.  
Memory, History, Forgetting consists of three main parts: “On Memory and 
Recollection”; “History, Epistemology”; and “The Historical Condition”, extended 
with an Epilogue called “Difficult Forgiveness” (le pardon difficile) which is 
Ricoeur's ethics on remembering and forgetting. The nucleus of Ricoeur’s last big 
project is to place the correlative relation between memory and ethics at the root 
of the philosophy of history. This “correlation” raises three central questions: 
what?, who?, and, how?  
 
1) What is it that we remember? If memory brings the absent past back 
to the present, then is what is made present again (recalled) a re-
presentation, a re-imagination, or an iconographic reduction of that 
past?; can any representation of the past be truthful or is it, rather, just 
a phantasm? 
 
2) Who remembers? Is it a brain, a body, a self that remembers? Who is 
the one that perceives and re-recognizes the past, who is the one who 
actively recalls? Is it the person that states "I was there," or are all 
personal memories always already collective? Are we embedded in 
images and memories created prior to us? Following the "who" of 
identity, the "who" of memory now extends the notion of attestation 
and selfhood, described in the previous chapter, to that of testimony 
and the witness.  
 
3) How do we remember? We remember by testifying of the past, by 
telling stories, by examining archives and constructing a narrative 
"history" (which we expect to be truthful to a particular past). 
                                               
215 We, of course, do not only suffer from the fear to forget, we actually forget all the time all 
day long; we also fear that what our memory re-presents to us is distorted, vague or plainly 
wrong. This undermines our trust in the capability of memory and the narratives of “history”. In 
Ricoeur’s dialectical scheme, happy and unhappy remembering mirror a happy and unhappy 
forgetting. There are memories that we forgot but which we hoped to remember as well as 
memories which we remembered but which we would have rather forgotten. Without the 
capability to forget we have no need to remember and thus, forgetting is a precondition for 
remembering. 
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Underlying these inquiries is the pragmatic question; what can memory do? 
According to Ricoeur, memory reveals three essential capabilities: the capability 
to remember oneself, the capability to forget and as an ethical necessity, the 
capability to forgive. Memory can fail in forgetting or be delusional, but memory 
also offers another human capability: we "can" remember, forget and forgive.  
 
The "I can remember" adds a new layer to the previous set of affirmative 
capabilities (I can speak, I can act, I can narrate, I can be accountable) of the 
l’homme capable. Again Ricoeur sets up a "conflict of interpretations" between a 
happy capability (to remember) and the unhappy suspicion that what we actually 
remember (its representation or re-imagination) cannot be trusted. What 
remembering stabilizes (the feeling of connectedness with the past), the 
imaginary character of the representation of this past undermines again; what 
haunts us this time is the suspicion that memories are only illusions and the 
narratives of history are nothing but retrospective speculations.216  
It is Ricoeur's goal, as he declares, to write a “properly dialectical conception 
of history” (M 303). This desire recalls the work of Augustine and Hegel. But 
there are, as Hayden White remarks, some crucial differences: “…whereas St. 
Augustine thought that the process informing history was divine providence and 
Hegel thought it was Reason, Ricoeur thinks that the historical process is a story 
of humanity making itself whole out of all the parts of the historical previously 
known.”217 The desire of making humanity “whole,” the re-binding of the broken 
pieces of the subject, self and society is, as shown previously, Ricoeur's constant 
premise. In this project the wish to find the resources for wholeness point to the 
experience of history as a “collective singular” understood as the “story of 
humanity in time”. Following the dialectics between time and narrative, and 
idem- and ipse-identity, Ricoeur now aims to rebind remembering to forgetting 
to expose the hermeneutic-ontological features of human historicity.  
Although not stated as a motivation to write Memory, History, Forgetting, 
the work can easily be read as Ricoeur's attempt to fill a hiatus left by 
                                               
216 Hence, once again Ricoeur confronts a “theory of suspicion” – the suspicion that our 
memory is fundamentally deceitful. To decide if a told recollection can be trusted is the core of 
the historical, juridical and intersubjective communicative operation. In this manner, the 
experience of memory and history belongs to the region of social ontology; we are intimately 
connected to others through our “ shared memories”.  
217 White, Guilty, 246. 
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Gadamer.218 A crucial difference with other theories of memory and history is 
Ricoeur's addition of a Heideggerian perspective: it is our experience of time and 
temporality that determines our experience of memory and history. The human 
being is a temporal Being but this temporality is a priori determined by the 
intentional, hermeneutic and ontological aspects of our capability to remember 
and forget. While Being is determined by temporality, temporality itself stems 
from the dialectic of remembering and forgetting. In short, Ricoeur’s 
phenomenology of memory aims to modify both Gadamer’s notion of tradition 
and Heidegger’s notion of Being. 
History is considered mainly to be a narrative of past experiences and events 
showing the continuities and discontinuities in human lives through time and 
space. History as process starts with the transference of oral testimony to written 
narratives stored as documents in archives. The subsequent explanation, 
understanding and representation of these “documents” of the past shows not 
only how the past stays part of the present, but in particular how we articulate 
and shape "history". Ricoeur considers this transformation from oral narratives 
into formal “history” symbolic for an existential condition which is fundamentally 
determined by forms of (institutionalized) remembering and forgetting. A crucial 
part of this existential condition is the responsibility towards a past evoked, for 
example, by feelings of guilt. The need for recognition and justice together with 
the capability to forgive enable the possibility to overcome the past. 
Ricoeur begins his analysis of memory by splitting the relation between 
memory and recollection into three main sections: memory and imagination, the 
exercise of memory and finally, the attribution of memory to individuals or 
collectives. The trajectory of the first part is based, unsurprisingly, on the Greek 
sources, Plato and Aristotle, before setting up a Weberian typology of 
remembering drawn from Husserl, Bergson, and Heidegger. In addition to these 
classics, Ricoeur leans heavily on Edward Casey’s book Remembering before he 
ends with Sartre’s work on the “pitfall of the imaginary” (M 53) revealing the 
                                               
218 Evenly important as Ricoeur's own anthropological endeavour is the unresolved question of 
the relation between hermeneutics and the historical experience which Hans-Georg Gadamer 
failed to answer in Truth and Method. Gadamer, focussing on the truth of the aesthetic 
experience in relation to the dialectics of understanding in the humanities, explains the relation 
between tradition and historicism but falls short in explaining the relation between memory 
and an ontology of our historicity. Our self-understanding does not only depend on the aporia 
and “truth” of art but, moreover, on the aporia and truthfulness of how what is absent (the 
past) can be recalled in the present. For Ricoeur the revelation of the truth of our experiences 
must lead to the question of the “just”; not the “aesthetic truth” but the problem of the 
“ethical just” is what a hermeneutic examination of our historicity (replacing Gadamer’s 
definition of the past as “tradition”) leads up to.   
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hallucinatory aspect of the imagination that turns the experience of memory into 
a phenomenology of the unreal. After examining the passive, intentional 
experience of memory Ricoeur turns to the active, practical "use and abuse" of 
memory which leads to the difference between memory as an experience of 
personal reflexive inwardness and memory as an experience of a collective public 
consciousness. Plato’s and Aristotle’s answer to the question "what is memory?" 
precedes the phenomenological sketch of memory—thus, I will return with 
Ricoeur to the Greeks for a moment.   
 
Towards a Phenomenology of Memory 
Classical Origins 
Both in Theaetetus and the Sophist Plato asks whether memories belong to the 
realm of “truth”; when are our memories “true” representations of the past? 
Because the main instrument of representation is our imagination (we re-imagine 
the past) Plato, applies to our memories the same rule as those by which he 
evicted the poets from the republic: stimulation of falsehood. This leads Ricoeur 
to call Plato's view of memories as informed by a “phenomenology of mistakes” 
(M 9) – it seems, rather, a phenomenology of complete mistrust.219 In contrast to 
Plato, Aristotle views memory as a problem and subcategory of the affections (as 
part of the realm of Pathos); memory is not an epistemological category but 
something we experience, something we undergo, sometimes suffer from.220 This 
raises a very different kind of question: Of what is memory a memory? The 
answer is: memory is a memory “of the past”. This very simple conclusion 
proclaims, Ricoeur declares, “the key phrase that will accompany my entire 
investigation”. The fact that memory is "of the past" links memory to time, and 
the human ability to perceive a before and after, an earlier and later, a now and 
then. For Aristotle time belongs to the category of movement and, thus, memory 
(as "of the past") appears as a subcategory of movement. Hence, the earlier 
question may be rephrased as: "of what is memory movement?"; "what moves 
memory?". These questions amount to a first phenomenological formulation of 
the intentionality of memory; our memory is always a memory of something 
because it moves consciousness towards something.  
                                               
219 Plato is the first source of concepts that still govern the current debate on representation: 
eikon (image), mimicry (mimesis), trace (tupos). 
220 Bergson will call this Aristotelian category the memoire involuntaire: it pops up 
spontaneously and makes us unexpectedly re-experience past moments, emotions and 
thoughts (here memory is, hence, treated as an affect). 
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Hence, while Plato delivers the initial aporia of representation it is Aristotle 
who provides the first step for an actual phenomenological description of 
memory. If we follow Plato, the classical problem of the "truth of representation" 
becomes projected into the problem of the "trustworthiness of memories". It is 
this problem ("can we trust our memories?") which determines the entire 
dialectical tension between our memory, our history and the ways we forget. 
How the past is represented in the presence, and how we trust or mistrust this 
representation appears, according to Ricoeur, to be the core dilemma of what we 
(still) remember, of what the witness testifies or of what the historian attempts 
to reconstruct. This is again a tension between a fundamental suspicion and an 
evenly fundamental need for trust (we "suspect" that our memories are illusions, 
but we "need" our memories to be trustworthy).221 What troubles our trust in 
memory is the impossibility to decide whether an image is pure fiction or 
attached to an actual real reference. Although imagining and remembering are 
fundamentally different, they coincide with the hallucination-pole of the 
imagination. While fiction was the pitfall of the historical narrative in Time and 
Narrative, hallucination now uncovers the “pitfall of the imaginary for memory” 
(M 53). At this point Ricoeur recalls Sartre’s “plea for a phenomenology of the 
unreal”. It describes the radical difference between the imaginative 
consciousness and the consciousness of the real. Sartre argues that “If I recall an 
incident of my past life I do not imagine it, I recall it. That is, I do not posit it as 
given-in-its-absence but as given-now-in-the-past in the past” (M 53). Ricoeur 
comments: “This is exactly the interpretation proposed at the beginning of this 
study. But now here is the reversal. It takes place on the terrain of the imaginary. 
It results from what can be called the hallucinatory seduction of the imaginary”. 
This "hallucinatory seduction of the imaginary" refers to the magical aspect of 
the imagination which Sartre understands as an “incantation destined to produce 
the object of one’s thought, the thing one desires, in a manner that one can take 
possession of it.” We imagine an object but know of its "not-being-there" and 
invoke, through a magical operation, its quasi-presence. This leads to a 
“pathology of the imagination” signifying the obsessive quality of the 
hallucinatory-pole of our imagination. This means that if we become fascinated 
                                               
221 This tension takes place at the intersection of recognition, imagination and truth, “in the 
moment of recognition, in which the effort of recollection is completed, this search for truth 
declares itself. We then feel and indeed know that something has happened, something has 
taken place, which implicates us as agents, as patients, as witnesses. Let us call this search for 
truth, faithfulness. From now on, we will speak of the faithfulness of memories, of memories 
being true to…, in order to express this search, this demand, this claim, which constitutes the 
veridical-epistemic dimension of orthos logos of memory” (M 55).  
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by the forbidden object, if we attempt “not to think about it anymore”, it will 
completely transform into “obsessive thinking” (M 54). In the sense of collective 
memory and history this structure equals a “past that does not pass”: the 
collective imagination (of a family, group or nation) obsessively reproduces a past 
it actually wishes to forget. 
Ricoeur’s detour through Plato, Aristotle and Sartre demonstrates the idea 
that before any phenomenological examination of memory the problem of the 
imagination as representation, as instrument to recall the absent past, as affect, 
and finally, as a possible unreal hallucination, will not stop to haunt us as long as 
it deeply permeates all efforts to remember. Can we re-grasp the past without 
imagining it? Before the intentionality and pragmatics of memory there is and 
always will be the aporias of our transcendental imagination. Since we are unable 
to escape this aporetic character of the imagination we are in need of an ethical 
compass guiding us through the doubtful re-imaginations of our past. In short, 
besides reconstructing the "past past" we want to know what (our) history 
"stands for"; if there cannot be a historical truth, we at least need to find a just 
history (sometimes bound to the wish for "historical justice").  
Departing from the classical approach, Ricoeur shifts to a contemporary 
phenomenology of memory and declares that because we always remember 
something (echoing the phenomenological key-phrase that our consciousness 
must always be a consciousness of something), a “distinction must be made (...) 
between memory (la mémoire) as intention and memory (le souvenir) as the 
thing intended” (M 22). A phenomenology of memory actually can only be a 
phenomenology of memories (Erinnerungen) because once we speak of the past 
we speak of past things; to have a consciousness of the past means to have a 
memory of a plurality: “Memory in the singular is a capacity, an effectuation; 
memories are in the plural: we have memories” (M 22). How do memories 
appear? The event of memory – the “memory-event” – is in Kantian terms 
something that “occurs” to us; it “takes place” in the double meaning of "caused 
by something" – that which makes it happen –, on the one side, and in the 
meaning of proceeding – it proceeds “from freedom, in accord with spontaneous 
causation”, on the other. Ricoeur divides this occurrence of our memories in 
“singular events and generalities” while the generalities refer to “states of affair” 
which are labelled as “historical knowledge” (these are the facts of which we say 
have happened in a certain way). The "event of memory" and the "knowledge 
about the past" coincide with a “state of affairs”. In relation to this, the notion of 
objective history and subjective remembering come together. But "things from 
the past" do not simple appear, “they reappear as being the same, and it is in 
accordance with this sameness of reappearing that we remember them” (M 23). 
Memories are divided in unique singular events or moments which we re-
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recognize (faces, buildings, words and so on). What we recognize as our past is 
also a “knowledge”: we know what we have once experienced or learned and re-
recognize this "known past". Our memory "knows" different forms of re-
cognition; memories may return as a spontaneous event or as an act of a 
conscious recalling (this recalls Bergson's famous division of a involuntary and 
voluntary memory).   
To clarify this polysemic field of memory Ricoeur formulates four 
oppositional pairs which constitute a “rule-governed typology” (but these rules, 
as Ricoeur admits, suffer from a “relative indeterminacy”). This indeterminacy is 
caused by the problematic translation of the preverbal experience or the Erlebnis 
within the “work of language that ineluctably places phenomenology on the path 
of interpretation, hence of hermeneutics” (M 24). The "work of language" never 
reaches the “mastery of meaning that a total reflection would want to 
command” because “the phenomena of memory, so closely connected to what 
we are, opposes the most obstinate of resistances to the hubris of total 
reflection”.222 A phenomenological typology of our experience of remembering 
must start with the duality of memory as habit and memory as recollection. A 
second duality refers back to the Aristotelian opposition of mnēmē and 
anamnēsis: evocation (as an “unexpected appearance of memory”) and search 
(or recall of memories), respectively.223 The third typological pair refers to the 
distinction between primary memory (or the retention) and secondary memory 
(or reproduction). The final and fourth oppositional pair differentiates between 
reflexivity and worldliness which, as dialectical complements, mark the transition 
from memory to history (M 36). The relation between reflexivity and worldliness 
refers back to the Lebenswelt in which Husserl’s phenomenology and Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics will meet. This means that  Ricoeur's methodological critique on 
the phenomenological notion of reflexivity and time prepares the transition from 
a phenomenology of memory to a hermeneutics of history. Ricoeur beautifully 
explains that, 
                                               
222 Phenomenology needs interpretation but interpretation can never fully cover the eidetic 
experience. This ambivalence runs through Ricoeur's entire work meaning it constitutes all 
efforts of interpretation: our phenomenological experience is always in need for articulation, 
this happens through the “work” of language (cast in semantic, discursive and classificatory 
structures). But once translated in language all experiences lose their eidetic purity staying 
redundant for a total lingual reflectivity and, thus, lack of complete interpretation. In short, 
phenomenology can never reach the dream of purity while language can never reach the wish 
for total articulation. 
223 Part of this active search, effort or recall is to “remember forgetting”: here the “happy 
memory,” signifyin the “little wonder” of a sudden return of the absent past, finds its 
counterpart in an “unhappy memory” that remembers our constant forgetting. 
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One does not simply remember oneself, seeing, experiencing, learning; 
rather one recalls the situations in the world in which one has seen, 
experienced, learned. These situations imply one’s own body and the 
bodies of others, lived space, and, finally, the horizon of the world and 
worlds, within which something has occurred. Reflexivity and 
worldliness are indeed related as opposite poles, to the extent that 
reflexivity is an undeniable feature of memory in its declarative phase: 
someone says “in his heart” that he formerly saw, experienced, learned 
(M 37). 
 
Our situation “in the world” is remembered through our “own body” in “lived 
space” occurring as the “horizon of the world and worlds”: our reflexivity 
happens in and through our worldliness.224 The shift of memory from pure 
inwardness to an outer situatedness in the Lebenswelt is further explored with 
help of Edward Casey’s work on Remembering.225 Similar to Heidegger and 
Ricoeur, Casey steps outside the realm of intentionality and shifts towards an 
existential ontology aimed at “protecting memory itself from forgetfulness” (M 
37). Heidegger’s basic assumption that we forget Being is extended to the plea to 
remember memory. Ricoeur links this plea with his own notion of “happy 
memory” (memoire heureuse) in the sense that our memory enables us not to 
forget which needs to be remembered.226 What is gone is not eternally lost; it 
retrieves itself spontaneously or can be searched for in our memory. 
Forgetfulness is a strong motivation for collective forms of memory-as-public-
performance such as commemorative rituals for victims or victories. Rituals and 
                                               
224 Husserl’s attempt to “listen” only to the “things themselves,” to detach reflexivity from 
worldliness and perceive time and memory as pure forms of inwardness, is, according to 
Ricoeur “a questionable effect of epoché, which, under the guise of objectivation, strikes 
worldliness” (M 36). Although Husserl’s concept of Lebenswelt re-situates the subject in a 
world, this does not mean that he distances himself from Idealism. In Husserl’s Lebenswelt we 
do perceive the world and others, but his subject stays locked in the ego cogitatum.  
225 Edward S. Casey, Remembering. A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1987). 
226 Ricoeur’s concept of “happy memory” also counters his own analysis of memory as 
dependent upon the ambivalent forces of our imagination as shown in his excursus on Plato. 
Despite the ambivalent credibility of what we actually remember, the fact that we remember 
something evokes a feeling of happy re-recognition, which in turn evokes the happy experience 
of a capability; the capability to retrieve the absent past. In Ricoeur’s words: “…the book is a 
plea for what I call “happy” memory, in contrast to descriptions motivated by suspicion or by 
the excessive primacy accorded to phenomena of deficiency, even to the pathology of memory” 
(M 37). 
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memorials counter our fear to forget but simultaneously serve our need for 
collective mourning and (re-) affirmation. On the collective level the fear to 
forget and the need for mourning coincide with the institutionalization, 
performance and materialization of memory.   
While the intentionality of phenomenology keeps memory “in Mind”, our 
worldliness signifies forms of memory “beyond Mind” (in his book Remembering 
Edward S. Casey divides all aspects of memory into these two main differences). 
Three “mnemonic Modes” can be inserted between these two poles: Reminding, 
Reminiscing, Recognizing. These three mnemonic forms correlate with three 
declarative statements of memory, 1) I see the canned food and think: “Feed the 
cat!” (reminding); 2) I meet an old friend, he states  “Say, do you remember…” 
(reminiscing); 3) I see somebody whom I haven’t seen for a long time coming 
closer and think: “Yes, it’s him!” (recognizing). What does the expression "this 
reminds me of this or that" mean? Something forms a point of reference to an 
earlier experience. Something exterior re-minds me (my mind/ body) of 
something already present, inner. What reminds me, what I perceive, can be 
evoked by an association – a smell, taste, image, gesture, emotion –  of 
something former, causing a re-appearance?227 The object that reminds us 
functions like a mnemonic device. While "to be reminded by" is something we 
passively undergo, reminiscence is a more active and conscious form of re-
minding oneself, despite  the use of the stories or pictures of others. We are not 
spontaneously reminded by something, we remind ourselves through the use of 
something (photo-album, home-video, music). Ricoeur compares this act of 
reminiscing with the German concept of Gedächtnis: our Gedächtnis can be 
consciously recollected and used, for example, in answering the question “Say, 
do you remember…, when…you...we?” (M 39). Ricoeur writes: “The mode of 
reminiscing thus unfolds along the same line of discursivity as simple evocation in 
its declarative stage” (M 39). The third mnemonic mode of recognition is more 
complex because it complements memory as recollection (what we recollect 
from the past we also need to recognize as what we searched for) and refers 
back to the “enigma” of memory as presence of the absent: what we recognize is 
the re-appearing of the absent in the presence. It is the otherness of the past as 
absent and distanced that is recalled in time; in this recalling the absent past 
goes through a passage of familiarity/ unfamiliarity (heimlichkeit/ 
                                               
227 The reappearance of the past can be triggered, as Ricoeur so accurately reminds us, by 
“photographs, postcards, diaries, receipts, mementos (the famous knot in the handkerchief!). In 
this way, these signposts guard against forgetting in the future: by reminding us what it is to be 
done, they admonish us not to forget to do it (feed the cat!)” (M 38). 
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unheimlichkeit). The strangeness of the absent past must, once it is recalled, 
regain a sense of familiarity for us to be recognizable as actually being "our" 
history, and therefore in order to make the absent past present again it must go 
through a process of re-cognition. The triple process of reminding, reminiscing 
and recognizing not only bridges the gap between a phenomenological and 
existential-hermeneutical conception of memory, but also reconnects the 
meaning of our personal memories with the collective memories (as history) 
which, taken together, form the "web of memories" through which we all 
remember.  
The cohesion of our perceived self refers also to the relation between 
memory and body, space and the “horizon of the world”: We live in a body in a 
world: the embodied subject is situated in a particular site/ space. As a 
mnemonic statement this experience is articulated as “I was there”. This does not 
mean that these phenomena “take us out of the sphere of intentionality but 
(they) reveal its nonreflexive dimension” (M 40). Thus, Ricoeur argues, with 
intentionality, reflexivity and worldliness  there should also be  the capability to 
enact our corporeal memory. This corporeal memory is split into the body-as-
event and the body-as-habit.  
 
I remember having experienced pleasure and pain in my body at one 
time or another in my past life; I remember having lived for a long time 
in a certain house in a certain town, to have travelled in a certain part of 
the world, and it is from here that I evoke all those elsewheres. I 
remember the expanse of a certain seascape that gave me the feeling of 
the vastness of the world. And, during a visit to an archaeological site, I 
evoked the cultural world gone by to which these ruins sadly referred. 
Like the witness in a police investigation, I can say of these places, “I was 
there” (M 40).   
 
The evocation of the feeling "I was there" assumes a re-cognition of a past 
experience like the famous example of corporeal memory in Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past.228 The moment we realize “I was there” links the 
phenomenological reflexivity of the mind with our temporal and corporeal 
experience, consequently, this evokes an experience of worldliness marked by 
                                               
228 In Proust's magnificent book the beginning, the scene of awakening is –  as Ricoeur explains  
–, “especially favourable for returning things and beings to the place assigned to them in space 
and in time the previous evening. The moment of recollection is then the moment of 
recognition. The latter, in its turn, can span all the degrees from tacit remembering to 
declarative memory, ready for narration” (M 41). 
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the fact that we inhabit the world in time and space. “It is on the surface of the 
habitable earth that we remember having travelled and visited memorable sites” 
(M 41). Memory-places function as reminders, they form a topological archive of 
the manner we move, experience and inhabit this world and, thus, we ascribe to 
them the same memory-sense as to documents in the archive.229  
 
The body, the absolute here, is the landmark for any there, be it near or 
far, included or excluded, above or below, right or left, in front or 
behind, as well as those asymmetric dimensions that articulate a 
corporeal typology that is not without at least implicit ethical overtones, 
for example, height or the right side. To these corporeal dimensions are 
added some privileged postures –  upright, lying down – weightiness – 
heavy, light – orientations to front or rear, the side, all determinations 
capable of opposed values: active man, standing upright, someone sick 
and also the lover lying down, joy that awakens and arises, sadness and 
melancholy that lower the spirits, and so on. To these alternatives of 
rest and movement is grafted the act of inhabiting, which has its own 
polarities: reside and displace, take shelter under a roof, cross a 
threshold and go out (M 149). 
 
Ricoeur's description of our corporeal inhabiting of the earth shows how the 
relation between memory and place becomes particular problematic at the 
“crossroad between memory and history”. The phenomena of localization, 
geography, geometry and dating point to how we assign time and space in forms 
of dating (“time” = chronology) and localizing (“space” = geography/ 
geometry).230 This blends an objectifying act and a subjective experience (now, 
when; here, there) together. As a result the “effort of memory”, the way we 
experience and recall what was, depends largely on an “effort of dating" — we 
ask: When did it happen?; How long ago did it happen?; How long did it last?. 
                                               
229 The power to remember and the power to inhabit are deeply connected. In this context Jean 
Greisch refers to the Aboriginals for which places constitute memory (places are not just “sites 
of memory” but also the only site where their memory can be generated). The violent 
displacement of Aborginals meant an active act of destruction of memory resulting in loss of 
identity. Here a cultural anthropological and phenomenological perspective show how memory 
“in mind,” as a cultural practice and as a topological “site” coincide. Jean Greisch, Paul Ricoeur: 
L’itinérance du sens (Grenoble: Jérôme Million, 2001) p. 291. 
230 Ricoeur asks: “up to what point can a phenomenology of dating and localization be 
constituted without borrowing from the objective knowledge of geometrical—let us say, 
Euclidian and Cartesian—space and from the objective knowledge of chronological time, itself 
articulated in terms of physical movement?” (M 41). 
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The "flow" of life, the endless ongoing temporal flux is turned into objectified 
moments of Now and past Nows that happened here or there, now or yesterday 
and so on.  
Husserl famously described this objective-subjective synthesis as an 
occurrence of temporal continuity (our experience of time as endurance) with 
the listening to a musical tone that goes on; once the tone starts we experience a 
beginning, then it goes on (and we experience simultaneously an endurance of 
time and a continuation of the beginning). Put differently: This experience of 
endurance – sensed as a “consciousness of succession” – takes place within a 
before and an after in between which a beginning moves to an end. This means 
that the before and after mark the temporal experience, the experience of time, 
as movement. Ricoeur now connects the phenomenology of temporal continuity 
with a phenomenology of spatiality from the perspective of a "hermeneutics of 
sense": spatial deitic categories as “here” or “there” appear closely connected to 
the phenomenological categories of “one’s own” and “foreign”. This ties the 
phenomena of orientation to the experience and articulation of inhabiting – 
inhabiting means here to turn the earth into a “world” – and shows an intimate 
familiarity between memory, time and space: (when) spaces are inhabited, time 
becomes memorable. The perception of space and the experience of being in 
space cannot be disconnected like the disconnection of Husserlian 
phenomenology with ontology did. In a similar manner, the link between the 
epistemology of history and the ontological experience of being in history, 
historicity, cannot be detached.231  
Hence, the phenomenology of memory, the epistemology of history and the 
hermeneutics of the ontological condition of our historicity are positioned within 
a xenogamic dialectic which, acccording to Ricoeur's model, marks a form of 
cross-fertilization between phenomenology, epistemology, hermeneutics and 
ontology. This is a similar methodological movement as the cross-fertilization 
between fictional and historical narrative and cosmological and 
phenomenological time as proposed in Time and Narrative. As shown earlier, in 
Time and Narrative this dialectic cumulates in the narrative expression of a third 
or human time. Now, in relation to memory, the dialectic between 
phenomenology and hermeneutics evokes the aspects of a lived memory. As we 
have seen before, this anthropological dualism between objectifying processes 
and subjective experiences of belonging and their articulation in an 
                                               
231 Our forms of localization and dating objectify the subjective experience of how we live in 
space and time i.e., they mark our spatial and temporal praxis, c.q., a praxis of inhabiting (our) 
time and space. 
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epistemological structure on the one hand, and a subjective narrative on the 
other, is typical for the overall methodology of Ricoeur's later work. Ricoeur 
shows in various complexities, how the hermeneutic interpretation is grafted 
onto the phenomenological analyses and how, in the reconciliation of these 
perspectives, a "human" expression of time, self and memory is discovered. 
In summary: Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory begins with the problem 
of Husserl’s intentionality and reflexivity, this is followed by three descriptions of 
mnemonic modes placed in between pure reflexivity and worldliness and is 
concluded with moving to the experience of "worldliness" that occur as memory–
experiences of body, space and the "horizon of the world". This path connects a 
phenomenology of memory with an existential-hermeneutical notion of 
historicity describing the historical-ontological human condition in which the 
capability to remember (I can remember) is central. From the intentionality of 
memory Ricoeur moves to the "doing of memory" (faire memoire) preparing the 
subsequent exploration of the "act of history" (faire histoire).  
 
Doing Memory, Doing History  
In remembering the past we are doing something, we actively search, recollect 
and "exercise" memory. This exercise of memory even evoked an art form; the 
art to memorize (Yates). Remembering, recalling or recollecting refers both to 
something we re-cognize and something we do. In remembering, the cognitive 
and practical aspects of memory overlap. This means that memory “comes to be 
inscribed within the list of powers, capacities, belonging to the category ‘I can’” 
(M 57). The transfer from "doing memory" to "doing history" allows Ricoeur to 
work through the tension between memory and history on the one hand, and 
history and hermeneutics on the other.  
It is in this double confrontation that the crucial question of faithfulness or 
veracity returns. On the cognitive level faithfulness questions the possibility of a 
truthful (cognitive) representation of the absent in the present. On the practical 
level faithfulness refers to the uses and abuses of how memory is exercised. The 
possibility of abuse reveals a “fundamental vulnerability” of memory. By way of a 
typology of the "natural abuses of memory" Ricoeur examines the pathological 
(traumatic memory), ideological (manipulated memory) and normative 
(obligated memory) forms of remembering. This typology reveals that, similar to 
the "entanglement in stories" (Schnapp), one can speak of an "entanglement in 
memories". Our entanglement in memories also refers to the ideological 
manipulation of memory (for power) and our obsession with celebrations and 
rituals of commemorations. These "abuses of memory" only seem to serve an 
affirmation of the nation-state or a symbolic general appeal, in the name of the 
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victims, to our collective conscience. Both forms have often become empty 
signifiers. The abuse of commemorations equals the abuse of history by 
ideological manipulations. Ricoeur distinguishes three levels of the ideological 
operation: 1) “distortion of reality,” 2) “legitimation of the system of power” and 
3) “integration of the common world by means of symbolic systems immanent in 
action” (M 82). At the deepest level ideology establishes a correlation between 
the symbolic synthesis, a semiotic system and a system of rhetorical tropes (M 
82). As such, ideology transfers the notion of power to the cultural symbolic 
system in which it becomes invisible. As a regulative and integrative power 
ideology collapses political, symbolic, semiotic and cultural systems and, thus, 
makes the ideology invisible: it blends in – it becomes – the overall structure. 
Ideology is, in short, not a part of a culture, it does not take place within a 
cultural process,  ideology is a hegemonic marker through which culture occurs. 
The ideology appears as the sole answer to the fragility of memory and identity. 
In a next step Ricoeur examines the relation between legitimacy and ideology to 
show how doubts about the credibility of authority (vs. the fragility of authority), 
is countered by the “surplus value” ideology can provide.232  
The ideological abuse of memory leads to a “forced memorization” and 
“customary commemorations” manipulating our common history and, 
subsequently, our common identity. In opposition to this “cult of memory” in 
which a particular truth is made total, the selection of memory must be 
reoriented towards a “duty of memory” which is the search for justice that marks 
“the representative relation of the present to the past” (M 87). Traumatic 
experiences exemplify the process that turns memory into an ethico-political 
imperative: Never Again! Instead of the current ideologies of commemoration we 
need to place once again the "work of mourning" and the "duty of memory" 
under the sign of justice: for Ricoeur the “duty of memory belongs to a moral 
problematic” which also entails the “eventual right of forgetting” (M 92).233 What 
                                               
232 In reference to Max Weber’s differentiation of order (Ordnung) and domination (Herrschaft), 
Ricoeur explains that “[i]deology is supposed to add a sort of surplus value to our spontaneous 
belief, thanks to which the latter might satisfy the demands of the authority. At this stage, the 
function of ideology would be to fill the gap of credibility opened by all systems of authority, 
not only the charismatic system—because the chief is sent from above—and the system based 
on tradition—because things have always been done this way—but also the bureaucratic 
system—because the experts are supposed to know” (M 83). Thus, Ricoeur understands the 
danger of a manipulation of memory mainly as an ideological distortion of memory within the 
socio-cultural narrative, “..it is on the level where ideology operates as a discourse justifying 
power ... that the resources of manipulation provided by narrative are mobilized” (M 85). 
233 Ricoeur connects this to Todorov’s remarks concerning trauma: “If the trauma refers to the 
past, the exemplary value is toward the future. What the cult of memory for the sake of 
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appears here is Ricoeur’s wish to reposition the dialectic of memory 
(remembering and forgetting) within the dialectic of justice (guilt and 
forgiveness).   
 
From Personal to Collective Memories  
After examining the dialectic between memory/ imagination and the use/ abuse 
of memory, Ricoeur turns to the question of whether memory is actually 
primordially personal or collective. Here the tradition of interiority (Innerlichkeit) 
– Augustine, Locke, Husserl – is juxtaposed with the external gaze described by 
Maurice Halbwachs.234 In this juxtaposition the question to whom the experience 
of memory can actually be attributed is at stake. Personal memory often relates 
to the tradition of inwardness and subjective reflexivity. In contrast, collective 
memory refers to the intertwinement of memories in social structures, traditions 
and history.235 According to Halbwachs, all memories are recollected and 
                                               
 
memory obliterates is, along with the aim of the future, the question of the end, of the moral 
issue. For the very notion of use, implicit in that of abuse, is unavoidably related to this 
question of the end” (M 86).  
234 Halbwachs and Husserl hold oppositional positions. Husserl’s pure flow of time proves the 
absolute subjectivity of our experience of memory; Halbwachs dismisses the possibility of a 
pure personal memory disconnected from the memory of others. 
235 The tradition of inwardness belongs to the philosophical problematic of subjectivity and 
consciousness whereas the concept of the external gaze (symbolizing a “collective 
consciousness” or Zeitgeist) emerges as part of psychology, sociology and history. While for 
sociology a private consciousness is more or less impossible, for Husserlian phenomenology an 
intersubjective ontology does not fit the solipsistic primordiality of pure consciousness. Maurice 
Halbwachs’ famous book The Collective Memory stands in exact opposition to Husserl’s 
philosophy by working out the simple claim “to remember, we need others” (M 119). This claim 
implies that, fundamentally, all memories are collective. Ricoeur summarizes: “not only is the 
type of memory we possess not derivable in any fashion from experience in the first person 
singular, in fact the order of derivation is the other way around” (M 120). It is Ricoeur's goal to 
resolve this estrangement between individual memory and collective memory by asking to 
whom and how certain formations of memory are attributed. In the Greek and Latin tradition 
foregoing Augustine, the problem of the person was still present in the tragic tension, not 
within the individual, but rather between the individual and the polis. According to Ricoeur, it 
was Augustine who “invented inwardness against the background of the Christian experience of 
conversion” (M 97), while Locke’s sceptical empiricism extends the Augustian inwardness with 
the problematic of how identity, self and memory coincides, to which Kant reacts with a three 
folded “subject” reality: the transcendental, the noumenal and the empirical. Although Kant 
revolutionized the concept of inwardness, he left no room “for a meaningful examination of 
memory” (M 97). This makes Ricoeur turn to Husserl’s unpublished work on memory where 
“the school of inwardness reaches its apex”. While in Time and Narrative Ricoeur uses Husserl 
for his ideas on time, now the focus lies, in regarding  the difference of personal and collective 
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recognized through the social, thus, through the collective world: our memories 
emerge through our confrontations with family, friends, familiar places, smells, 
sounds and particular events and situations. In short: “no one ever remembers 
alone”, which, according to Ricoeur, simply means that “we are not an authentic 
subject of the attribution of memories” (M 122).236 While in Oneself as Another 
the ascriptions apply to identity as idem or ipse, now, the same problematic of 
ascription returns as the question of how we can actually know if our memories 
are personal or collective. If we ascribe something to our-selves (self-ascribable) 
we can also ascribe something to someone else (other-ascribable). 
 
one can consider appropriation as the self-ascribable modality of 
attribution. And it is this capacity to designate oneself as the possessor 
of one’s own memories that leads to attributing to others the same 
mnemonic phenomena as to oneself, whether by the path of Paarung, 
of Einfühlung, of other-ascription, or something else (M 128). 
 
As a socio-phenomenological category memory also signifies a 
“transgenerational phenomenon” (Schütz) that constitutes a “Mitwelt” in which 
“the simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity of the other self’s consciousness with my 
own” is constituted. For example, in “growing-old-together” (M 130). In short: 
”The shared experience of the world rests upon a community of time as well as 
                                               
 
memory, on the “passage from egology to intersubjectivity”. The crucial distinction in Husserl's 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Inner Time between the “constitution of memory in its 
objective relation” shifts first to an “object spread out in time” and subsequently to the 
“constitution of temporal flow itself, excluding any object-oriented intention” (M 109). Ricoeur 
considers this shift as such a  “radical” one that he divides his treatment of Husserl’s ideas on 
memories into two parts: a phenomenology of memory-images and a phenomenology of 
continuity or ‘flow’. The two processes of retention and protention define the transference from 
an “object that endures” (the tone of a piano) towards the “pure temporal flow” (which Husserl 
perceives as a self-constitutive subjectivity). While the phenomenology of memories is bound 
to images (of the past), the experience of a pure temporal flow “excludes any objective 
reference” (M 110). 
236 Our memories, like our identity, are always social –  we remember within a “web of 
memories”. But even in Halbwachs notion of collective memory the wish for recollection starts 
with a personal act that “in each case is ours” (M 123). Although our memories are strongly 
influenced by the social, political, cultural, lingual and historical collectives surrounding us, it is  
individuals as group members who remember” (M 124) while “each memory is a viewpoint on 
The Collective Memory, [and] this viewpoint changes as my position changes …”. It is exactly this 
possibility of a change of one’s position which shows that the understanding of the collective in 
analogy with the Kantian schema falls short. Remembering is, in Ricoeur's understanding 
foremost an act of memory, part of a “mental initiative which make us acting subjects” (M 523). 
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space.” This experience is perfectly captured in the German term 
Zeitgenossenschaft (contemporaneousness): a generation consists of 
companions of time. Ricoeur proposes a third or in-between level between the 
individual memory of persons and the public memory of collectives, namely, the 
level of “close relations”. Close relations are those persons “who count for us and 
for whom we count”, they inhabit the space between self and others, self and 
“they” (“Man”), thus, close relations are “privileged others”.  These privileged 
others signify the "other as one-self" towards whom we attest or testify our 
existence (M 131-2).  
Ricoeur successfully constructs an analogy between the "oneself as another" 
that constitutes his intersubjective selfhood of attestation and the "individual 
memory as communality memory" that informs his socio-phenomenology of 
memory.  
 
Memory as History 
The next phase in the evolving relation between memory and history is marked 
by the question whether “history” is a science that reconstructs the truth of the 
past or whether history is a manner of producing meaning (Sinngebung).237 We 
must ask: in what manner can history claim to be epistemology? According to 
Ricoeur, the pivotal point of this claim is the witness testifying "what happened" 
by stating "I was there". The subjective articulation of a "lived experience" 
through testimonials (of witnesses) stands in opposition to a written objectified 
history of a reconstructed past by the historian as professional expert. What 
binds the oral testimony and the written historiography is the need for credibility 
or trustworthiness: the “question of confidence”. This question of confidence, as 
Ricoeur states “floats as the unsaid over the whole undertaking” as a 
“methodological epoché” (M 138).   
                                               
237 Cf. Ricoeur's statement: “History is this quasi-‘thing’ on which human action leaves a ‘trace’, 
puts its mark. Hence, the possibility of ‘archives’. Before the archives which are intentionally 
written down by memorialists, there is a continuous process of ‘recording’ human action which 
is history itself as the sum of ‘marks’, the fate of which escapes the control of individual actors. 
Henceforth history may appear as an autonomous entity, as a play with players who do know 
the plot. This hypostasis of history may be denounced as a fallacy, but this fallacy is well 
entrenched in the process by which human actions becomes social action when written down in 
the archives of history. Thanks to this sedimentation in social time, human deeds become 
‘institutions’ in the sense that their meaning no longer coincides with the logical intentions of 
the actors. The meaning may be ‘depsychologized’ to the point where the meaning resides in 
the work itself.” Paul Ricoeur The Model of the Text, Social Research 38, 3 (Autumn 1971), 543-
44.  
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The trustworthiness of the witness can be discredited simply by a witness 
with another testimony; the trust in the historian can be undermined by a 
different interpretation of the "same" past. How to know whether the narration 
of the witness or that of the historian can be trusted? Is the historian's first 
operation of "documenting" an early sign of suspicion towards the prior oral 
testimony? How can we divide fact from fiction – both in the oral testimony and 
in the written narrative of history? Questioning the trustworthiness of our 
cognitive capacity to remember is, therefore, deeply connected with questioning 
the trustworthiness of our archives and interpretations. How is knowledge (in 
this case, "historical knowledge"’) produced, what is the "site" of this production, 
and how is it used or abused?  
Ricoeur examines various phases of the historiographical operation (the 
faire l’histoire). The first phase describes the tension between the sources (a 
document in the archive or the story of the witness), the second phase refers to 
the difference between explaning and understanding these sources and, finally, 
the third phase examines the forms of representation these sources produce. It is 
here that two questions seem central: how does the singularity of oral testimony 
or a personal memory become a generalized history?; and, how does the trust 
and credibility ascribed to the witness work through the historiography of the 
historian? Since trust is an ethical category the form of representing the past, the 
testimony of the witness, as well as the historiography of the historian,  are now 
charged with an ethical tone. The passage from memory as the testimony of the 
eyewitness to memory as a form of archived document can be divided into five 
“meaningful sequence(s)”: Inhabited Space, Historical Time, Testimony, Archive 
and, finally, Documentary Proof.238 Through these five phases or sequences 
"memory" becomes "history". The "formal condition" to change an oral 
articulation (testimony) in a material carrier (a history book) refers to the need 
                                               
238 The first two phases connect the “lived experience” of space and time to the manners in 
which we articulate, narrate and structure this experience. Through these articulations of a 
lived experience in a particular place at a particular moment our testimony, the third phase, 
becomes a declarative statement: “I was there” (j’y etais). Hence, Ricoeur argues, History does 
not begin with the archive and its documents but with the testimony of the witness: “We have 
nothing better than testimony” (M 147). Once the eyewitness has testified, this testimony can 
be collected, archived, categorized, confronted and compared with other testimonies; once 
part of the archive testimonials turn into “documents” and “proof” as “sources” these traces of 
the past produce a “tone of assurance” within the “historiographical operation.” It is therefore, 
the transference from the personal, orally narrated remembrance (“I was there”) to a written 
historical narrative (“this is how it was”) that symbolizes the passage from a lived subjective 
remembering to a documented, archived, objectified collective memory called a “History”. 
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for a (formal) moment of inscription. Inscription marks the “mutation” from the 
lived experience of space and time (and its oral expression) into a fixed, 
materialized and archived memory: this mutation transforms the here and now 
into the declaration “I was there.”   
 
the space in which the protagonists of a recounted history move and the 
time in which the told events unfold conjointly change their sign. The 
explicit declaration of the witness, whose profile we shall take up below, 
states this clearly: “I was there" (j’y etais). (…) the here and there of the 
lived space of perception and of action, and the before of the lived time 
of memory, find themselves framed within a system of places and dates 
where the reference to the here and absolute now of lived experience is 
eliminated (M 148). 
 
This "elimination" is affirmed in the constitution of geography and historiography 
which map, materialize, exteriorize and visualize experiences of space and time: 
geography and historiography transform our memories of spaces and places in a 
“corporeal space” and an “inhabited land” (M 148). I will now take a closer look 
at the first three sequences which make up the passage from our "lived 
memories" to "material documents" and which make and fill our "archives". 
1. Inhabited Space. We have an intimate relationship not only with people, 
but also with spaces and places. Our past locations frequently become “sites of 
memory” (M 149). Thus, through a phenomenology of places we might 
understand how the body, the inhabitable earth, corporeal sites and ethics get 
connected:  
 
The body, the absolute here, is the landmark for any there, be it near or 
far, included or excluded, above or below, right or left, in front or 
behind, as well as those asymmetric dimensions that articulate a 
corporeal typology that is not without at least implicit ethical overtones, 
for example, height or the right side. To these corporeal dimensions are 
added some privileged postures—upright, lying down—weightiness—
heavy, light—orientations to front or rear, the side, all determinations 
capable of opposed values: active man, standing upright, someone sick 
and also the lover lying down, joy that awakens and arises, sadness and 
melancholy that lower the spirits, and so on. To these alternatives of 
rest and movement is grafted the act of inhabiting, which has its own 
polarities: reside and displace, take shelter under a roof, cross a 
threshold and go out (M 149). 
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Our moving bodies always move in reference to “points, lines, surfaces, volumes, 
distances inscribed on a space detached from the reference to the here and 
there inherent to the lived body”. In between the “lived space of the lived body” 
(M 150) and the public or environmental space a geometrical space occurs. On 
the border between the geometrical and lived space the “act of inhabiting” 
shows how we install ourselves in a space by acts of settlement, of habitation 
(building-sites are acts of inhabiting, dwelling). This act is the act of architecture 
which – in analogy to the (third) time of narrative – Ricoeur calls a “third space” 
(M 150). This "third space" marks the correlation between inhabiting (Wohnen) 
and constructing (Bauen). As such, a city offers a “sedimented history” and “gives 
itself as both to be seen and to be read” (M 151).239 Once again, the world as 
space and place is a text that is ready to be read and interpreted and whose 
narratives we constantly, by inhabiting, write and re-narrate.  
Can we consider geography (as the "science of place") the opposite of 
history (the "science of time")? The French historiography of, in particular, the 
so-called Annales-school (Braudel) considers locality as territory, and landscapes 
or milieu as a crucial determination of the socio-cultural-political history of 
everyday life. Geo-history or geo-politics can show us how localities shape 
societies. To explain Ricoeur cites Braudel “What is a civilization if not the 
timeworn placement of a certain humanity in a certain space?” (M 151) and adds 
that “space is the setting for the inscription of slower oscillations than those 
known by history” (M 153).  Historiography as the discourse of space thus runs,  
 
from the phenomenology of ‘places’ that beings of flesh and blood 
occupy, leave, lose, rediscover—in passing through the intelligibility 
belonging to architecture—up to the geography that describes an 
inhabited space, the discourse of space too has traced out an itinerary 
thanks to which lived space is turn by turn abolished by geometrical 
space and reconstructed at the hyper-geometrical level of the 
oikoumenē (M 153).  
 
                                               
239 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Architecture et narrativité (Mailand: Catàlogo de la Mostra “Identità  
Differenze”, 1994). For Ricoeur the main difference between architecture and text  is a 
configuration manifesting itself in stone, in the former, and manifesting itself in words, in the 
latter: “Narrative and construction bring about a similar kind of inscription, the one in the 
endurance of time, the other in the enduringness of materials. Each new building is inscribed in 
urban space like a narrative within a setting of intertextuality. And narrativity impregnates the 
architectural act even more directly insofar as it is determined by a relationship to an 
established tradition wherein it takes the risk of alternating innovation and repetition” (M 150). 
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This discourse of “lived, constructed, traversed and inhabited space” produces an 
"ontology of space" that, in Ricoeur’s model, functions as a subcategory for the 
"ontology of historicity".  
2. Historical Time. The next stage of the historical operation turns the 
experience of a temporal past into an "historical time". While in Time and 
Narrative Ricoeur sets out to reconcile phenomenological and cosmological time, 
now the transition from lived memory to “the ‘extrinsic’ positing of historical 
knowledge” (M 153) makes him return to his notion of “third time” or, in 
Benveniste’s terms, chronicle time which marks our capacity for dating (as a 
particular phenomenon of inscription and datability). The capacity for dating 
connects the “feeling of being distanced from the past” with a “sense of 
temporal depth.” These feelings of distance and depth origin in the manner in 
which time and movement evoke a “sense of intervals” through notions of 
simultaneity and succession. The extension of time in a before and an after 
enables a more precise dating of the attestation "I was there": I was there before, 
after, during, since and so on. Just as places localize the absolute “here” of the 
lived body in geographical space (materialized in cartographic maps), “so too 
[does] the present moment with its absolute “now” becomes a particular date 
among all the ones whose exact calculation is allowed by the calendar” (M 
155).240 Besides these forms of dating which fixate the lived time of 
phenomenology, Ricoeur refers to Krysztof Pomian’s four temporal categories – 
chronometry, chronology, chronography and chronosophy241 – as core examples 
of the temporal metastructures in which “historians’ history confines itself” (M 
155).  
Specifically, it is the speculations on time which Pomian calls chronosophy 
that mark this "history of history". Chronosophy refers to the categorization of 
                                               
240 This more or less extended part of humanity is a problematic perspective if confronted with 
the outcomes of cultural anthropology: through colonialism and imperialism Western notions 
of time and dating are globalized while the existence of very different notions of temporal 
experience and dating have been ignored and suppressed. Cf. Johannes Fabian, Time and its 
Other: How Anthropology makes its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
241 Krysztof Pomian, L’ordre du temps (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). For Pomian chronometry refers 
to cyclical time (day, week, months, year); chronology refers to linear time (century, 
millennium). Although historians use the linearity of chronological time they neglect the 
division between nature and history: the cosmic history, history of the earth or history of life 
are all placed within the same quasi-linear chronology (here the historical time-scale is 
presented as a “natural” story). In contrast, chronography tells the “chronicle” through a 
particular author; the chronosophy can be summarized as the “history of history”. A classical 
chrono-sophy is the maxim that we “stand on the shoulders of giants” in which an infinite 
genealogy of “great” predecessors is visualized. And, of course, “modernity” and “progress” are 
both typical teleological chronosophies.    
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events and history in ages, centuries or periods (like Antiquity, Middle Ages, 
Renaissance, Modernity) and processes of continuity vs. discontinuity, cyclical vs. 
linear processes and so on. Pomian differentiates between the representations of 
the past in “events,” “repetitions,” “ages” and, “structures.” Ricoeur adds that 
these periodizations have “conquered” an “excess of the thinkable…before being 
able to face up to the demand for truth with which history is supposed to 
confront the trustworthiness of memory” (M 157). In short, chronosophy 
contains the history of periodization which Hegel’s Philosophy of History aims to 
synthesize. What is at stake “After Hegel,” Ricoeur declares, is “nothing less than 
the possibility of a history without direction or continuity” (M 159). At this point 
history as a continuity divided in periods is replaced by the structuralist approach 
introduced by Levi-Strauss; history is no longer considered a chronology of 
periods – “spread out in time” – but a history “spread out in space.” There is not 
one ongoing process of civilization, but various and simultaneously developing 
civilizations divided in space. Hence, structuralism de-historicizes history.242 
 Ricoeur argues that historians tend to forget that their historiographical 
operation suffers from two reductions: the reduction of the “lived experience of 
memory” on the one hand, and the “multimillenary speculation on the order of 
time” (M 160) on the other. While structuralism has a “speculative side” which, 
as a kind of “scientific chronosophy” prolongs the “great theological and 
philosophical chronosophies”, the speculative visions of history as cyclical, linear 
or stationary tend to eliminate the actual (history) of lived memory.  It is our 
"lived memory" that Ricoeur wants to defend by regaining a sense for its 
significance against the historical constructions of time in speculative periods.     
3. Testimony. The experience of the witness takes place within a particular 
historical time-space ("I was there"). Ricoeur describes this spatio-temporal 
experience through the intertwining of two phenomenological informed lived 
dialectics: the dialectic of geometrical and inhabited space on the one hand and 
the dialectic of cosmic and historical time on the other hand. We transfer our 
embodied inhabiting of space in various forms of lingual and material mapping 
(geography, cartography, here, there, far, close) while lived time is ordered, 
narrated and historicized (chronology, calendars; days, weeks, months, cyclical 
seasons). This temporal and topical mapping of time and space shapes a chrono-
topos which we inhabit and historicize. Thus, Ricoeur's "small" phenomenology of 
                                               
242 Ricoeur wonders if this implies that we lose any future orientation or “horizon of 
expectation” (Koselleck)? More important is his attempt to integrate the claims of structuralism 
within his own theory of action and the dynamic and innovative force of language that 
determine his hermeneutics. History and language are always in the process of happening, 
besides structural structures it are creative events done by people.    
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space and time describes how our experience is transformed in forms of 
inhabiting (a locality) and dating (as the concretization of historical time). These 
forms precondition how the subject is able to state “I was there” while this 
statement, in return, is the precondition for the archive to transform our lived 
memory into an archived memory (and, subsequently, turn personal into a 
shared, collective history).  
This brings Ricoeur to declare that it is human testimony – our capability to 
testify – that forms the actual core of the historiographical operation. “With 
testimony opens an epistemological process that departs from declared memory, 
passes through the archive and documents, and finds its fulfilment in 
documentary proof” (M 161). We must divide testimony in the act as such, the 
act of testifying, and testimony as a stored inscription, as archived memories. Of 
course, besides filling our archives, testimonies directly influence the narratives, 
rhetorical figures and images of historical representation. For example, 
testimonies of the Shoah (the “Holocaust”) symbolize the friction between the 
wish to testify and the impossibility to represent. Adorno’s dismissal of the wish 
to represent the Shoah illustrates an ethics of testimony which sacralises the 
non-representability.243 This friction informs several of Ricoeur’s overall 
questions: in what manner do we trust the witness as a person, what does the 
testimony as a form of narrative mean and can oral testimony be a form of 
representation? A mistrusting of testimony infects all these levels: our suspicion 
begins with scepticism towards the experience or perception of the event: is that 
really what you saw? It questions the possible accuracy of memory and the 
declarative and narrative form in which it is expressed.  
We doubt the subjective testimony of the witness while knowing that a 
“disengaged observer” (similar to the quasi-neutral registration of a camera’s 
“eye”) does not exist. We not only desire a testimony that is value-free but we 
also wish to attribute value to the testimony. Both in the historical and juridical 
use of testimony the actual trustworthiness of the witness is at stake. For this 
reason there is a need to clarify the conditions that render the mistrust of 
testimony possible. Ricoeur posits the “activity of testifying” between the 
juridical and historical use on the one hand, and narrative and promising on the 
other: it is attestation that connects all four categories. While for historiography 
testimony – as archived memory – becomes a "documentary proof," testimony –  
as a deposition –  constitutes the most important ground for the judiciary verdict. 
                                               
243 It is strange that, at this point, Ricoeur doesn’t mention the work of Theodor W. Adorno but 
rather follows the work of Renaud Dulong, his Le Témoin Oculair: Les Conditions socials de 
‘attestation personelle (Paris: EHESS, 1988), in particular. 
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In stating “I was there” the claim (promise) that my testimony is “true” and the 
trustworthiness of my person coincide – both forms of “trust” are at stake in the 
courtroom.     
 Ricoeur divides the testimonial operation in six levels which determines the 
actual trustworthiness of the testimony: 1) factual reality which “attested-to-
fact” must be important and should enable a clear distinction between fact and 
fiction; 2) this “assertion of reality” must be “inseparable” from the “self-
designation of the testifying subject”: by stating "I was there" the witness 
declares itself a witness244; this “I” is also “enmeshed in stories”; 3) The witness is 
part of a dialogical situation: it is “before someone that the witness testifies.” 
This dialogical situation immediately evokes the question of trust: “the witness 
asks to be believed. He does not limit himself to saying "I was there," he adds 
"believe me".” This implies that our testimony needs to be “accredited” by 
others. If others do not believe "me", my testimony appears worthless. The 
witness will be “habitually believed” based on former situations. This puts the 
credit given to the testimony on a personal level: will I be trusted? – am I 
trustworthy? — considering my reputation?; 4) The possibility of mistrust opens 
up the "conflict of testimonies": this conflict belongs to the communicative 
process that shapes the public sphere. Ricoeur summarizes this conflict of 
testimonials as: I was there, believe me, if you don’t believe me, ask someone 
else. “The witness is thus the one who accepts being questioned and expected to 
answer what may turn out to be a criticism of what he says” (M 165)245; 5) The 
credibility of the witness strongly depends on his willingness and ability to repeat 
his testimony: for Ricoeur the endurance of testimony and the endurance of the 
self depends on a similar condition,  
 
The trustworthy witness is the one who can stay steadfast about this 
testimony over time. This steadfastness makes testimony akin to 
promise-making, that of keeping one’s promise, of keeping one’s word. 
Thus testimony links up with promise-making among those acts of 
discourse that specify ipseity in its difference from simple sameness, the 
sameness of character or, better, that of one’s genetic make-up, which 
is immutable from the birth to the death of an individual, the biological 
                                               
244 Ricoeur summarizes this relation as: “A triple deictic marks this self-designation: the first-
person singular, the past tense of the verb, and the mention of there in relation to here” (M 
164).  
245 This seems to be not enough: the non-recognition of the witness by asking someone else is 
intimately bound to forms of self-respect and self-denial. To deny a person the credibility of his 
or her testimony is often experienced as an actual dismissal of one’s personhood and dignity.  
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basis of his identity. The witness must be capable of answering for what 
he says before whoever asks him to do so (M 165).246 
 
6) The final level of the testimonial operation, and perhaps its most important 
one refers back to the necessity of the trustworthiness of the witness as 
"constitutive of the social bond.” The trustworthiness of the witness depends on 
the importance of our” confidence in what other people say” which, in reverse, is 
crucial for the strength of our relationship with others. Trust as the main 
“principle of the social bond” is, as Ricoeur argues, “a habitus of any community” 
(M 165). Hence, the trust we grant statements made by others is performative 
for the further existence of the entire community.  
 
The credit granted to the word of others makes the social world a 
shared intersubjective world. This sharing is the major component of 
what we can call the sensus communis (M 165).247  
 
While the sustainability (maintenance-de-soi) of the self in Oneself as Another is 
guaranteed in the intersubjective performativity of the act of attestation (for 
which the act of promising, as we have seen, is symbolic), now it is the trust given 
to the witness that forms the pivotal point for Ricoeur’s dialectic of memory, 
history, and forgetting. And just as the made and kept promise mark the moral 
selfhood of the person, the trust given to the witness  creates an ethics of 
memory. In other words, the aporetics of time needs a poetic response 
(narrative), now, in a similar way, the aporetics of the past evokes another poetic 
response: “history”. However, Ricoeur argues, history needs a moral complement 
to overcome its speculative, imaginative component: this moral complement 
consists of our trust, our belief-in, the witness. The witness who testifies "what 
was" comes to represents the voice, the "who," of history.  
 
                                               
246 Cf. OA 140-168. 
247 This sensus communis must be emphasized “in fine to compensate for the excessive accent 
theme of difference in many contemporary theories of the social bond” (M 166). Ricoeur 
further states that “Reciprocal exchange consolidates the feeling of existing along with other 
humans – inter hominess esse, as Hannah Arendt liked to put it. This "betweenness" opens up 
the field to dissensus as much as to consensus. And it is dissensus that the critique of potentially 
divergent testimonies will introduce on the pathway from testimony to the archive” (M 166). 
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The Hermeneutics of History  
After the analysis of how the lived experience of inhabited space and historical 
time becomes articulated in testimony, stored and materialized in archives and, 
subsequently, an object of documentary proof, Ricoeur turns to the second 
phase of the historiographical operation, namely, the explanation, understanding 
and interpretation of testimonies as documents. What do documents proof? 
How does explanation and understanding evolve from the document, and how 
does the scientific methodology relate to a hermeneutics of interpretation? 
History as a science claims to implement the epistemological model of causalities 
that starts with the questions "why?" and ends with the answer "because". 
Ricoeur argues that also the explanatory model of causality depends on a 
scientific imagination (that imagines "objectivity"). The relation between 
narrative causality and the explanatory procedure was examined before in the 
first volume of Time and Narrative. Here Ricoeur explains that the so-called 
"singular causal imputation" as worked out by Max Weber and Raymond Aron, 
“essentially [consist] of the constructing by our imagination of a different course 
of events, then of weighing the probable consequences of this unreal course of 
events, and finally, in comparing these consequences with the real course of 
events” (TN I: 182).  
Weber summarizes this process as: ”In order to penetrate the real causal 
interrelationships, we construct unreal ones”. Aron’s version of the same idea: 
“Every historian, to explain what did happen, asks himself what might have 
happened” (TN I:183). The problem, therefore, with historical causality is its 
entanglement with the imaginary "what if". Two guiding principles underline the 
influence of this historical imaginary. The first principle refers to the idea that 
history concerns “human reality as social fact” (M 183) and, thus, all history is 
social history.248 The second principle concerns the difference between sociology 
and history and stresses changes, differences, intervals, time-scales, periods, 
epochs, which are, in short, temporal structures and connotations. Although they 
share a similar interest in our temporal experiences, phenomenology – as we saw 
at the beginning of this chapter –  examines duration as a lived experience. 
History, in contrast, seems to construct temporal processes or time-spans (and 
fills these with “History”): micro or macro, short or long, continuity or 
discontinuity, and so on.   
                                               
248 History belongs both to the social sciences and to a phenomenology of action, identity and 
empathy. But while history attempts to objectify the past of human relations, phenomenology 
and narrative stay bound to subjective articulations of memory. 
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These concepts of duration and change, as descriptions of continuity and 
discontinuity, deeply influences the post-war French historiography and, in 
particular, the so-called Annales School (Braudel, Lévy-Bruhl). It is their 
explanatory concept of mentalités (meaning that it is mainly the duration or 
change of a collective mentality what steers the historical process) which Ricoeur 
confronts with the "advocates of rigor" (Foucualt, Certeau, and Elias) whose work 
undermines Representation as the privileged referent of change. It is not 
Ricoeur’s goal, however, to dismantle the concept of mentality. He, rather, does 
the opposite by proposing to substitute representation for mentality “thanks [to] 
its conjunction with the notions of action and agent” (M 187). This conjunction is 
reached by the “interplay of scales”  in micro-stories.  
 
Just as macrohistory is attentive to the weight of structural constraints 
exercised over the long time span, to a similar degree microhistory is 
attentive to the initiative and capacity for negotiation of historical 
agents in situations marked by uncertainty (M 187). 
  
Ricoeur points out that between these macro and micro forms of historical 
determination (as situations of uncertainty), agents are allowed to act on and 
negotiate the (historical and social) preconditions of their existence; in short, 
acting agents can change the "scales" of their coercion, public esteem, and 
efficacy. This leads to a “new overall approach,” a “history of societies” in which 
the “accent will be (...) on social practices and the representations integrated in 
these practices, the representations figuring as the symbolic component in the 
structuring of the social bond and the identities that are at stake within it” (M 
187). It is Ricoeur's goal to show how the history of mentality merges with a 
history of representation by way of a history of scales. Together they form a 
"history of society" in which social practices integrate symbolic representations 
and structure the social bond. 
   
Mentality 
Ricoeur places the work of the so-called Annales-school or the history of 
mentality within a close connection to the notion of Weltanschauung and 
civilisation (Elias). Originally, the historians gathered around the journal Annales 
d’histoire économique et sociale intended to set aside the emphasis on political 
processes and the historicizing methodology of the German School (Ranke) with 
a focus on socio-economic long-term processes described within the geo-
strategic context. For them History is no longer a reconstructive narrative of 
dominant political leaders (kings, heroes and dictators), nation-states or 
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incidental events put in a chronological order. Instead, history must describe the 
“mental tools” (Lévy-Bruhl) and le croyable disponible of a particular society in a 
particular time and space. This does not amount to a history of ideas, but rather 
to a description of the mental and historical structures of the “ways of feeling 
and thinking” signified by “collective, symbolic practices” and “unperceived 
mental representations” of various social groups.  
Although Elias, Bloch, Durkheim or Febvre place a different emphasis on the 
relation between the individual and society, they share the idea that civilizations 
are embedded in a social history marked by the “interdependence of the spheres 
of activity”.249 For them history needs to incorporate sociology, ethnology, 
psychology, literary studies and linguistics. Ideally “total history” (M 193) merges 
all social sciences and considers the sociological and psychological dimension as 
the all determining factor of history. A focus on anthropocentrism and humanism 
is crucial for the first period of the Annales-school while after the First World 
War, this focus is shifted to socio-economic and quantifiable structures. As a kind 
of compromise between the anti-historicism of structuralism and the fixation on 
changes of traditional historiography the concept of longue durée (Braudel) is 
introduced. The longue durée examines structural socio-economic long time-
spans contextualized in geographic and climatic processes: it understands itself in 
opposition to histories concerned with “events.” But Ricoeur considers it a 
conceptual weakness of the longue durée model that it accumulates 
temporalities instead of showing their dialectical interrelatedness. The decision 
to do “total history” only clarifies how relations of interdependence create a 
macro-history (in contrast to micro-histories).  
It is this connection between the perspective of longue durée and macro-
history that signifies the final contribution of the history of mentalities. Mentality 
as "mental history" evolves from a hierarchy of long durations and a macro-
history of the triadic network of the economic, social and cultural history. Ricoeur 
attests Braudel’s model though of a “fatalism,” namely, the view that the 
                                               
249 The socio-historical model of interdependence provides an alternative to the post-war 
dominance of the Marxist infra- and superstructure model, as such, one macro determination 
overrules a former one. Simultaneously, the inclusion of sociological and psychological aspects 
in the description of the historical process signifies a clear reaction against the ahistorical claims 
of structuralism. The “history of mentalities” holds on to a historical anthropology, containing 
all social sciences, as opposed to the “terrorist antihistoricism” (M 195) attributed to Lévi-
Strauss. This opposition between anthropology and structuralism raises the question of 
whether the human being is the only species that can be considered as the actual synthesizing 
object of all sciences (as the actual object of research and as the subject asking the questions)? 
If this is negated, does this mean that the fragmentation of the sciences will also fragment 
history in the same way that a “history of humanity” will always be impossible?  
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economic and geographical determinations permanently and inescapable 
pressurize all other aspects of a society, this leads “to a vision of humanity 
overwhelmed by greater forces than its own” (M 194).   
For Ricoeur the "history of mentalities" is important as a method to explain 
the “availability” of particular thoughts and beliefs at a particular time and space 
like, for example, Lucien Febvre’s assertion that “Atheism” was a thought which 
was not available in a society of the sixteenth century. History as an examination 
of a mentality becomes again an anthropological project where the human being, 
its capacities, experiences, beliefs, ways of inhabiting the world and manners of 
thinking about this world, form a complex interdependent web, a complete 
world-view. This web represents “what a person of the time could and could not 
think about the world” (M  192). In short: what a human is depends on what he 
or she can imagine to be or become. As a result –  and this may sound like a cliché  
–, it becomes clear that we only understand "our" history if we understand the 
forms and manners of our self-understanding and its limitations. This Kantian 
deadlock can partially be resolved by going back in time and examining how our 
contemporary self-understanding differs from those of past generations. What 
kind of inquiry or questioning was possible five hundred or thousand years ago? 
What does this tell us about the beliefs, attitudes, experiences and actions of 
those who lived in those days? Are we entitled to judge them by our current 
standards?  
Ricoeur's decision to begin his inquiry of the "hermeneutics of history" 
through a critique of the explanatory object of the French Annales-school 
(mentalité) closes the gap between a phenomenology of action and a sociology of 
the social bond. This sets the stage for Ricoeur's intention to reclaim 
historiography as part of a philosophical anthropology (now examined through 
the question what it means for humans to be historical beings) that unites all 
social sciences (in contrast to a historiography that aims only at reconstructing 
the "truth of history"). While the description of mentalities seems to oppose a 
theory of representation, Ricoeur shows how the collective self-understanding in 
a particular mentality depends on the thinkable or, rather on yet unthinkable 
structures of representation and cultural symbolization.  
The Sceptical Position 
Using the advocates of rigor – Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau and Norbert 
Elias250 – the explanation/ understanding problematic within Ricoeur's 
                                               
250 These “masters of rigor” echo Ricoeur's earlier remark on Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as the 
masters of suspicion. “The contemporary philosopher meets Freud on the same ground as 
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"hermeneutics of history" turns into three sceptical positions which not only 
dismantle the explanatory concepts of the Annales-school but also radically 
redefine the "representation of history" as a "history of representations". They 
not only doubt the explanatory concepts of history (causality) but also  focus on 
the powers that control the discursive production of knowledge, on the place of 
this production and the process of social formations. For them the "production of 
history" is another form of social, political and cultural disciplining and regulating, 
turning social constraints into forms of self-constraining. Foucault, De Certeau 
and Elias share a fundamental critique of history as being a normative process 
leaving little room for agency. But, they differ considerably in  answering the 
question of where to find the source of the discursive hegemonic and social 
formative power structure that dominates us. How much freedom is left or how 
can the self regain agency after its apparent complete determination by the 
meta-structures called history, society and state-power? The "rigor" of the three 
anti-historian historians fundamentally undermines the abilities of the "capable 
human being" and, thus, of Ricoeur's own anthropological understanding of 
history.  
In Foucault’s work, Ricoeur states, we do not find a “hermeneutic of 
intentions and motivations, only a listing of specific forms of articulation” (M 
201). Foucault opposes the linearity of events in historicism and stresses 
discontinuities, ruptures, fault lines, gaps. While historicism reconstructs changes 
(as the result of an active force or agent) Foucault calls these processes 
transformations to define a quasi-neutral process which stands outside the 
“great metaphorics of flow” (M 202). Ricoeur repeats a well-known criticism, 
namely, that Foucault only replaces the ideology of continuity with an ideology of 
discontinuity. Foucault’s idea of the archive as a “register of discursive 
formation” and archaeology as a “description of interdiscursive formations” leads 
to a kind of “intellectual asceticism” which attempts to create a “radically neutral 
terrain” of “statement(s) without a speaker” (M 203).251 This leads Ricoeur to ask: 
                                               
 
Nietzsche and Marx. All three rise before him as protagonist of suspicion who rip away masks 
and pose the novel problem of the lie of consciousness and unconsciousness” (CI 99). In a 
similar manner, Foucault, de Certeau an Elias rip away the mask of historicism to show the lie of 
the traditional reconstructions of the past. Ricoeur follows them, as he did before with Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud both in their criticism of consciousness and in their criticism of historicism 
to the point where the subject tends to disappear in economic structures, semantics, the 
unconscious, discursive epistema or social formations. In rebalancing this suspicion, Ricoeur 
insists on the who behind the intention, action, articulation and response.   
251 If we are entirely captured within interdiscursive formations certain questions must be 
raised, namely,  “Who can take up a position outside this formation? and “how are we to 
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“who is it that knows what no one knows?” and “who speaks and from where?”. 
Although Foucault does not answer this question, there seems to be a way out of 
the deadlock of discourses without agent: in the passage from his examination of 
the archive to the archaeology of knowledge, Foucault calls to “reverse the 
procedure” and, according to Ricoeur, to “proceed to possible domains of 
application” (M 202). Ricoeur understands this call for application as Foucault’s 
wish to reconnect the neutralized discourse to social practices. Here there seems 
to be an opening to overcome Foucault’s reductionism and rebind the pure 
discursive realm with the nondiscursive “where language itself resist any 
reduction to a statement”. Thus, Ricoeur aims at a “displacement of Foucault’s 
displacement” (M 203).252  
For De Certeau, who is even more rigorous, it is the “celebration of absence” 
which forms the actual object of all history amounting to nothing else but a 
“tracing of the ‘traces of the other’”. These traces sojourn in “zones of silence” at 
the “limit of the thinkable”, only retrievable by a “rhetoric of the exceptional” (M 
203). De Certeau's interest lies with the “inaugural moment when the gesture of 
doing history brings about a gap in relation to the practices through which 
human beings make history”. This shows, Ricoeur comments, that his project is 
still “rooted in a philosophical anthropology in which the reference to psychology 
is fundamental and foundational” (M 205). Phrased differently: de Certeau asks 
why we need and "do" history and what this says about our self-understanding as 
humans. The simple answer is: humans "do history" because they suffer from the 
absent past. While Freud's psychoanalytical diagnosis aimed to retrieve 
knowledge by "reading" the hidden symbolism of the patient's dreams to 
overcome its suffering, it is De Certeau who considers the "historical operation" 
as a comparable attempt of diagnosing the past in search for its hidden traces of 
                                               
 
continue to think about the formation and transformations not of discourses neutralized in this 
way, but of the relation between representation and practices?” (M 202). If representation and 
practice collapse and, consequently, the “author” is neutralized, the continuation of social 
practices and their representations and articulations in our “reality” becomes a self-
reproducing machine, a social perpetuum mobile.   
252 For Ricoeur the relation between representation and practices cannot be reduced to neutral 
discursive transformations or “statements without speaker”. He comments that “We can see 
what is set aside: the phenomena of expression, of reflection, of symbolization, of the causal 
relation transmitted by the consciousness of the speaking subjects. But what is the positive 
relation to nondiscursive practices? Foucault confines himself to assigning to archaeology the 
task of showing how and in what sense “political practice” is part of “its condition of 
emergence, insertion, and functioning” for example of medical discourse. But it is not a 
question of its determining this sense and this form” (M 541). The relation between Ricoeur 
and Foucault is far more complex as I am able to describe at this point and in this project. 
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meaning. This search is motivated by a desire to overcome our suffering from 
absence whereby our "overcoming" of this absence gets articulated in the 
fictional story we call "history".253 But it is crucial to understand that the "truth of 
history" does not lie in what we find in history but in how we "do history," 
correspondently, the "truth of dreams" is not to be found in the patient but in 
the sort of epistemological diagnosis that psychoanalysis represents. 
In contrast, Norbert Elias' civilizational theory proposes the idea that all 
social formations can be perceived from one single macro-historical viewpoint, 
namely, the normative process of civilization. This leads to forms of voluntary 
self-constrainment in a civilizing habitus. Ricoeur summarizes: “The self is in fact 
what is at stake in civilization, what civilizes itself, under the institutional 
constraint” (M 207). For Elias this self-civilizational-constrainment is not entirely 
deterministic, but rather reveals forms of interdependence between “the 
modifications affecting the political organization and those affecting human 
sensibility and behaviour” (M 207). This interdependence is a process of 
appropriation that leaves an “opening” within the habitus of the actor. Hence, 
our habitus serves as a self-regulative force that reconstitutes equilibrium 
between behavioural extremes. Even Elias admits that it is "by no means 
impossible" that the “unplanned dynamics of these structures” – rationalization, 
civilization, shame and habitus – leads to a “greater scope” for the subject to 
intervene in the constraining structures (cf M 209). As mentioned before, Ricoeur 
does not accept the total domination of the subject by discourses, fiction or 
social formations. In all structural structures there remains a who that speaks, 
acts, narrates, remembers and "stands for" a particular utterance, intervention, 
creation or act.  
In this section I have described how Ricoeur proposes two crucial shifts 
(back) to representation, 1) the shift from the history of mentality to the history 
of representation, and 2) the shift from interpretation to representation as the 
key to a hermeneutics of explanation and understanding. This double shift is 
motivated by his basic assumption that the connection between memory and 
history is found through (the problem of) representation which is both an object 
of history and an instrumental part of the historiographical operation itself. As a 
consequence, the phenomenology of memory is reconnected with a 
hermeneutics of history. Ricoeur shows that both the re-imagination of the 
                                               
253 De Certeau, in his reading of how Freud “does history” in Moses and Monotheism, brings 
together the writing of psychoanalysis and the writing of history. Freud understands that his 
manner of “doing history” amounts to using a “theoretical fiction” (psychoanalysis) in 
understanding a “legend” (a fictional fiction). This turns “history” into a purely literary genre; 
one fiction explaining the other (Cf. M 206).   
148  |   Chapter Five 
 
absent past through remembrance, and the reconstruction of this past by 
historiography depend on forms of re-presentation which, in turn, depends again 
on our belief-in, our trust-of, representation. Trust permeates all levels of 
experience and knowledge: cognitive, phenomenological, historical, or 
hermeneutical. Without trust in what our memory re-presents in the presence 
and without the conviction that the narrative of history can be trusted as truthful 
both the cognitive and hermeneutical "function" (intrinsic both in memory and 
the historical operation) cannot be effectuated.  
In conclusion, the first part of this chapter examined Ricoeur’s 
phenomenological examination of our cognitive capability to remember. This was 
followed by his epistemological perspective on our manners of explaining, 
understanding and representing the past. But, Ricoeur argues, we must, in the 
end, return to an ontology of our historical condition which is the condition of 
human historicity. In the core of this return stands an effort to add an “avoir été” 
(having been) to Heidegger’s original notion of Dasein. Hence, the consciousness 
of Being-There belongs to the experience of Having-Been expressed as a 
consciousness of history (Geschichtsbewußtsein). While the epistemology of the 
archive, the hermeneutics of understanding and the structures of representation 
show how history is produced as a "standing for the past" it is, finally, only 
through a clarification of the ontology of the historical condition that we can 
understand how we actually "stand in history". In other words, we can 
understand how we are affected by and committed to history as a force, an idea 
that deeply influences all our future acts. Our commitment to the past shows 
itself in a feeling of responsibility and accountability to represent, or overcome, 
this past in the present.254  
Ricoeur prefers the term “historical condition” over the term “historicity”, 
because each of us is “enclosed” in a situation which is a “conditionality, in the 
sense of a condition of possibility on the order of the ontological” (M 284). He 
                                               
254 Ronald Eyerman's original sociological theory shows that our collective memories of cultural 
traumas (for example, those caused by war, state-violence, natural catastrophes, assassinations 
of political leaders, minority struggles for recognition), often articulated and solidified in 
narratives of re-telling, may provoke new social drama's. The reason for this is that the often 
silenced or unresolved initial “events” (for example, enslavement) trigger political or moral 
processes which repeat or perform (often in the figure of a negative dialectics) the unresolved 
“wound” of the “past”, the “collective shock“, and thus, creates a web of meaning that 
entangles its subjects. See, for example, Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African-
American Identity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001); The Assassination of Theo 
van Gogh: From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); The 
Cultural Sociology of Political Assassination: From MLK and RFK to Fortuyn and van Gogh 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 
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aptly summarizes this condition as: “We make history, and we make histories 
(nous faisons l’histoire et nous faisons de l’histoire) because we are historical” (M 
284). This dialectics grounds his “working hypothesis” which aims at establishing 
a coherence through a “twofold passage”: the first is the passage from historical 
knowledge to critical hermeneutics and, the second, is the passage from critical 
hermeneutics to an ontological hermeneutics. Ricoeur admits that the 
“necessity” of this hypothesis cannot be presumed but  only  “confirmed through 
its enactment” (M 284). This means that we first need to examine how the 
"operation" that constructs "historical knowledge" functions as an epistemology, 
followed by a (Kantian) examination of the actual condition of this knowledge 
(critical hermeneutics). Both passages are then reframed by the question of how 
this operation and critical knowledge influence the manner in which we 
experience our existential condition of Being (ontological hermeneutics). Finally, 
Ricoeur reads his own dialectic backwards: our existential and ontological 
condition shows how we experience, articulate and reconstruct the having-been 
of Being. Just as the last chapter of Oneself and Another (called What Ontology in 
View) describes the actual ontological commitment intrinsic to the ethical self, it 
is now the ontological condition that proves to be an evenly inherent part of our 
historical consciousness.   
In the final part of Ricoeur's impressive theory of memory the cognitive, 
phenomenological and hermeneutic examination of our capability to remember 
turns to a (correlative) examination of forgetting; how do we forget?; what do 
we forget?; what does forgetting do and mean?; and, of course, who forgets? The 
ability to actively forget leads Ricoeur to an "appendix" on the capability to 
forgive adding another layer to the "ethics of memory" which can be considered 
the actual, unspoken, theme of this, Ricoeur's, anthropology of human 
remembering as a description of us, as "animals with a past". 
Forgetting 
While Heidegger’s famous first sentence in Being and Time lamented that we 
"forgot Being", we need to remember as Ricoeur states, that we also "forgot 
forgetting".255 This is a strange omission in the philosophies of history because 
forgetting symbolizes “the emblem of the vulnerability of the historical condition 
taken as a whole” (M 284).256 While for remembering forgetting seems a 
                                               
255 Although Ricoeur's title Memory, History, Forgetting puts forgetting on an equal level with 
memory and history, it actually forms only one of three sub-chapters dedicated to the historical 
condition (thus, accurately Ricoeur’s title should have been Memory, History, Historicity). 
256 The involuntary forgetting of amnesia destroys the dialectic between remembering and 
forgetting because it undermines the core functions of memory – to store images and 
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“disturbing threat” (M 412), its opposite – a “memory that would never forget 
anything” – seems an evenly “monstrous” idea. If we combat with the “ultimate 
phantasm” of total reflection or total history, we must also fight a “memory 
lacking forgetting”. Forgetting is “so closely tied to memory that it can be 
considered one of the conditions for it”: in short, Ricoeur argues that in order to 
be able to remember, we must be able to forget, since without forgetting there is 
no remembering. We forget that we "naturally" (and permanently) remember 
and forget things. This natural dialectic between remembering and forgetting 
belongs to the “silence of our organs” (M 427).257 
For Aristotle memory was "of the past", which meant that remembering is 
part of our temporal experience. We desire to recall that time moves from the 
present to the past. But this same temporal experience causes forgetting which, 
according to Aristotle, belongs to the forces of decay (Physik IV, 12, 221a-221b). 
According to this logic, the continuity of time means a continuity of forgetting 
ending with definitive erasure. This logic is undermined by the fact that often, 
particularly in old age, the oldest memories, those of our childhood, appear most 
vividly while memories closer in time seem more difficult to recall. Thus, 
memory-traces can persist and endure even if we are no longer aware of their 
existence. There is, thus, a form of unconscious forgetting that silently holds in 
“reserve” past affections and experiences (the German translation uses the very 
accurate term "verwahrendes Vergessen": a forgetting that "holds in store" what 
we think we forgot, what we do not know our body or mind still is able to 
remember). On another level habits, as habit-memory, show that we can move, 
act and respond even if we do not first consciously recall how to. There seems a 
silent “availability” (disponibilité) of memory as a body-habit which we, in daily 
life, forget exists. This is what Ricoeur refers to as our "profound forgetting"; a 
                                               
 
experiences. Amnesia only marks the existential limit-situation of aging and death. It is here 
that the biological and ontological meet again in an anthropological description of what the 
human is; the human can only be human if it has memory and be a person able to remember. 
On the ontological level forgetting belongs to the involuntary aspects of life, it is a “limit 
situation” as described by Jaspers and Nabert (“lamented in the same way as aging and death”), 
forgetting is a figure “of the inevitable, the irremediable,” an “endless abyss” (M 426), a sign of 
the “sorrow of finitude” (M 440). 
257 While splitting the cognitive aspect between the “effacing” and the “persistence of traces” it 
is in the pragmatic aspect of forgetting that Ricoeur returns to the earl ier categories of the “use 
and abuse of memory” but now from the perspective of a blocked, manipulated or commanded 
forgetting. Here comes up a strange but adequate question: can there be a “measure in the use 
of human memory”? (M 413). Do we need, analogue to the just use of history, to find a just 
balance between remembering and forgetting? And if so, how to find this just measure?. 
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forgetting which in fact reveals a "deep memory" inscribed in our body. This is 
the memory of what we once learned or acquired by repetition (which we often 
call our "second nature"). “The capable human being draws from this thesaurus 
and relies on the security, the assurance that it provides. Next come general 
forms of knowledge, such as rules of calculation or grammar, familiar or foreign 
lexicons, rules of games, and so on” (M 441). This habit-memory refers back to 
Leibniz’s fundamental insight “that everything that is in the understanding has 
first been in the senses, except human understanding itself” (M 441). Thus, our 
senses hold a silent memory-reservoir which is so "natural" that we actually 
forgot it exists. A final form of forgetting refers to what Ricoeur calls the 
“immemorial” which “is never an event for me and which we have never actually 
learned”.  
At the basis of this ontology is the “forgetting of foundations," a forgetting 
of our "Ursprung”, of an “originating power" that is "irreducible to a dated 
beginning and, as such, participates in the same status of fundamental 
forgetting” (M 442). This profound forgetting exposes a “primordial 
equivocalness” revealing the “double valence of destruction and perseverance”; 
there can both be a “destructive forgetting” and a “forgetting that preserves”. 
This apparent paradox explains Heidegger’s renaming the past as Vergangenheit 
to naming it something that was – gewesen, Gewesenheit. As a "having-been" 
the past is not something absent but something that was and, in a temporal 
distance, it still is. Ricoeur summarizes,  
 
forgetting has a positive meaning insofar as having-been prevails over 
being-no-longer in the meaning attached to the idea of the past. Having-
been makes forgetting the immemorial resource offered to the work of 
remembering. Finally, the primary equivocalness of destructive 
forgetting and of founding forgetting remains fundamentally 
undecidable. In human experience, there is no superior point of view 
from which one could apprehend the common source of destroying and 
constructing. In this great dramaturgy of being, there is, for us, no final 
assessment (M 443).      
 
Forgetting, Forgiving 
As a final "appendix" Ricoeur reflects on our ability to actively forget, to let go of 
the past as the necessary precondition for our capability to forgive. But in order 
to give forgiveness we first need justice; forgiveness comes after, not before, 
justice. One could say that forgiveness forms the "small ethics" of Ricoeur’s 
theory of history, an "ethics of memory" connecting the "hermeneutics of moral 
selfhood" with a "phenomenology of memory". Both identity and memory 
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demonstrate a fragility or "wound" to which we respond by taking up the difficult 
task of self-affirmation; the me, voici of attestation and the j’y etais of testimony 
stand for the potential of human responsibility in the present towards the past 
and in the future. This potential is conceived as a task of "being just"/ "doing 
justice". In this manner, the ethics of memory also marks a confrontation 
between the self and the "other of history", adding another layer to the complex 
intertwinement of "oneself as another". Just as the fragility of identity 
(exemplified by the distortion of self as sameness) led Ricoeur to formulate an 
"ethical selfhood", it is through a recognition of the fragility of memory and 
history that the need for an "ethics of memory" is made visible. It is in our ethical 
imputability (exemplified by our ontological affections and commitments) that 
we re-affirm who we faithfully "stand for" when we attest to our self in the 
present or when we testify of the past (both as personal testimony or collective 
histories).  
The analogy between promising and forgiving now appears as two sides of 
the same coin; one is directed towards the future while the other is directed 
towards the past. The "ethics of selfhood" and the "ethics of history" coincide in 
an ontological anthropology of attestation and testimony. This amounts to an 
existential "notwithstanding" in light of the fundamental vulnerability of our 
capabilities:  our identity may fall apart, our memories appear as sheer illusions 
but the "I can" of hope and self-affirmation seems only truly meaningful in light 
of these painful experiences of our incapabilities and limits. In contrast to the 
feeling of loss evoked by involuntary forgetting, there is, therefore, a need also 
for a voluntary or “happy forgetting”. Happy forgetting extends Ricoeur's earlier 
concept of a happy memory and emerges from the relation between forgetting 
and forgiveness: to forgive we must allow ourselves to forget. But forgiveness can 
only be celebrated "after justice" if it truly wants to produce a “reconciled 
memory” (M 285). With this possibility of a happy affirmation of forgetting 
Ricoeur’s renewal of the philosophy of history comes full circle.  
Conclusion  
The capability to remember – set up as the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting and described as a cognitive, phenomenological, hermeneutical and 
ontological process  –  crowns Ricoeur’s entire philosophy of history. In this line 
of thought the intentionality of memory is overtaken by the actual "doing of 
memory" (faire memoire) which precedes and informs our "doing of history" 
(faire de l’histoire). The fragility of memory consists of two key moments: first, 
the fact that our re-imagination of the past suffers from the unanswerable 
question whether what we re-imagine is an accurate representation, an illusion 
or even a hallucination. This insecurity produces the suspicion that we cannot 
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always trust what we remember, subsequently, the mistrust in our own 
capability destabilizes our sense of self and history. The search for the right 
balance between remembering and forgetting echoes the central theme of 
Ricoeur's anthropology: the need for an equilibrium between the fallible, 
wounded, cogito and the capable, affirmative, self. In order to save our "happy 
memory" we need to overcome the (involuntary) distortions of trauma, 
manipulation or obligation that cause despair and sorrow both on a personal and 
collective level. It is in our complex responses to the fallible and fragile aspects of 
remembering and forgetting that our ontological and ethical commitments finally 
come together.  

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
 
ETHICS 
 
Ricoeur’s ethics of a Shared Life  
 
 
  

 
 
6. REFLEXIVE EMPATHY  
 
 
 
The structure of address is important for understanding how moral authority is 
introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address others when we 
speak, but that in some way we come to exist, as it were, in the moment of being 
addressed, and something about our existence proves precarious when that 
address fails. More emphatically, however, what binds us morally has to do with 
how we are addressed by others in ways that we cannot avert or avoid. 
 
Butler (2004: 13) 
 
 
Key to Ricoeur’s ethical outlook forms the continuing question of how human 
action and ethical commitments can be unified and bound to concrete existence 
in its practical, moral and ontological dimension both on a personal and a 
collective level. His early ethical thinking begins with the problem of freedom and 
choice, fallibility and fragility, evil and sin, while it concludes with the complexity 
of human attestation and testimony, forgiveness and recognition, reciprocity and 
mutuality, giving and receiving, love and justice. These meta-ethical structures of 
suffering and action mark the negative or affirmative aspects of human 
experience, affection and reflection. The particular anthropological quality of 
Ricoeur's ethics lies in its starting point: our irresolvable finiteness that leads to 
the recognition that we are "wounded subjects". This condition places us in 
constant danger of involuntary physical or mental suffering and possible 
humiliation and domination by others in the personal or collective aspects of our 
existence. As such, the anthropological aspect of Ricoeur's ethic echoes – as its 
actual precondition – the human as a Mängelwesen (Gehlen). This condition of 
human deficiency does not only endanger our own intention for the "good", but 
also evokes a need for social contracts, institutions of justice, regulative 
distribution and other concrete practices (like democracy) allowing us to "live 
together" in peace. This engagement is possible because humans are capable of 
feeling empathy and love for others, and fulfiling, through conscious actions, our 
ability to do good. While our fallibility opens the gate to evil, it is through “our 
ability to recognize ourselves as accountable” (RJ 2) that we are able to restore 
the relation between our capabilities and ethical self-affirmation: “This 
imputability is a capacity homogenous with the series of capacities and 
incapacities that define the capable human being”. The "standing for", 
symbolized in attestation and testimony, signifies both an accountability for a 
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moral-ethical enduring self and an ontological response to the Other while 
Ricoeur navigates his notion of "other" between the "dialogical other" of 
hermeneutics and the totalizing Other of Levinas.  
All universal, deliberative, procedural or communicative forms of moral 
action must be able to exemplify how we "stand for" the realization of the "good 
life" and the translation of this aim in our acts, narratives, promises, and 
responses to others. It is here that the intricate problem of how the self can be 
an ethical self - how it can give an account of oneself as ethical258 – is posed in 
relation to the question of how we can reach agreement over the definition and  
performance of morality, ethics, justice, and the law in the context of our 
concrete existence, embodied subjectivity and ontological commitments. This 
problem of the self is asked also in relation to socio-political institutions. The 
personal is political because the social contract is evoked through or dismissed by 
the social bond (or the lack of it). The self can only affirm itself mediated through 
the social bond by which it is recognized (as a full esteemed citizen). Similarly, if 
the social bond in which we live denies our existence by exclusion or humiliation, 
our commitment to the social bond deeply suffers.  
 Although Ricoeur, as we shall see, engages meticulously with the ethical 
and moral tradition, he, in the end, returns to an ethics of conviction and reflexive 
empathy (we are deeply anchored in ontological commitments showing the 
endurance and accountability of the self as exemplified by acts of promising, 
forgiving and friendship). Furthermore, the problem of the just is key to his 
ethical and political outlook and concerns questions of equality, dignity, self-
esteem, trust and our sense of injustice (in light of our own fundamental 
vulnerability and dependency on others).  
 
Ethics 
The most comprehensive account of Ricoeur's ethical views can be found in the 
"small ethics" of Oneself as Another. It is there that, within the context of his 
"hermeneutics of selfhood," the question “who is the subject of moral 
imputation?" posits the shift from the descriptive to the prescriptive aspects of 
                                               
258 This phrase is borrowed from Judith Butler’s illuminating book Giving an Account of Oneself 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). Whereas for Ricoeur to “give an account of 
oneself’ is a unifying experience (albeit not a totalizing one) it, in Butler’s understanding, refers 
to the problem that a “self” can never be sufficiently unified (let alone know itself completely or 
free itself completely from all forms of subjection) and, hence, cannot be asked to present, 
stand-for, a unified and complete accountability of its “self” towards (all) others. What does this 
impossibility (of the self’s coherence) mean for ethics? I will return to this fundamental problem 
in another, forthcoming, study on Ricoeur’s legal theory.    
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identity. This move also represents the passage from the semantic, pragmatic 
and narrative categories of action towards the triad of our ethical intentions, 
moral obligations and finally, our practical or "critical" wisdom. Seen through the 
lens of classical ethical philosophies Ricoeur aims to reconcile Aristotle’s 
phronesis, passing through the Kantian Moralität, with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. 
Therefore, Aristotle’s teleological perspective of aiming at the good life (closely 
connected to the need to live an "examined life") must "work through" the 
Kantian notion of obligation (Pflicht) and perceive the norm (hence, the 
deontological perspective) as enabling a reconnection between the "good life" 
and the actions, values and norms of practical life (reflecting a situated and 
concrete ethics). This working through Kant by way of Aristotle seeks to re-
establish “the primacy of ethics over morality” (OA 170).259 Thus, the relation 
between Aristotle and Kant is one of simultaneous “subordination and 
complementarity” reinforced by a “final recourse of morality to ethics”. The 
tension between the (Aristotelian) teleological and (Kantian) deontological model 
recurs in two forms of ethical self-designation: self-esteem (teleological) and self-
respect (deontological). In the conceptualization of self-esteem Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of selfhood and the intentionality of the "primacy of ethics over 
morality" signify that my attested commitments (towards my enduring self and 
others) are commitments to an ethical good. In this way, I do no longer prescribe 
to my "self" what it ought to do, or obey to, but rather examine my life 
(establishing my "narrative identity") after which, the teleological viewpoint – 
how to realize the "good life" as an "accomplished life" – prevails over the 
deontological position; the aim of my life is to lead a good life. The central 
question, thus, becomes how "having a good life" and "doing good" coincide.260 
The "primacy of ethics or morality", of the "aim over the norm" and of "self-
esteem over self-respect" guides the “ethical intention” which Ricoeur 
                                               
259 Ricoeur’s formulation of his “working hypothesis” is the idea that “morality is held to 
constitute only a limited, although legitimate and even indispensable, actualization of the 
ethical aim, and ethics in this sense would then encompass morality” (OA 170). Within this 
triangle of ethics, morality and practical wisdom Ricoeur examines, a) the wish for the “good 
life” b) the care for our own life in relation with the solicitude we experience for the life of 
others, c) the relation between self-esteem and self-respect, and d) questions of redistribution 
and  equality. 
260 This position is summarized as, (1)”self-esteem is more fundamental than self-respect, (2) 
that self-respect is the aspect under which self-esteem appears in the domain of norms, and (3) 
that the aporias of duty create situations in which self-esteem appears not only as the source 
but as the recourse for respect, when no sure norm offers a guide for the exercise hic et nunc of 
respect. In this way, self-esteem and self-respect together will represent the most advanced 
stages of the growth of selfhood, which is at the same time its unfolding” (OA 171).  
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synthesizes (and unfolds over three chapters) as “aiming at the ‘good life’ with 
and for others, in just institutions” (OA 172). This definition beholds three key 
components: the ethical intention ("aiming at the good life"), the intersubjective 
relation ("with and for others") and the justice of the social contract in relation to 
the social bond ("in just institutions"). In each of these three components, the 
friction between the moral norm and the ethical aim is at stake.261 
The Ethical Intention   
Most people do not consciously make "bad" choices. Our intention is to make a 
good choice. For us a good choice is the right choice. What I hope is a good 
choice may turn out to be a bad one but this doesn’t change my original "good" 
intention. As a doctor or mechanic my intention is to heal the patient or repair 
the car – my intention is to do "good" work. These examples show that my 
primary motivation aims at doing good (in this sense "doing good" is a leading 
value in the teleological perspective determining the way I lead my life or pursue 
my profession). Of course, what is considered "good" may be defined by 
deontological norms but the intention itself and search for "a good" is what 
determines the praxis of the "good life". Here its relation to self-esteem becomes 
obvious: it belongs to my self-esteem (to be exact: to the actual validation of my 
self-esteem) that I attempt to be a "good" doctor. Consequently, being a good 
doctor (by caring for my patients) provides me with self-esteem. This circular 
argument (the ends-means model) between intentionality and self-esteem only 
holds if I am capable, if I actually have a choice, to realize my ideal aim in life (in 
this case to be a doctor). This end-means model equals the hermeneutical circle 
because I asses and interpret my actions and choices in the light of the ethical 
                                               
261 In Justice and Truth Ricoeur aptly summarizes the core structure of the relation between 
ethics and morality that he develops in Oneself as Another: “I propose two intersecting readings 
of the structure of morality. A horizontal reading will lead me to derive the constitution of the 
self from the following threefold structure: the wish for a good life, with and for others, in just 
institutions. A vertical reading will then follow the ascending progression that, starting from a 
teleological approach guided by the idea of living well, traverses the deontological where the 
norm, obligation, prohibition, formalism, and procedures dominate, to find its end on the plane 
of practical wisdom which is that of phronesis, of prudence as the art of a fair decision in 
situations of uncertainty and conflict, hence in the tragic setting of action. According to this 
intersecting reading, justice finds itself situated at the intersection of two axes, since it first 
figured in third place in the threefold structure in which I have joined the terms, and it remains 
the third category named when this threefold structure is transposed from one plane to 
another. Justice can be taken as the highest category of the practical field if we can show that 
there is a progression on the horizontal plane from the first to the third term of the basic 
threefold structure, and equally on the vertical axis, where the idea of justice culminates in that 
of fairness” Cf. Justice and Truth (J 60).  
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intention and in relation to the deontological norms surrounding me. This 
interpretation also echoes Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (phronesis): our 
ethical intention is evaluated and validated through a self-reflexivity aiming at 
making the best possible choices to live the best possible life (to act according to 
the good standards of our profession, be a "good" parent and so on). Ricoeur 
argues that it is “in the unending work of interpretation applied to action and to 
oneself that we pursue the search for adequation between what seems to us to 
be best with regard to our life as a whole and the preferential choices that 
govern our practices. (…) On the ethical plane, self-interpretation becomes self-
esteem. In return, self-esteem follows the fate of interpretation” (OA 179). 
Interpretation informs our practical judgements of which we can attest, 
subsequently, the attestation of our actions and intentions informs our self-
esteem; we are worthy of esteem because we evaluate and stand for our choices 
and actions. Although Ricoeur does not define what the good life actually is, he 
seems to offer a procedure explaining how to search for it. This procedure 
reflects our only attempt to use our practical wisdom to balance our “life ideals” 
and our actual practical decisions. The final judgement on how to act in a "good" 
manner depends on what he calls “experimental evidence” which is the “new 
figure in which attestation appears when the certainty of being the author of 
one’s own discourse and of one’s own acts becomes the conviction of judging 
well and acting well in a momentary and provisional approximation of living well” 
(OA 180).  Thus, the good life (as the coming together of a fulfilled and examined 
life) cannot be defined as such, but it can, however, function as a permanent 
intention underlying our acts and “exercise of judgements”: our ethical 
intentions pass through the "sieve" of moral practices just like my personal idea 
of the "good life" steers me through my practical decisions which, in an ideal 
case, coincide. It is this thought that Ricoeur retrieves from Aristotle’s ethics.       
 
With and for Others. 
How is the good life connected with the second aspect of the ethical intention 
namely, "with and for others?". This second component designates the relation 
between self and Other as solicitude, reciprocity and friendship. What these 
figures of mutuality show is the intertwinement of a shared life, self-esteem and 
the care for "each other" (wheras each other is felt and recognized as a possible 
"other me"). This "other me" is not so much a duplication of my own self but the 
acknowledgement that all Others, as my co-humans, have the same value as me; 
I value the other as I value myself, thus, I need to care for them as if I cared for 
my self. Equally, if others suffer, I suffer not only because it concerns "another 
me" but also because "it could be me".  In friendship, for example, the pain of the 
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other is my pain (we suffer "each-other’s" pain), this makes me an "other among 
others". In this dialogical model of care, solicitude and suffering it is the figure of 
unconditional reciprocity that determines the similitude at work in the 
“reversibility of roles” as well as the “bond between oneself and the other” (OA 
193). Ricoeur summarizes this relation as, 
 
Similitude is the fruit of the exchange between esteem for oneself and 
solicitude for others. This exchange authorizes us to say that I cannot 
myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as myself. “As myself” 
means that you too are capable of starting something in the world, of 
acting for a reason, of hierarchizing your priorities, of evaluating the 
ends of your actions, and, having done this, of holding yourself in 
esteem as I hold myself in esteem. The equivalence between the “you 
too” and the “as myself” rest on a trust that can be held to be an 
extension of the attestation by reason of which I believe that I can (do 
something) and that I have worth. All the ethical feelings mentioned 
above belong to this phenomenology of “you too” and of “as myself.” 
For they well express the paradox contained in this equivalence, the 
paradox of the exchange at the very place of the irreplaceable. 
Becoming in this way fundamentally equivalent are the esteem of the 
other as a oneself and the esteem of oneself as an other (OA 194).  
 
Although each of us is "irreplaceable" each of us is a similar (capable) self as 
"me". In this phenomenology of the "you too" and "as myself" it is in the 
mutuality of self-esteem that Ricoeur finds “the primordial reflexive moment of 
the aim of the good life” (OA 188). Hereby, friendship represents the ideal-type 
of esteem between human beings as persons “who each esteem themselves”. 
Mutual self-esteem unfolds through the recognition of similitude, of reciprocity 
and finally, of equality. By this means, the intersubjective bond of friendship 
prepares the ethical intention of the larger social bond expressing a generalized 
idea of justice. “As for the corollary of reciprocity, namely equality, it places 
friendship on the path of justice, where the life together shared by a few people 
gives way to the distribution of shares in a plurality on the scale of a historical, 
political community” 262 (OA 188). The third component of the ethical intention, 
                                               
262 On an ontological level even ideal friendships depend on a “fragile balance” of “giving and 
receiving”. This balance forms “the midpoint of a spectrum in which the end points are marked 
by inverse disparities between giving and receiving, depending on whether the pole of the self 
or that of the other predominates in the initiative of the exchange” (OA 188). As we will see, 
the balance of giving and receiving recurs as the core problem of recognition.   
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just institutions, is already included in the former two; the position of the "other" 
(in "oneself as another") includes the position of “you” or the “each” in "each 
other". The good life is a life lived in common – both with intimate others (like 
friends or family) and the general others included in the "each other". Oneself as 
another thus, also implies "oneself as each other".  
In Just Institutions 
The inclusion of the unknown Third-party, of the "you" or "each" of "each other," 
is already implicated in the definition of the good life in which I strive to act in a 
"good" way. As a medical doctor, for example, this good means that I treat 
patients unknown to me equally (equally good) as I would treat myself or my 
family and friends; hence, my "good practice" includes all others with whom I 
live; all others may not be "intimate others" but all others are my "fellow men". 
Institutions represent the realm of the social beyond the interpersonal and it is in 
“the structure of living together” characterized as the “bond of common mores” 
(OA 194) that the plurality of others meet in a communality aiming to be a 
power-in-common or action in concert.263 Within the institutionalization of the 
social bond the question of a just distribution, of the equality of means, is crucial. 
In order to guarantee that "each" one is capable of realizing his or her rights— 
that we all get a fair share—is the aim behind all "just" institutions. But the status 
of the “desire to live together,” the importance of our power-in-common is, 
Ricoeur declares, something we have “forgotten” (OA 197). The reason for this 
lies in the everyday “relations of domination,” these derail the power and original 
sense of a “common initiative”.264  
The complex arguments surrounding questions of equality and 
redistribution belong to the sphere of justice in which Ricoeur replaces the 
notion that we have an "idea" of justice with the more accurate description of "a 
sense of justice" and, in particular, a sense of injustice (the suffering from 
injustice done to us or others seems prior to all deontological or normative 
claims). Our experience of a lack of justice undermines and destabilizes all human 
relations based on esteem, respect and trust. Only if I feel treated "justly",  can I 
                                               
263 As part of the social bond the communality of power and action is  the invisible Third party  
“who will never be faces” (OA 195).   
264 While writing these lines, the so-called “Arab Spring” unfolds seemingly showing a text-book 
example of how the forgotten power-in-common and action-in-concert is suddenly vividly 
remembered and, once fear is overcome, acted out until a new “imaginary community” 
(Anderson), freeing itself from the current domination, comes to life. The sovereignty of “the 
people” lies in their will to “act in common” aiming to realize their autonomy which, in this 
combination, means re-gaining an individual and collective notion of self-esteem and human 
dignity - as persons and civilians.   
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feel "equal" to all others.265 In this manner my self-esteem and the esteem of 
others coincide with my sense of justice and the institutional "just" that gives 
"each" his or her equal share, as members of a common humanity in which all 
are "equal among equals".   
 
A Normative Sieve  
According to Ricoeur, the “sieve” of moral normativity must filter (“test”) our 
ethical intentions. Although a rupture occurs between the teleological movement 
of ethics and the deontological process of morality Ricoeur finds an overlapping 
theme (turning the original distinction into a complementary necessity). Both 
teleological and deontological ethics ground in a fundamental human initiative 
(this echoes Nabert’s primary affirmation). Striving for the good or obeying the 
law (preventing us to act evil) is both an activity of willing. The "good will" of 
ethics is, on the deontological level, translated into the good rule or the 
normative Maxime. In other words, our primordial ethical intention is reshaped 
as a normative imperative; our good will is guided by the deliberate obedience 
under a good norm. This norm may be negatively expressed in the “vocabulary of 
Maximes”, like for example, in "Do not do to your neighbor what you would hate 
him to do to you", and positively like in "Love your Neighbour as Thyself". These 
maxims of reciprocity maximize the relation between solicitude and the 
reciprocal norm: as performative speech acts they evoke the moral Imperative 
which I "voluntarily" obey. As such, the Maxime translates my (ethical) striving 
for the good into a universal Golden Rule which guides me (here "guiding" means 
to obey to a rule to which I voluntary submit myself) towards "good practices" 
(which again, mirror the original ethical intention). By this means, normative 
rules do not test whether my final goal is good (the "good life") but rather 
whether  my acts, my actual practices (the way I wish to get there) are "good". 
The test of the ethical intention by way of the moral norm is tested in the form of 
an internal and imperative appeal/ addressing (Ansprechen) of the self. A 
(normative) rule affects me by making a claim, a demand, towards me. By 
accepting (the effect of) this demand the disciplining function of the law 
effectively self-disciplines me. In summary: autonomy means the ability to 
legislate my "own" self. This means, Ricoeur argues, that “we have not left the 
vocabulary of the imperative, but we have in a sense sublimated it: when 
                                               
265 Equality as mutual self-esteem extends to a “sense of justice” (I sense it as just that you 
esteem me as much as I esteem you).  
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autonomy substitutes for obedience to another obedience to oneself, obedience 
has lost all character of dependence and submission. True obedience, one could 
say, is autonomy” (OA 210). 
In other words, if we voluntary obey to ourselves, obeying does no longer 
mean submission but rather marks an expression of freedom and thus, by freely 
obeying to the law I actually attest my freedom. This classical liberal definition of 
autonomy runs into three possible aporias concerning 1) the relation between 
attestation and autonomy, 2) the relation between respect as a rule and respect 
as affection, and 3) the silent sheltering of radical evil in autonomy. While 
autonomy is defined as active willing, Kant’s description of our relation to the law 
implies a prior (passive) receptivity.  
In a Kantian vocabulary: it is the Faktum der Vernunft that directs my acts 
and binds me to the moral norm whereas the maxims of reciprocity aim to 
overcome the asymmetry in human relations. Even if you have power over me, 
you still should not do to me what you do not want to happen to yourself. As 
such, the maxims of the Golden Rule intend to prohibit violence by overcoming 
asymmetry while allowing difference (the maxime wants to evoke reciprocal 
equality, not equalness). The crucial insight of the Faktum is that it produces a 
synthesis between freedom and the law. This synthesis results from a definition 
of human autonomy in which I can decide freely to obey the law because it 
belongs both to my reasoning as such (the Faktum) as to my intuitive and 
intentional striving for the "good life". This Faktum shows that pure reason can 
be practical and thus, reason can be performed as a moral pragmatic (which 
seems the best translation of Moralität as Sittlichkeit). In short, the Faktum of 
pure reason turns our moral acts into a (rule-governed) pure pragmatics. It 
seems, as Kant asserts, that our will to obey a law evoked by pure reason is an 
act of nature (Naturwillen) itself and by obeying the (natural?) law we also obey 
to our own "nature". Following this logic my esteem for the law (as the quasi-
natural consequence of pure reasoning) equals my self-esteem: “Respect is self-
esteem that has passed through the sieve of the universal and constraining norm 
– in short, self-esteem under the reign of the law” (OA 215).  
But a difficult aporia occurs here: how can self-esteem as what I strive for, 
as something I need to reach for through my ethical intentions, be 
simultaneously something that is already present in me as part of the a priori 
laws of pure reason?  It is the definition of autonomy that causes the problem: I 
cannot freely choose to obey a law when this law already belongs to the inherent 
aspects of my reasoning. In short, obeying the Faktum collapses human nature 
with the nature of humans. On another level the question  of "for whom" do I 
obey the law? is raised. Do I really obey the law just to fulfil the Faktum of reason 
or does my affection for the law result from being affected by (general) others? If 
166  |   Reflexive Empathy 
 
the law as the formalization of the maxime ("don’t do to others….") depends on 
feelings of love or disgust, it cannot prevent human arbitrariness and opens the 
gate to evil. Evil appears as a reversal of our respect for the law resulting from 
the “perversion” of self-esteem into self-love. This reversal points to the abuse of 
our free will, revealing a paradox at the (dark) heart of the free will, situated in 
our “penchant for evil” (OA 215). The silent sheltering of evil in the heart of 
autonomy undermines not only obedience to the law (it is used against the law) 
but also to all universal maxims. Thus, autonomy as free self-obedience must 
overcome – in developing a resistance against – the human penchant to evil.266  
The place of this resistance is the sieve (signifying the universal norm) which 
filters the ethical goal (our striving for the good life) by way of our moral 
obligation (to avoid evil at all time): In other words, our idea of the good must be 
tested by the (moral) norm in order to avoid evil. In conclusion Ricoeur re-
formulates the previous Kantian maxim as, “Act solely in accordance with the 
maxim by which you can wish at the same time that what ought not to be, 
namely evil, will indeed not exist” (OA 218).  
  
Solicitude 
The second aspect of the moral sieve aims to explain the relation between self-
respect and respect for others on the level of solicitude, self-esteem and the 
norm: “Just as solicitude is not an external addition to self-esteem, so the respect 
owed to persons does not constitute a heterogeneous moral principle in relation 
to the autonomy of the self but develops its implicit dialogic structure on the 
plane of obligation, of rules” (OA 218). The key problem is how to connect 
respect as fundamental reciprocity (the dialogical relation with others) with 
respect as fundamental asymmetry (we need to respect the difference of others). 
Reciprocity aims at an ethics of solicitude: to realize the "good life" we must care 
for each other. If I care for you I will respect you. Asymmetry aims at a morality 
of autonomy: to show my respect for you I need to respect your autonomy, and 
vice versa (to feel respected by you, you must respect my autonomy). In order to 
overcome this duality, the "ethics of solicitude" and the "morality of respect" 
                                               
266 Ricoeur's anthropological theme of the “original wound” returns here, now as the enigma of 
evil in the heart of human autonomy: “Human (free) choice appears to carry with it an original 
wound that affects its capacity for determining itself for or against the law; the enigma of the 
origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects the actual exercise of freedom. The fact that 
this penchant is always already present in every opportunity to choose but that it is at the same 
time a maxim of (free) choice is no less inscrutable than the origin of evil” (OA 218).  
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must be unified in a “norm of reciprocity” (OA 219) for which the Golden Rule (or 
rather rules!) offers the main example (exemplified by “Treat others as you 
would like them to treat you”). The main problem with Golden Rules is that they, 
as norms of reciprocity, react to a foregoing “initial dissymmetry” between the 
“active form of doing and the passive form of being done, hence of suffering and 
submission”. In other words: reciprocity is threatened by the power-over of one 
person over another, power-over endangers my power-to-do or our power-in-
common. To defend/ affirm human reciprocity as exemplified by the Golden Rule 
(both in its positive and negative formulation) we first need to overcome a 
primordial dissymmetry. This dissymmetry—the lack of a balance of power—can 
be countered only by a fundamental prohibition because just a call for mutual 
respect is insufficient: “You shall not kill”.   
An asymmetry in power relations cannot be countered by a call for 
reciprocity but only by a convincing normative call against violence, by 
demanding to obey a moral obligation: “you shall not lie, you shall not steal, you 
shall not kill, you shall not torture” (OA 221). But these normative prohibitions 
are not only sufficient in themselves. They are only justified in serving a different, 
ethical aim, namely preventing “indignities”, which in return enables the “mutual 
exchange of self-esteems”. Thus, we need the negative prohibitive norm ("you 
shall not…") to realize an affirmative ethics of solicitude which actually forms, 
Ricoeur argues, “the hidden soul of the prohibition”.267 In summary, our moral 
obligations, formulated as prohibitions, make sense only if they, in the end, serve 
and affirm the ethics of human reciprocity. According to Ricoeur, this ingenious 
relation shows the priority (and affirmation) of the ethical over the moral.268   
A tension in the relation between the ethical and the moral returns in the 
second formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative which states, “Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end” (Groundwork 4.429). This formulation aims to further generalize the 
previous maxim, “Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always hold 
at the same time as a principle of universal law” (ibid.). The tension lies between 
                                               
267 In Ricoeur's words, “solicitude, as the mutual exchange of self-esteem, is affirmative through 
and through. This affirmation, which can well be said to be original, is the hidden soul of the 
prohibition. It is what, ultimately, arms our indignation, that is our rejection of indignities 
inflicted on others” (OA 221). 
268 Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 166. Dauenhauer aptly remarks at this point that Ricoeur's use 
of original affirmation “appears to be a part of the “primary affirmation” he argued for already 
in 1956 and that continues to figure in various forms in all of Ricoeur's subsequent philosophical 
work” Ibid., p. 173. The central position of Nabert’s notion of primary affirmation in Ricoeur's 
thinking cannot be overemphasized.    
168  |   Reflexive Empathy 
 
the singularity of "humanity" and the plurality of persons as ends in themselves. 
Ricoeur argues that,  
 
the notion of humanity can be considered the plural expression of the 
requirement of universality that presided over the deduction of 
autonomy. Introduced as the mediating term between diversity of 
persons, the notion of humanity has the effect of lessening, to the point 
of eliminating, the otherness that is at the root of this diversity, 
otherness which is dramatized in the dissymmetrical relation of the 
power one will hold over another, opposed by the Golden Rule (OA 223). 
 
While "humanity" seems to eliminate all otherness, the second part of the 
imperative re-establishes the demand to treat each person as a unique, 
autonomous, person. Hence, we are all equal in humanity while at the same time 
we are different as ends in ourselves. The intuition of the Golden Rule, the 
fundamental need to overcome a lack of reciprocity, grounds in recognition of 
genuine otherness. Since we are all different and unique persons ("ends"), we 
need to formalize the rules of our reciprocity. Again, the moral norm ("treat 
others as ends in themselves") serves to support and fulfil the ethical aim ("serve 
the good of humanity through the rule of reciprocity"). While ethical solicitude 
often falls prey to particular historical, social and political preferences of 
inclusion and exclusion ("whom do we recognize within our reciprocal relation?; 
who is in- or excluded in ‘humanity’?"), it is the formalization of moral norms in 
impartial laws that secure the (possibility to fulfil the) primary ethical aim by 
defending the otherness of all Others.269 In short, ethics needs a universalizing 
norm to realize its own aims. But the universal norm (and its grounding in an 
ethical aim) firmly roots in two other needs: the need to resolve our sense of 
injustice and the desire to overcome tragic conflicts (which cannot be resolved 
either by reciprocity or a universal law) through acts of practical wisdom.  
 
Justice  
Ricoeur now shifts from Kant to Rawls, hence, from the relation between ethics 
and morals to the question of "justice as fairness," from the question of persons 
as end-in-themselves within humanity to the question of how just institutions 
and procedural redistribution emerge if all deliberations start quasi-neutral 
behind a "veil of ignorance". Rawls’ theory intends to separate (or overcome) the 
                                               
269 Ibid., Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 168.  
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pragmatics of justice from the teleological notion of the ethical good. The 
question, therefore, that is asked is: Can we do without a sense of the good to 
realize the principles of justice (meant to counter our "sense of injustice")?  
Distribution 
The third stage of the sieve – the test of the moral norm by the ethical aim – 
examines the Rawlsian concept of procedural distribution that aims to 
institutionalize "fairness as justice".270 The question of just distribution forms the 
“intersection” between the ethical and the moral, as well as  pointing to a 
conflict between unitary and pluralistic concepts of justice.271 The underlying 
question is in what manner our sense of justice (as our desire for equality) 
belongs to and is determined by an autonomous self or a dialogical self. This 
question points out the tension between the realization of individualism on the 
one hand, and the realization of reciprocity and solicitude (as ontological basis of 
our sense for justice) on the other. Rawls’ theory, as Bernard Dauenhauer aptly 
summarizes, “seeks to overcome these ambiguities by developing a fully 
formalized procedural conception of justice, a conception of justice that is, in a 
Kantian spirit, wholly detached from any particular conception of the good. To 
effect this detachment, Rawls makes use of the fiction of a social contract 
established behind a veil of ignorance about what one’s own share or allotment 
of society’s benefits and burdens will be. This contract is supposed to hold the 
place on the level of “institutions that autonomy holds on the level of individual 
morality.”272 This leads to a theory in which a just institution “would be what a 
pluralistic society of rational and disinterested persons would choose if they 
could deliberate in an equitable situation, that is, in a position whose conditions 
and constraints are immediately evident to them.”273 Because Rawls’ procedure 
to attain justice is detached from a telos of the good, the main problem with this 
position seems that it lacks a “transcendental foundation” (OA 231). As a 
                                               
270 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973). 
271 The sense of (in-) justice as formalized in rules and principles runs into a conflict between a 
unitary (Rawls) or a pluralistic (Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, Michael Walzer) concept of 
justice. There is no space here to reflect on Ricoeur’s substansive and important reflections on 
Rawls’ work. See, among others,  the articles on Rawls in the collection The Just and Reflections 
on the Just, in particular “Is a Pure Procedural Theory of Justice Possible” (J 36-58), and “After 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice” (J 58-76). For an excellent commentary on Ricoeur’s understanding of 
Rawls see Molly Harkirat Man,”Ricoeur’s Principle of Civic Inclusion. An Aristotelian 
Interpretation of Rawls’s Theory of Justice”, in Philosophy Today, Spring 2009, 44-57. 
272 Ibid., Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 177.  
273 Paul Ricoeur, John Rawls: de l’autonomie morale à la fiction du contract social,  Lectures I, 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), p. 203. Cf. trans. Ibid., Dauenhauer Paul Ricoeur, p. 177. 
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consequence, there are no longer objective criteria in the basis of the just or the 
good, but only a contract based on what is considered fair and equal. Rawls 
replaces foundational questions with procedures, substituting the telos of the 
good with a contractual process of fairness. In short, Rawls’ theory aims to 
disconnect the notion of the good (the ethical intention) from the notion of the 
just (the normative sieve). Justice is no longer what we deem good but what each 
of us, starting from a similar and equal position, regard as a "fair" treatment. On 
this point Ricoeur engages with Rawls’ theory along three basic questions; "What 
would guarantee the fairness of the situation of deliberation from which an 
agreement could result concerning a just arrangement of institutions? What 
principles would be chosen in this fictive situation of deliberation? What 
argument could convince the deliberating parties to choose unanimously the 
Rawlsian principles of justice rather than, let us say, some variant of 
utilitarianism?" (OA 231). 
The first question — what guarantee’s the fairness of a situation? —, refers 
to the famous nonhistorical and hypothetical concepts introduced by Rawls, 
namely, the so-called original position and the veil of ignorance. Rawls uses these 
concepts to restage a situation of innocence, and asks what people in this 
innocent situation need to know to establish a just society (this implies that our 
sense of injustice is always pre-determined by our historical and social position). 
What we need to know – as this knowledge equals certain levels of constraint – 
is,  
 
a) some psychological knowledge of human nature, its passions and 
motivations,  
b) if all humans wish to possess certain social goods of which self-
respect is primary,  
c) if all persons have a similar insight in the various principles of justice 
(thus, we must be able to rank our options to attain justice),  
d) if we have equal access to information (all discussions about justice 
must be public), and, last,  
e) if we can trust the stability of the contract.274  
 
In Rawls’s theory all these "constraints" serve only one purpose: to annihilate the 
“effects of contingency” (OA 232). What Rawls hopes for is that once our 
historical and social differences disappear, the pureness of our rationality 
prevails (albeit constrained by the five points just mentioned). Living in this 
                                               
274 Cf. (OA 232); Rawls Theory of Justice, p. 137ff.  
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utopian rational275 – albeit behind a "veil of ignorance" –  it can be easily 
determined which principle of justice (in total impartiality of all participants) 
realizes the criteria of fairness to a maximum for all. Rawls formulates his 
principles as,  
 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.  
 
 Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all.276  
 
This "principle of difference" automatically “selects the most equal situation 
compatible with the rule of unanimity,” leading to the final, third question, 
namely: “For what reasons do the parties placed behind the veil of ignorance 
prefer these principles in their lexical order rather than any version of 
utilitarianism?” (OA 235). Rawls’ answer seems brilliantly simple: “the parties are 
supposed to choose the arrangement that maximizes the minimum share” (OA 
236). This so-called Maximin-principle reformulates the utilitarian perspective. 
Although the moral worth of an action is still defined by its outcome (a key 
aspect of utilitarianism), the fact that I no longer know my own particular 
position within society (my advantages or disadvantages are neutralized) nor  do 
I know those of all others, forces me and all others to “choose the distribution 
that would guarantee them a share that was larger than any other principle 
would guarantee.”277 A rational choice taken behind a veil of ignorance will 
choose the principle that maximizes my minimum share because this is what I 
consider the most just  and thus, a fair distribution of shares.278  
                                               
275 Cf. “Since the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally 
rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments” Ibid., Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice, §24, p. 139. 
276 Ibid., Rawls,  A Theory of Justice, §11, p. 60. 
277 Ibid., Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 179. 
278 Even if we have only one pencil and piece of paper we want to be given all resources to 
realize all our capabilities to learn and develop ourselves; only if I posit this as a principle for “all 
and each other” it will include me and, thus, help to maximalize the minimum share; a just and 
“fair” distribution can only succeed if the maximalisation of my minimum share is justly 
distributed among all. The respect of other persons is not just the result of obeying a particular 
rule but the effect of my wish that everybody is able to maximalize their minimal share, thus, 
the just and fair distribution of shares.  
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Ricoeur disputes the idea that Rawls’ pure procedural notion of the just and 
fairness can do without “some sense of the good to underpin his principles of 
justice” particularly in Rawls’ concept of personhood (as "ends in themselves") 
that assumes an underlying ethical, and thus, a foundational claim.279 Our desire 
to be fair to every other person originates from our respect for them, this respect 
refers to beings as "ends-in-themselves" which, again, refers to the fact that 
persons should be considered "good" a priori.280 Thus, not surprisingly, Ricoeur’s 
criticism of Rawls echoes Ricoeur’s criticism of Kant:  normative imperatives or 
procedures cannot do without a silently assumed ethical foundation (the a priori 
"good" of persons) to validate or justify its overall claims. Ricoeur argues that just 
as the deontological position cannot do without a teleological striving (or be 
replaced with the teleology of a "just procedure"), it also cannot do without a 
sense of justice or injustice.  
Hence, the fact that we have a sense of justice or injustice implies that we 
can judge certain acts as just or unjust, good or bad acts. Our definition of 
fairness, thus, must be based on a shared sense of justice. But, Rawls’ 
constructivism (that if we rationally agree on a procedure in which everybody 
feels treated fairly, the outcome is a just social contract and, therefore, a fair 
society) lacks this content; for the Rawls of A Theory of Justice fairness is still a 
rationally defined unitary concept which, ultimately, becomes heavily contested 
in our contemporary pluralistic societies with its many incommensurable 
positions and "clash" of sensed injustices (the topic of Rawls' Political 
Liberalism).281 While the unitary definition of fairness might exclude otherness, a 
wide pluralistic concept might end in relativism: the danger that we cannot agree 
on any definition of a "fair" procedure, Ricoeur argues, brings us back to the need 
for a common, underlying ethical aim that binds the plurality of positions, 
translating plurality into a procedure of shared consensus. In short, Rawls 
formalization and rationalization creates a hypothetical situation of ideal 
deliberation and procedures. Although his theory helps to critical reassess the 
                                               
279 Ibid., Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 179. This section partially follows and profits from 
Dauenhauer's lucid explanations of Rawls’ and Ricoeur’s position on justice and practical 
wisdom. Cf. Ibid., p. 178-209.  
280 Dauenhauer provides an excellent summary of this Kantian point: “This respect demands 
that no person be treated as a thing. Existing as an end in itself is the mode of being that Kant 
recognized as belonging to the very nature of rational beings. Having this nature is a specific 
kind of good, the good of being a person instead of a thing. It is therefore each person's telos to 
treat both himself and other persons as ends in themselves. In short, Rawlsian fairness 
presupposes the kind of respect for persons that Ricoeur found to be resident in the ethical 
aim” Ibid., p. 179. 
281 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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procedures of redistribution it fails to account for the plurality of worth and 
diversity of goods that constantly challenge our "will to live together" (a 
challenge evoked by conflicting concepts of justice). But, simultaneously, Rawls’ 
work also shows the need for a purification of the distributive procedures to 
avoid that part of the population become scapegoats for the good of the rest of 
society.282 Ethics is again a relation between an original aporia, a conflict and an 
anthropological question (why do humans sense injustice?): is our sense of 
injustice an ontological universal or rather a construction of liberal modernity. 
Does this sense  belong to a "natural" or liberal idea of "human rights"?   
 
Critical Phronesis  
The final stage of the ethical-hermeneutical arch belongs to what Ricoeur, in a 
Kantian adjustment of Aristotle, calls a critical phronesis. As Aristotle explains in 
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, phronesis is “that capacity of deliberating 
well about what is good and advantageous for oneself” in regard to “what sort of 
thing contributes to the good life in general” (Book VI, 1140a).283 The capability of 
the phronimos (wise person) is that he or she is good at knowing the nature of 
the good. For Aristotle, phronesis belongs to the ethical aim of realizing a good 
life. The current revival of Aristotelian ethics that is mainly evoked by the work of 
Joseph Dunne, Alistair McIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, falls, as John Wall 
explains, “into three broad categories: an anti-utilitarian practice of situated 
reasonableness, a communitarian application of shared values to particular 
situations, and concrete attention to human particularity.”284 Ricoeur’s fine-
tuning of the classical concept combines a Kantian reframing, albeit a critical 
phronesis, with the poetic force of a “reflexive narrative self” and “a practice in 
which selves take the singularity or alterity of others into account”.285 This 
"alterity of Others" describes, in generalized virtues and imperative rulings, an 
                                               
282 Cf. Dauenhauer, Paul Ricoeur, p. 188. 
283 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1960), p. 26-28.  
284 John Wall, “Phronesis, Poetics, and Moral Creativity”, in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, nr. 6, p. 318. Wall compares the interpretation of 
Aristotelian ethics in the work of Dunne, MacIntyre and Nussbaum mainly through how they 
value the connection between phronêsis and poiêsis. His conclusion is that “non of these 
perspectives seriously entertains the possibility—which would question Aristotle’s distinction 
fundamentally—that phronesis may be poetic in itself”, ibid., p. 323. This is what Wall considers 
the contribution of Ricoeur’s reformulation of phronesis as a “means to creating narrative 
meaning that includes attention to otherness as an end”, ibid., p. 330. In short, the poetic and 
ethical will overlap in our “reflexive narrative self”.  
285 Ibid., Wall, p. 330, 323. 
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ethical deficit. When confronted with both a de-centered subject and the infinite, 
unknown source of justifications, all ethical and moral propositions appear as 
part of a forever incomplete project (the generality of the good and our moral 
rules hide the fact that, ultimately, all decisions are made as "exceptions"). 
Ricoeur's purpose is to understand how exceptions to normative rules, as a result 
of absolute singular situations and Others, are made and justified while avoiding 
to fall into absolute moral arbitrariness. The core of the validated exception lies 
in a condition beyond the fundamental moral conflict or otherness. This beyond 
points to our deep sense of a "shared life", of a "life in common". Only if this 
overall condition is recognized, can “the exception on behalf of others” (OA 269) 
guide our moral decision.286  
Ricoeur returns to the question of how to act when confronted with the 
tragic and incommensurable limits of moral positions. This issue is  exemplified 
by the absolute singularity of particular existential situations combined with an 
evenly absolute un-knowing or "mythical" ground with which we justify our 
deepest convictions (e.q. Antigone’s blood-ties vs. Creon’s state-hegemony). By 
this return, Ricoeur shows the tension between the need for "exceptions" and 
the need to, if we want to avoid falling into arbitrariness, test the exception for 
its potential to become universal.287 Only by keeping the moral exception in close 
proximity to the universal rule, as "universals in context" or "inchoate univerals," 
will the exception  not undo the ethical and moral scheme. It will show, though, 
the need to include (as an evenly practical as radical openness towards) 
historical, situational and personal aspects of alterity. This amounts to, as Wall 
points out, a definition of critical phronesis as “each self’s capacity — which can 
be more or less well realized in actuality — for the public, dialectical formation of 
                                               
286 Like in a functioning democracy where the overall functioning of the system is more 
important than my personal objection to a new law. Hence,  even if I oppose the law, I support 
the legality of the procedure as such.  
287 Ricoeur’s example of a tragic moral and existential conflict is taken from Euripides’ famous 
play Antigone. As is well known, Antigone pays with her own life for her wish to bury her 
brother. Her fundamental conflict with Creon raises a simple but irresolvable tension: fidelity to 
family vs fidelity to the state. This conflict of loyalties cannot be resolved peacefully because 
the state can never allow her legitimacy to be undermined by tolerating an exception to the 
rule (in this case: that Antigone’s brother, a traitor, is not buried in the city but left to the birds 
outside the city-walls). This conflict of loyalties is absolute and thus, prohibits communal 
reflection, it leads to a tragic ending without room for any form of “situated wisdom”. If tragic 
conflicts must be resolved, Ricoeur argues, we must first ask how (tragic) fate and conviction 
can be reconciled – for this to happen we do not need a tragic katharsis but forms of  practical 
wisdom able to carry “moral formalism back into the thick of ethics” (OA 249).    
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social convictions that are ever more radically accountable to the exception 
required by respect for each and every other.”288  
The need for exceptions stems from the reductive violence of moral 
principles which do not recognize Others, the singular positions and acts they 
confront us with, and the overall complexities of life that resist generalization. 
Just like Antigone’s fundamental differing position confronts Creon with the 
limits of his hegemony, our confrontation with otherness harbours the potential 
to undermine the stability of our current beliefs.289 Ricoeur's extension of 
Aristotelian phronesis with a critical Kantian perspective aims to include the 
challenge of otherness within the ethical arch. This challenge is met by the notion 
of solicitude enabling a new connection, a "third" path, between the teleological 
and deontological. Through compassion and care we recognize singular 
otherness which, when included in critical reflection, might motivate us to create 
and act in exception to established moral principles. In Ricoeur's words, 
“Practical wisdom consist in inventing conduct that will best satisfy the exception 
required by solicitude, by betraying the rule to the smallest extent possible” (OA 
269). It is exactly in the respect I show to others — by recognizing their 
singularity — that the exception to the moral principle reaffirms the self-worth of 
others. It is in singular situations that our deliberations — a term that in the final 
phase of Ricoeur's ”small ethics” alternates between "considered convictions," 
"reflective equilibrium" and "critical phronesis" — need to find a new balance, 
despite the finiteness and, thus, tragic core of all moral grounds. Moral principles 
and rules might even be "betrayed" if this betrayal serves to recognize others 
through exceptions, but only if the exception reflects genuine solicitude and 
provides a valid justification.  
Ideally, our judgement-in-situations creates an exception to the rule which 
not only I but also others consider as a new reflective equilibrium. According to 
Ricoeur, this new equilibrium combines a return to an “initial intuition of ethics” 
(OA 240) with the “ethics of argumentation,” and with strong “considered 
                                               
288 Ibid., Wall, p. 327. 
289 Although the vulnerable human condition is always in flux and potentially endangered, our 
moral and ethical conduct aims to stabilize this situation in which every exception to the “rules” 
represents both the possible undermining of this stability as well as the inescapable 
acknowledgement that all moral convictions were prior generalizations of singular conditions. 
Thus, any exception to the rule needs to re-establish a credible and coherent structure between 
the ethical aim, the normative rule and the law. 
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convictions.” In perfect circumstances this arrangement enables a "wise" 
decision meaning — a justified, i.e., just decision.290  
A complex moral conflict also occurs between the notion of respect and 
solicitude. The question of when life begins or ends can serve as an example 
here. If the moral imperative is that we shall not kill other persons, the question 
becomes , as in the cases of abortion, deep coma or the death penalty, what 
defines another person. Namely, is an embryo already a person (if not, how many 
weeks later does this change and how can we make valid claims in this 
situation)?; does a brain that gives no signals amount to a "dead person"? or, 
does murdering someone mean that one looses the right to be considered a 
person oneself and, thus, can be legitimately dehumanized, even executed? In 
each of these situations universal or deontological rules often reach their limit.291 
Must we, for example, out of solicitude not tell the dying patient that the end is 
very near, or must I, in contrast, follow the principle that I need to tell the truth 
at all times. Ricoeur makes a differentiation here between the respect for rules 
(always tell the truth) and respect for persons (out of respect for the person I 
withhold the bad news). If I follow the obligation to tell the truth I must follow 
the rule that no matter what the situation is, I need to tell the truth. But from the 
point of solicitude I could come to a different conclusion. If I am convinced, for 
example,  that the patient does not want to know to be able to still enjoy life for 
the time that he or she has left. My practical deliberation, the reflection on a 
singular case in a particular context, tested by the moral rule but guided by the 
ethical intention to do good, can, in the end be genuine, truthful, without being 
true. Here my conviction passes through a process of reflective argumentation 
before deciding which practical decision in-situation occurs as the best one at 
that particular moment in time. My truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) does not need 
to cohere with “a truth,” my testimony can be very true for me without being 
                                               
290 The conviction, underlying practical wisdom, mirrors the ethical dimension of attestation. In 
“standing for” who I am I also stand for “what I stand for” (values, norms, justice in the form of, 
for example, my promises and responsibilities). What I stand for is who I am (or want to be: I 
want to stand for who I am). If rules or norms can no longer resolve (tragic) fundamental 
conflicts the “standing for,” the conviction, of my “wise decision-in-situation”, becomes the last 
resort.    
291 I, however,  agree with John Wall’s assessment that Ricoeur's position here is close to post-
structuralism: “This ‘exception’ consists, along post-structuralist lines, in the recognition of 
others as ultimately irreducible to one’s own understanding or interpretation of them. It recalls 
in a way the ethics of the commanding face of the other of Ricoeur's Parisian colleague Levinas. 
But rather than affirming the other’s otherness as such, critical phronesis goes further and 
attempts to ‘satisfy’ this exception in the self’s own conduct in the world, to make within this 
situation of incommensurability with others an actual ‘judgement in situation’” Ibid., Wall, 
Phronesis, p. 324.  
Chapter Six   |  177 
 
 
 
true for others.292 Absolute singular situations force me to establish a new 
reflective equilibrium between the need for a logical coherence of arguments and 
the considerations of my strong convictions. In Ricoeur's words, “The 
articulations that we never cease to reinforce between deontology and teleology 
finds its highest –  and most fragile – expression in the reflective equilibrium 
between the ethics of argumentation and considered convictions” (OA 289). In a 
footnote to this remark Ricoeur stresses that in German conviction “is rendered 
Überzeugung, a term related by its root to Bezeugung, which signifies 
"attestation"—the password for this entire book”. In this sense identity and 
ethics come to a complete overlap: the person that I am able to "stand for" 
simultaneously "stands for" its convictions; in the "look at me, here I am" (me, 
voici) of attestation, the subject’s self-referential and ethical position cohere (in 
the ideal case we strive for).  
The problem that might occur here is that while my "account" can just be 
my story, my "account-ability" will be examined within the existing moral norms 
and juridical procedures. Because even total autonomy or total freedom still 
takes place among others I, in order to practice my autonomy as well as possible, 
must try to understand the autonomy of others. As a consequence, (of wanting 
to realise my own autonomy) I must be open and able to engage with others and 
otherness. In short: heteronomy is an integral part of all autonomy. This means 
that autonomy as freedom is not just realized by applying ahistorical rules and 
principles but also by taking place within a historical and particular community. 
                                               
292 For each parent, the tension between following the rule (always tell the truth) and solicitude 
(care for others) is a daily reality. Telling a child who wishes an ice-cream a simple ‘no' is much 
more difficult as saying that ‘it is a real pity but, my dear child, the ice-cream store is already 
closed’ (although its two o’clock in the afternoon). Another recurrent conflict is the obligation 
to attend birthday parties. One cannot tell another parent that your child does not want to 
attend their party, because he really dislikes their son or daughter. We much rather “make up” 
a story as to tell the actual truth, our "white lie" serves another truth - that we do not want to 
hurt others and, secondary, keep the social bond alive. While the moral rule expects from us to 
show compliance with  the law upon which the trust of the community is based, i.e., that we do 
not deceive one another, the daily practicalities and rituals of friendliness force us to a moral 
economy in which “lying” actually reveals a form of solicitude and care. From the perspective of 
solicitude the fact that we do not want to hurt somebody’s feelings is the “greater good”; to lie 
is, thus, the “lesser evil” compared to the real Evil of actual conflict and the falling apart of the 
community. It could, of course, also be that I don’t have  enough courage to confront the 
situation and avoid a painful conversation (“My child hates your child and that is why he does 
not attend the birthday party”!). In short, we juggle between the strictness of maxims, rules 
and norms and the daily need for flexibility within our moral conduct. This balancing act 
returns, albeit with much stronger implications, on the macro-level of the our institutions and 
the authority of the state and, more concretely, in the judgements made in our court-rooms.  
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Here, again, a reflective equilibrium between my personal autonomy and those 
of others, between our shared heteronymous selves, is necessary.293   
It is the manner in which the reflective equilibrium between procedures and 
convictions must be re-established that the key aspect of Ricoeur's 
anthropological ethics occurs, namely, the question of justice. As mentioned 
above, while justice for Rawls  remains bound to the question of a fair 
distribution (formulated as a theoretical ideal) and for Habermas pertains to 
equality within the communicative network (formulated as a practical ideal), 
justice for Ricoeur describes a dialectic between the political and the moral 
sphere (formulated as a mutuality between our sense of the "just" and a 
conformity to the law). Hereby justice as procedure replaces vengeance with a 
"just" legal verdict.   
 
Towards a Hermeneutics of Justice 
While Ricoeur's "small ethics" in Oneself as Another rethinks the complex post-
Hegelian-Kantian-Aristotelian relation between ethics, moral rules and practical 
wisdom, it is in his many separate articles on justice where we find a more 
hermeneutical understanding of justice. Central to this hermeneutics of justice is, 
unsurprisingly, the way we create distance (between perpetrators and victims), 
an understanding of narrative conflicts (of different testimonial narratives), as 
well as a just interpretation of the law that enables a new equality.294 Re-
establishing this equality for the law means, simply put, recognition of the fact 
that “your life is as important, as significant, as valuable as my own” (RJ 224). 
Christopher Watkin divides Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of justice in four main areas 
of possible application: justice and space, faith and commitment, the 
incommensurable multiplicity of justice and finally, love and justice. The main 
space of justice is the court-room. As a ritualised space the "theatre of justice" 
replaces vengeance: violent bodies are placed in a “constellation of distances” 
                                               
293 Ricoeur summarizes his position as, “The notion of universals in context or of potential or 
inchoate universals is (…) the notion that best accounts for the reflective equilibrium we are 
seeking between universality and historicity. Only a real discussion, in which convictions are 
permitted to be elevated above convention, will be able to state, at the end of a long history 
yet to come, which alleged universals will become universals recognized by “all the persons 
concerned” (Habermas), that is, by the “representative persons” (Rawls) of all cultures” (OA 
289-90). 
294 The following considerations benefit greatly from Christopher Watkin’s original 
interpretation of Ricoeur’s rather scattered writings on justice, sovereignity and law  which, 
according to Watkin, amounts to a  systematic hermeneutic theory of narrative ethics.  Ibid., 
Watkin, Phenomenology, p. 109 ff. 
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that mirrors the “distribution of distances” in the larger society.295 The court 
creates distance on different levels. Firstly, within the space of the “theatre of 
justice” physical assault (where there is no distance between bodies) is replaced 
with the assault of words (by means of arguments). Secondly, within the 
“institutionalised space of the court competing narratives are in ritual tension” – 
the court process is, thus, a form of “handling a conflict of interpretations”.296 
Thirdly, the court procedure, defining justice, contains a narrative structure with 
a beginning, middle and end (the end symbolized by the proclamation of the 
verdict) that equals the coherence of the Aristotelian poetic plot.  
 
The verdict and sentence grasp together the conflicting stories the court 
has considered, and they produce a new narrative, the point of which is 
not in the first instance to arrive at agreement among all the parties 
involved, but rather to divide and separate them, establishing a ‘just 
distance’ between them: before its constraining function, the sentence 
aims to speak the law, to put the parties in their just places.297  
 
Thus, Ricoeur understands the court as a narrative space in which a "web of 
narratives" replace personal vengeance with the “victory language gains over 
violence”; in court physical assault turns into the “assault of words and the 
competition of arguments.”298 As a result, the courtroom becomes a "third 
space" that allows for a "show-down" in which “the entire procedure, from the 
citation of particular laws to the handling down of the verdict and sentence and 
everything that comes between the two”, can become nothing but a peaceful 
and “prolonged discourse”.  
Forgiveness 
Ricoeur’s concept of "difficult forgiveness" is closely related to this hermeneutics 
of narrative justice. In the previous chapter we saw that most forms of 
                                               
295 Ibid., p. 109. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Watkin further clarifies that “Ricoeur defines the space in the court in contradistinction to 
the abolition of the space between bodies in the reign of unrestrained violence and vengeance, 
which is to say that, while the court replays the conflicts which lacerate civil society, it does so 
in a codified and distanced way which mitigates and controls their violence. The law, with its 
procedures, rituals and structures, interposes itself as a third party, a mediating institution in 
bilateral conflicts which serves to separate the two parties in disagreement and forces each to 
“make room” (“fair une place”) for his or her adversary. This distancing maintains the court as 
the privileged place in society for ordered and ritualised decision-making.” Ibid., p. 109. 
298 Ibid., p. 109. 
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remembering and history produce also, actively or passively, different forms of 
forgetting and forgetfulness. On an ethical level this leads to the question of how 
the "guilt of history" and a "need for forgiveness" are connected. The guilt of 
history points both to the suffering of the victims of the past – to their forgotten 
voices, stories and injustices – and to the burden of being haunted by too much 
history. While guilt can be differentiated in criminal, political and moral aspects, 
the "economy of the gift" appears central to an understanding of how we can 
give forgiveness. We need forgiveness not just in the present but also in the 
future – particulaly in enabling a future for the "not yet born"; a future freed 
from the burden (not the responsibility) of history. 299  To forgive derives from the 
"ontology of giving" and refers not only to an active form of forgetting but, in 
particular, to the use and abuse of history through a politics of memory, 
materialized and symbolized in memorials, rituals and “events” of 
commemoration. The "capability to forgive" is the crucial element in Ricoeur’s 
ethics of memory.  
In the preface of Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur states, “I continue to 
be troubled by the unsettling spectacle offered by an excess of memory here, 
and an excess of forgetting elsewhere, to say nothing of the influence of 
commemorations and abuses of memory—and of forgetting. The idea of a policy 
of the just allotment of memory is in this respect one of my avowed civic 
themes” (M xv). As such, forgetting forms a “pair,” signifying the ethical 
complement in Ricoeur’s conceptual structure, with forgiveness. Once we allow 
ourselves to forget (by, for example, no longer actively re-invoking particular 
events) we start creating a space to forgive. Besides overcoming or letting go of 
an unjust and violent past, this experience turns forgetting, as an event of loss, 
into an event of “happy forgetting” (by allowing to let go of pain and suffering). 
By its very nature, this possibility of a  "happy forgetting" dialectically 
complements our "happy memory" (in the sense of the Joy felt when we 
remember what seemed lost) and together they hold the hope of a “reconciled 
memory” (M 285).300  Forgiveness as reconciliation extends the concept of 
                                               
299 A question here seems to be whether our responsibility cannot just turn into a burden, 
particularly if the current generation is no longer the generation to which the guilt or need for 
forgiveness is directly connected. According to Ricoeur, only the disconnection between the 
actor and the act or between a nation and its past acts of violence enables us and the “yet to be 
born,” in particular, to continue in a present which is no longer haunted by the violent past, 
albeit, by being  conscious of the responsibility to seek justice and  avoid new forms of violence. 
It is up to the citizens to re-establish a more just form of remembering (juste mémoire) to 
establish a more balanced form of public memory. 
300 The notion of forgiveness is excluded from the dialectic of Memory, History, Forgetting in 
which the question of the faithfulness to the past was central. The question of guilt, 
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the promise.  Both acts of promising and forgiving show how we relate to others 
in time: the promise towards the future relation with the Other301 and 
forgiveness toward a past that needs to be overcome in order to enable the 
community to go on into a further future. In the present we forgive for the past 
and promise towards the future. In Oneself as Another the promise symbolizes 
the relation between identity, attestation and accountability whereas, in 
Memory, History, Forgetting forgiveness symbolizes the relation between 
historicity, remembering, forgetting and the community at large. For Ricoeur 
promising and forgiveness both mark the manner in which we shape and 
preserve our sensus communis through time. Time and Narrative, thus, connects 
Oneself as Another and Memory, History, Forgetting by delivering all elements of 
a narrative ethics: all narratives "stand for" a particular or possible ("yet to 
come") world.  
But while forgiveness can be given even without justice, a pardon seems 
possible only after justice, not instead of justice. Pardon occurs as a gift of the 
victim to the perpetrator: the victim pardons the perpetrator and as such 
releases it from (personal) guilt for the victim. The victim allows the perpetrator 
to go on, to have a future as a person, recognizing that each person is more than 
just his or her guilt. On a collective level it enables a society to go on, to heal the 
“wounded community” and build a unified future, but without  the pardon 
replacing justice. If the pardon overrules the need for justice it becomes 
amnesty. Amnesty is a political act, an authority setting free those convicted and 
thus overruling the verdicts of the court. Amnesty runs the risk to bring back the 
feelings of failed justice and reactivate resentment, opening up the wounds of 
the victims.  
   
Recognition  
The problem of recognition is the very final addition to the philosophical 
anthropology of the capable human being. While Memory, History, Forgetting 
filled a lacuna between Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another, Ricoeur's 
very last book, The Course of Recognition, extends his theory of personal identity 
with a systematic philosophical reflection on the capability "to recognize". From 
                                               
 
punishment and justice in relation to the past does not belong to the realm of representation 
but to ethics. 
301 This also is crucial for the community as political body: the trust we put in politicians is due 
to the manner in which they promise to make things better, to work for our benefit, for the 
“good” of the people.  Thus, to strive for the good translates in politics into promises made.  
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the lexicographical and semantic complexity of recognition Ricoeur percolates 
three philosophical perspectives which he considers "thought events" (CR 248). 
These three thought-events each represent a particular paradigm-shift (in the 
meaning of "recognition") but also reveal a common denominator: identification. 
Ricoeur describes the three positions as,  
 
1) re/cognition as the identification of "things in themselves" (the 
Kantian Ding-an-sich);  
2) recognition as understanding one’s self-identity (recognizing oneself), 
and;  
3) recognition as the problem of social asymmetry (identifying 
Others).302  
 
The course Ricoeur lays out perceives recognition as an attempt to overcome 
forms of mis-recognition. We misrecognize truth from false, we misrecognize 
our-selves (separating, for instance our, "true" from our "false" self), and we 
misrecognize others. This leads to three struggles or desires: an epistemological 
quest for the truth (as the wish to discover the modes of judgement through the 
knowledge of how we recognize things), finding manners for self-identification 
(as self-recognition) by answering the question "who speaks" or "who acts?", and 
finally, the desire to-be-recognized by others by affirming the mutuality and 
equality of our social positions. At the heart of all these struggles – for truth, self-
recognition, and mutual-recognition – we find conflict and insecurity. With these 
three categories of recognition, Ricoeur develops a dialectic between recognition 
(as grasping the nature of objects), recognizing oneself, and mutual recognition. 
Hence, recognition shifts from an instrument of knowledge to a concept 
describing our acknowledgement of others. This process represents the transfer 
from an active to a passive use of the term and from personal to collective forms 
of recognition. Ricoeur’s motivation to develop a "philosophy of recognition" is 
the idea that the philosophical exploration of recognition stays behind the 
complex lexicographical and semantic history of the term which is found in the 
dictionaries. In his inquiry of the 23 derivations of reconaître in the famous 
French dictionary Littré, Ricoeur searches for the “unsaid” beneath, what he calls, 
a “rule-governed polysemy.” Together with the manners of classification, the 
order of derivation and the “methodical history of usage” the lexicographical 
semantic shapes an order of meaning, in this case the meaning of reconnaître. It 
                                               
302 It is, of course, no coincidence that these three areas overlap with the major themes of 
Ricoeur’s own late philosophy. 
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is in the in-between of the lexicographical entries of recognition that Ricoeur 
finds the “thought events” or philosophical transition points of the concept of 
recognition.303 At the end of his study Ricoeur returns to recognition in the 
meaning of gratitude. It signifies the highest form of unilateral recognition of 
others because it transcends the logic of reciprocity. It is in the five entries for 
reconnu in which Ricoeur finds “the principal conceptual revolution on the plane 
of philosophy …the Hegelian theme of the struggle for recognition, where ‘being 
recognized’ is its horizon” (CR 9). This revolution marks the shift from “to 
recognize” as an active verb (Erkennen) toward its use in the passive (Hegelian) 
tense of ‘being recognized’ (Anerkenntsein). According to Ricoeur this 
replacement of the active meaning of recognition by the passive form marks “the 
gap that we shall have to account for between the mode of lexicographical 
derivation at the level of ordinary usage and the reconstruction of a rule-
governed polysemy in terms of philosophical concepts” (CR 9). This is the "axis of 
meaning" in need of examination, namely the point of turning from recognition 
as an individual act of intellectual mastery ("grasping") to recognition as an 
                                               
303 The first meaning of reconnaître is defined as: 1. To bring again to mind the idea of someone 
or something one knows (connaît). Here the “bring again to mind” stresses the re- of 
recognition which shows the temporal character and, in Ricoeur's reading, points to the 
philosophical unsaid (of the lexicography). Besides the temporal quality the actual “how” (quid) 
of what is again brought to mind marks the unsaid. But this ‘how’ is immediately clarified in the  
second entry: 2. To know by some sign, some mark, some indication, a person or a thing one has 
never seen before. Here the sign or mark indicates or clarifies what we actually recognize. This is 
a crucial shift of definition: now we recognize something “as this or that” (CR 6) although we 
still do not know how we recognize. Ricoeur: “What remains unsaid here is the reliability of the 
sign, the mark, or the indication of recognition by which one recognizes something or 
someone”. For Ricoeur the “knowing by some sign, some mark” can be understood as the 
intermediary phase to the next entry: 3. To arrive at, to catch sight of, to discover the truth of 
something. Here the idea of truth and value is introduced within the definitions of recognition. 
“To arrive at” has a similar form of delay or hesitation to the earlier ‘bring again to mind.’ “We 
touch here on the implicit operation by means of which a gap is both acknowledged and 
overcome” (CR 7). Here recognition is still described as a movement towards something we 
then come to re-cognize. In the following entry, “4. To recognize with negation sometimes 
indicates not having any regard for,” as in the example: “He recognizes no law but his own will.” 
The unsaid lies in the negative form of to “recognize only” (as in: God is the only authority we 
recognize). Here recognizing signifies excluding. Thus, the meaning ascribed to recognition 
changes in the course of the lexicographical entries from something we “arrive at” to 
something we “explore” to something we “admit”. What follows are forms of recognition that 
refer to “recognizing for” (like: to recognize a child) as a sort of affiliation marked by a right (the 
right to recognize a child as one’s own means using a law/ right underlining a biological or social 
association) or a signature (recognizing one’s signature means recognizing an authorization). 
Finally, by enumerating entries that refer to recognition as a form of declaration (of faith: to 
recognize one God) or confession (to recognize one’s error or debt), Ricoeur emphasizes the 
French use of recognition as a manner “to bear witness to one’s gratitude” (CR 8).  
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expectation or as a  demand even to be recognized by others or institutions.  In 
short, this process passes through recognition as identifying-oneself. As a 
consequence, the Hegelian socio-political and ethical context that dominates the 
contemporary debate on social recognition (Honneth, Fraser) is reframed within 
a much wider philosophical scope, ranging from Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, 
Kant, Husserl, Levinas, Hobbes, Hegel, to Jean-Marc Ferry, Luc Boltanski, Laurent 
Thévenot and Marcel Mauss. In this manner, a "course of recognition," 
approached in the usual phenomenological-hermeneutical perspective, cuts 
through the landscape of western philosophy. Ricoeur aptly summarizes this 
entire linguistic and conceptual process as, 
 
the passage from recognition-identification (reconnaissance), where the 
thinking subject claims to master meaning, to mutual recognition 
(reconnaissance mutuelle), where the subject places him- or herself 
under the tutelage of a relationship of reciprocity, in passing through 
self-recognition (reconnaissance de soi) in the variety of capacities that 
modulate one’s ability to act, one’s ‘agency’ (CR 248).   
 
The passage through these three moments of recognition corresponds to 
paradigm shifts from Kant, to Bergson, and to Hegel. Ricoeur examines both the 
spaces in-between these paradigms and the manner in which the three forms of 
recognition as identification are dialectically intertwined. Although the entire 
third part of the "course" examines the differences between reciprocity and 
mutuality as forms of social intersubjectivity, the contemporary discourse of a 
"politics of recognition" – examined in particular through the concrete social 
frictions of multiculturalism – plays only a marginal role. 
The basic structure of our personal encounters is an event of mutuality 
evoked by acts of giving and receiving. These acts reflect an original bond which 
recognizes that we are in an absolute and inescapable manner among each other. 
Our original encounter with others, with the neighbor as our fellow human being, 
seems to be the hidden but basic force that informs, motivates and creates all 
larger, more abstract and institutionalized forms of the social bond. Already in an 
early article, The Socius and the Neighbour, written 50 years before the 
publication of The Course of Recognition, Ricoeur complains about the lack of a 
"sociology of the neighbor", because in Ricoeur’s opinion,the theme of the 
"neighbor" is reduced to a "theology of charity" (reflecting the Biblical Samaritan) 
instead of being understood as the beginning of a yet uncompleted 
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phenomenological-sociology of empathy and compassion (a start for such a 
“philosophy of the Mitwelt“ was made in the work of Max Scheler and Alfred 
Schütz).304 Ricoeur’s mature ethics resets the original theological tone into an 
overall humanistic anthropological key. This leads to a reframing of the question 
of social recognition within the ethics of solicitude and the concept of just 
institutions worked out in Oneself as Another. The focus is not primarily on social 
or political claims of recognition but also on the primordial essence underlying 
recognition, i.e., the ontological dissymmetry between self and others (we are 
common in our humanity but different as humans). Thus, the main question 
becomes: how to think reciprocity and mutuality in light of the limits set by both 
Husserl (the other only appears as an alter ego) and Levinas (alterity completely 
comes to occupy the self)? After a detour through Honneth’s reactualization of 
the Hegelian concept of recognition, Ricoeur shows how reciprocity should rather 
be understood from the perspective of our need for mutuality (in which 
mutuality again echoes Aristotle’s notion of friendship). Although concerned with 
collective identities and the social structures of justice, redistribution and 
equality, Ricoeur’s wish to reclaim "recognition" as a philosophical (and not just 
as a political) concept aims at, in its final analysis, understanding the 
phenomenological difference between reciprocity and mutuality. In order to 
examine this difference Ricoeur reformulates Marcel Mauss’ famous 
anthropological analysis of the gift-exchange which does not just reveal a 
utilitarian or symbolic structure of (normative) reciprocity but also, as Ricoeur 
argues, shows acts of giving and receiving. The "gift" from these acts is not just 
material but is also a giving of oneself and a giving towards others; in giving, one 
also gives oneself, in receiving, one also receives the other. 
The highest, absolute and non-conditional form of giving and receiving is 
found, Ricoeur argues, in love as symbolized by the ancient Greek term Agape. 
For Ricoeur Agape represents the exact opposite  to the theories of recognition 
based on social struggle: in Love and Friendship mutuality and recognition do not 
result from a prior struggle but are given unconditionally. In contrast to forms of 
recognition resulting from war or struggle (Hobbes), recognition as a peaceful 
personal encounter evokes a mutuality of care, solicitude, respect and, love that 
harbors no expectation of return.  
Ricoeur's final section on "recognition as mutuality" is the central ethical 
category underlying his entire anthropological system of thought. The path from 
self-recognition to mutual recognition connects the dialectic of idem- and ipse-
                                               
304 Cf. Scheler, see above p. 36-39; Alfred Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: eine 
Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie (Wien: J. Springer, 1932). 
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identity (united in narrative identity, attestation, promising and remembering) 
with the dialectic of private and public, individual and collective identities (united 
in communal narratives, institutions, goods). In this way the "standing for" of 
moral selfhood and the "standing for" of the community share a dialectical and 
dialogical process  that, if fails, points back to our fragility and fallibility But, once 
recognized, this process allows an ontological commitment of mutual care, 
friendship and love as fulfilment of a concrete, communal life "for oneself and 
with others in just institutions". 
 
Conclusion 
I will now briefly summarize Ricoeur's trajectory: starting with a 
phenomenological inspired existentialism, reflecting the influence of Scheler, 
Marcel and Nabert, Ricoeur integrates the eidetic methodology into the 
existential aspects of our "wounded cogito" and "concrete existence". Following 
his interpretation of the notion of defilement, sin and guilt (as symbols of evil) his 
"hermeneutical turn" develops into a complex theory of text, meaning and action 
which prepares a theory of narrative poetics that, in Oneself as Another, is 
finalized as the connection between a narrative and moral identity. This 
connection cumulates in an ethical-moral attestation anchored in ontological 
commitments attested to in forms of personal and social endurance. Here 
Ricoeur's central, Aristotelian, position returns, namely that the aim of our moral 
selfhood should be to realize "the good life for oneself, with Others in just 
institutions". In this manner, the personal, the intersubjective and the social are 
bound together in a shared and unifying "just" goal. Thus, Ricoeur argues, the 
ethical aim must be examined by the moral norm and, in the end, synthesized in 
a critical, practical wisdom – a wisdom which is able to resolve normative aporias 
and tragic human conflicts. The self, once challenged by otherness, must find its 
own ethico-moral "standing". In the fundamental intersubjective sphere of 
"oneself as another" Ricoeur uncovers an ethics of mutuality, trust, solicitude and 
conviction that holds the potential to counter the threats of evil, domination and 
the limits of normative universalism. Respect and self-worth, core to all forms of 
moral selfhood, derive from mutuality and trust (trust in the reliability of others, 
and the performative force and fidelity of language).  
The ethics of mutuality reflects Ricoeur's early dismissal of Husserl’s 
phenomenological solipsism, as well as the ongoing influence of Schutz’ 
phenomenological sociology and, most crucially, it again reveals the deep 
influence of Nabert’s "affirmative reflexivity". As a whole, Ricoeur's ethics aims to 
fill a void within the anthropological dialectic of vulnerability and autonomy. 
Because the hermeneutic "surplus of meaning" suffers from a "normative lack" it 
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must be countered with an ethical-normative conviction; this is the conviction 
that the "I" can "stand for" a testimony, a promise or a deed done". Ultimately, 
what I "stand for" unities my vulnerability and autonomy.  
The central theme of Ricoeur's "small ethics" can now be summarized with 
the question  of "How can we overcome the conflict between ethics, morality 
and justice if perceived as a conflict between universal, teleological, 
deontological and practical claims?" This conflict also recalls Rawls’s notion of 
"reflective equilibrium" which Ricoeur, albeit very critical of the redistributive 
theory, will integrate in his model of practical wisdom or critical phronesis 
(coupling Aristotle with Kant). Critical deliberation appears as the only way out 
once moral conflicts can no longer be resolved through the application of social 
rules or universal principles. Once moral conflicts become incommensurable they 
can easily violate our sense of autonomy, integrity and self-worth and lead to 
forms of humiliation. Although human singularity and moral exceptions need to 
be brought into a new, stable moral coherence in order to find justification, it is 
exactly the uniqueness of situations and the alterity of others which discloses the 
irresolvable tragic source of all moral principles whose validity reaches a limit 
once confronted with the overwhelming complexity of life itself. The 
acknowledgement of this tragic source reveals the continuity of Ricoeur's early 
anthropological assessment; starting with questions of fragility and fallibility and 
working toward the affirmative capability of attestation and accountability. Thus, 
Ricoeur sets out to reconnect our ethical intentions, moral principles and 
reflecting our singular otherness with a critical phronesis. In Memory, History, 
Forgetting Ricoeur extended his "small ethics" with an appendix on forgetting 
and an epilogue on "difficult forgiveness". In his final book, The Course of 
Recognition, this relation between giving and forgiveness broadens  the political 
notion of recognition (Hegel, Honneth) with an ethics of reciprocity, mutuality, 
(unconditional) love and gratitude.305  
The core of Ricoeur’s ethics is Aristotelian, which means, simply put, that 
our main ethical question must be "how to fulfil our aim to have  a good life?". 
Thus, the "examined life" forms the main precondition in need of fulfilment if we 
wish to reach this aim. As mentioned previously, Ricoeur formulates his own 
version of the examined life in the reconfigurative aspect of narrative identity 
which, through the ethical aim, is transferred to the "standing for" of attestation 
                                               
305 Ricoeur’s two volumes of articles on the Just not only summaries his own positions (on 
autonomy, justice, redistribution, applied ethics and so on) but also show Ricoeur's rigorous 
engagement with the contemporary debate on ethics and moral issues  (among others, John 
Rawls, Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thevenot, Jean-Luc Ferry, and Otfried Hoeffe). 
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and testimony that binds narrative identity to moral identity. As we are 
"entangled in stories" (Schnapp), we are evenly entangled in moralities. In both 
cases the question arises as to how and when our own intervention can enable 
itself to evoke a different narrative, a different morality. It is in our testimonies, 
our acts of attestation, that ”what we stand for” (the narrative in which the self 
aims to cohere) and ”what we wish to stand for” (the moral position through 
which the self coheres with others) are able to merge. This merging of self-
attestation and attestation-towards-(all)-others points to a fundamental 
mutuality, reciprocity and solicitude which forms the new core around which 
Ricoeur's rethinking of the relation between ethics, morality, justice and 
phronesis takes place.  
The struggle for recognition — a struggle also for our primary, ethical, self-
affirmation — is not only motivated by the wish to overcome forms of 
misrecognition, humiliation or injustice but is also rooted deeply in perhaps our 
most humane capabilities - those of giving (ourselves) and receiving (others). In 
the mutuality of these deeply rooted gestures we find ourselves in a common 
humanity, capable of unconditional love, uplifted by the Joy of life ("the gift of 
life"), and holding on to the Hope that our desire to exist and endure, will be 
fulfilled. It is Ricoeur’s great achievement to have translated these ideas into a 
humanistic and anthropological dialectic in which human fragility and fallibility is 
hold in an equilibrium by the use of our abilities to speak, act, narrate, respond, 
remember, forget, forgive, recognize, to give, to receive, and  finally, to love.   
 
 CONCLUSION 
Ricoeur's renewal of philosophical anthropology 
 
 
 
I started out with recalling the forgotten tradition of German Philosophical 
Anthropology and its French counterparts. Placing Ricoeur back in this tradition 
shows how all of his core themes echo, react to, and aim to renew the field of 
philosophical anthropology. Against this background, and in reaction to Husserl’s 
idealism, Ricoeur develops his own anthropological perspective by applying the 
Kantian notion of the limit to the involuntary aspects of our human condition; if 
the free will is the central symbol of the difference between humans and 
animals, the question is what the actual limit of our capacity to will means for our 
self-understanding as humans. Ricoeur’s primary anthropological understanding 
is that the human suffers from a “wounded cogito” (cogito blessé) experienced as 
a disproportion between subject and self. This diagnosis sets the stage for an 
extensive research program into the eidetics, empirics and poetics of the will 
embedded in the questions and methods of anthropology, phenomenology and 
hermeneutics. It is the relationship between intentionality, meaning and action 
that ties both Ricoeur’s "program" with his method, and the "diagnosis" with the 
"remedy" (this remedy shifts in Ricoeur's late work from the creative ability of 
the poetic will toward an ethics of attestation and solicitude). Ricoeur's solution 
intertwines a hermeneutic with an ethical dialectic: Humans create meaning and 
hereby create themselves; humans respond to others and thereby respond, 
mediate and constitute "oneself as/ in another". In "standing for" ourselves we 
can stand-for something (values, actions) toward others, once we can account for 
our "self" we can be accountable towards others.  
 But this self-creation in meaning and others does not eradicate all 
underlying aporias. Questions such as "what is time?", "what is identity?", or 
"what is the past?" can never be sufficiently answered. But while Ricoeur does 
not find an answer (or does not wish to find one) to these aporias, he does find 
the complex meaning-structure of our poetic responses ("human time," "attested 
selfhood," "lived historicity") and ontological empathies (signified by care, 
friendship, solicitude and a common striving for the "good life" in a just society). 
These poetic and ethical responses are not objective epistemological 
explanations, but rather articulate how we understand ourselves as humans; it is 
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in our narratives and actions that we tell and reveal who we are. For Ricoeur it is 
exactly this who that determines the what.306  
It is only at the end of his narrative theory, after  numerous pages written on 
the relation between time and narrative, when the “who-question” appears as an 
urgent question: "who narrates?" (“who actually is the person who narrates his 
or her life?”). Ricoeur subsequently unfolds this singular question in a plural 
examination by asking: who speaks?; who acts?; who narrates?; who responds?; 
who is accountable?; who remembers?; and, finally, who recognizes?. Because 
the human is an animal who can speak, narrate, respond, act, promise, 
remember, commemorate, or judge, the human can attest to the kind of being 
that it is as a self (that can appropriate and attest to its otherness). Therefore, I 
am able to say: me, voici. In this state of self-testimony an ontological and ethical 
self-becoming coincide: here I am, the one who speaks, acts, promises, suffers; I 
was there, the one who remembers, testifies; who saw, heard, underwent. It is 
here that the intentional and meaning-making act intertwines with the possibility 
of imputation and accountability of my selfhood towards others and the past (as 
the "other" of history which is "all other times before the present time"). In 
Ricoeur’s approach both the me, voici and the j’y étais hold an answer to 
elemental challenges of the human as an ethical self. First, Ricoeur answers to 
the classical “theories of suspicion” (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud) with a theory of 
trust (here I am, trust what I say, do, who I am), secondly, his work reacts to the 
dismantling of humanism by structuralism and post-structuralism (Levi-Strauss, 
Barth, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida) with a theory of action, creative imagination and 
hermeneutical dialogue (we are not only subjected, we can create, subvert, 
renew, overcome; we can act differently!) and, third, it replaces the solipsistic ego 
of absolute idealism (Husserl) which appears detached from the world, language 
and others with a social ontology of the response: although I am a  unique person 
I am only able to reflect and respond in the world through language toward and 
with others. Ricoeur’s social ontology of responding reconnects the acts of 
promising, forgiving and recognizing. Thus, the critique of the "theories of 
suspicion" is rebalanced with the conviction of the "theories of trust": besides 
doubt, finiteness and negation humans have an evenly deep affirmative potential 
                                               
306 As a consequence, the Kantian epistemological question “What is the human?” must be 
replaced with the question “Who is the human?”. This shift clearly echoes Ricoeur's early 
ontological question (first posed in 1960), namely, “who is this Being for whom being is in 
question?” Ibid., Ricoeur, Antinomy, p. 20. This becomes rephrased as “How can we experience 
ourselves as the authors and actors of our life, a life we live with and for others?”. This is the 
key-idea informing Ricoeur's conceptualization of narrative identity and attestation.   
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as capable subjects committed to their own existence able to reflect, think, 
speak, respond, and so on.   
The notion of Otherness appears as the crucial hinge between Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic anthropology and the position of ethics as its necessary but external 
supplement (external in the sense that the ethical "how ought I to act?" can 
never be answered within the anthropological quest itself). In Ricoeur’s early 
work the "disproportion between subject and self" opens up a transcendental 
rupture that we struggle to close (we become others to ourselves). The process 
of finding a different route to overcome this rupture stays the central theme 
throughout Ricoeur’s entire anthropology.  
Finding this route (in Ricoeur’s work a route, of course, always means a 
detour!) is motivated by two main assumptions: the primordial tension between 
our nature and freedom and the mediated access to self-understanding 
(opposing both the Cartesian and Husserlian quest for immediacy and 
Letztbegründung). It is this inescapable “double allegiance” (to the natural world 
and the world of meaning and action) which determines early on Ricoeur’s 
exploration of our hermeneutical self-understanding and, after his "ethical turn," 
his interest in the intertwinement of a polysemy of selfhood with the polysemy 
of otherness. This polysemy of self and otherness points to what is foreign, what 
is "other (than) self" (OA 318), this can be the experience of our embodied state 
(flesh), or the "hidden" relation of self to self (which, as Ricoeur states, refers to 
"conscience in the sense of Gewissen" — which, as moral superego, functions as 
the “other within”). Once we attest what we "stand for" the polysemic ontology 
of otherness becomes part of the "intimate constitution" (OA 329) of our 
selfhood. Thus, Ricoeur replaces his original phenomenology of willing with the 
"demand for a phenomenology of the self affected by the other than self" (OA 
331). Our involuntary primordial limit, no longer denotes a boundary of finiteness 
but is the source and potential for an affirmative self-constitution in Otherness. 
This commited attestation to otherness forms, for Ricoeur, "the other side of 
suspicion" (OA 347), and thus, through a philosophy and ethics of otherness the 
diagnosis of the "wounded cogito" finds a final remedy in our capability for a 
moral selfhood.  
An other way to look at the importance of the theme of rupture is to 
consider the key dichotomies and figures of reconciliation in Ricoeur’s work: in 
Freedom and Nature the notion of "consent" equalizes the instability caused by 
the voluntary and involuntary aspects of existence; in Time and Narrative the 
"concordant discordance" of the "plot" stabilizes the disruption caused by the 
incoherent dispersion of events through time; in Oneself as Another "attestation" 
unifies the friction between idem- and ipse-identity; in Memory, History, 
Forgetting our personal and collective "history" binds the apparent opposition 
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between remembering and forgetting; "justice" settles the rupture between acts 
of evil and our normative rules and values. All these dichotomies and the ongoing 
human need for an operational “re-binding” (of subject and self, body and 
consciousness, self and other, meaning and explanation, time and identity and so 
on) mark the philosophical reformulations of Ricoeur's original anthropological 
diagnosis. 
In Identifying Selfhood Isaac Venema argues that “[Ricoeur’s] detour has not 
gone far enough, and surprisingly returns in the end to its starting point, to a 
voluntary cogito, albeit broken open by the other, but a cogito nonetheless.”307 
Venema further concludes that narrative identity as attestation harbors a quasi-
essentialist idea of human self-examination projecting the poetic plot of narrative 
unity back into a self-reflective "core" that quasi-unifies my sense of self through 
time. This position questions  whether Ricoeur’s conceptualisation of selfhood 
does not overstretch the actual capabilities of the self (to consciously endure and 
discipline itself into a coherent, unified or consistent reasonability translated into 
a "moral self"). I think Venema's reduction of Ricoeur's selfhood to a "cogito 
nonetheless" represents a misreading both of the intertwinement of idem- and 
ipse-identity (incorporating self and/ as otherness) and of the impact of Ricoeur’s 
ethical turn toward solicitude and mutuality.308 
Perhaps the question whether our response to Others emerges from an 
ontological commitment to the "who" I "stand for" or from a desire to present 
oneself as coherent may never be answered309; "I" can never state that due to 
my object-subject split I am no longer responsible for promises made or deeds 
done to others. In our daily languages split persons are psychiatric patients and 
not accountable selves. Our ultimate "standing for" the self, our ethical positions 
or the testimony of what we experienced is, ultimately, dependent on this 
"notwithstanding": although I can never be sure "who I am" (because I am always 
                                               
 
308 In my opinion, Venema’s critique misrepresents Ricoeur’s understanding of otherness as 
what simultaneously decenters and recenters selfhood. It decenters us because all self-
understanding is mediated through otherness and it recenters us because the appeal of the 
other, the call for care and the mutuality of solicitude, shows that despite the impossibility of 
absolute self-knowledge or an always incomplete knowledge we have of others, I will respond 
to my fellow human. 
309 This doubt shines through in Ricoeur's very final admission in Oneself as Another: “Perhaps 
the philosopher as philosopher has to admit that one does not know and cannot say whether 
this Other, the source of the injunction, is another person who I can look in the face or who can 
stare at me, or my ancestors for whom there is no representation, to so great an extent does 
my debt to them constitute my very self, or God–living God, absent God–or an empty place. 
With this aporia of the Other, philosophical discourse comes to an end” (OA 355). 
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already occupied by others and the possibility of self-knowledge is a limited 
condition) this is the "who" I wish to stand for – here and now. This "standing 
for" signifies the possibility to, in light of our fundamental fragility and fallibility, 
use our capabilities for an affirmation of our humanity which, in Ricoeur's most 
dense definition, means "to strive for the good life for oneself with others in just 
institutions".310 
 The nucleus of Ricoeur's last big project is to place the correlative 
relation between memory and ethics again at the root of any philosophy of 
history. In the same way as the fragility of identity (exemplified by the distortion 
of self as sameness) led Ricoeur to formulate an "ethical selfhood," it is the 
fragility of memory (exemplified by the distortion of memory by the imagination) 
that leads him to formulate an "ethics of memory". While in the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting the question of the faithfulness to the past is crucial, 
the question of guilt, punishment and justice are central to our ability to forgive 
or pardon. While memory and history ask whether there is a just representation 
of the past, the ethics of memory and history questions whether our judgement 
about the past can be just or justified. Crucial component of Ricoeur’s ethics of 
memory is the act of forgiveness: Forgiveness can be given as pardon or amnesty 
but actual forgiveness can only come after the need for justice is fulfilled. To 
testify of the past, to hear the voices of the victims, to pardon or forgive reveals 
the ethical component of human historicity. Furthermore, both on the individual 
and collective level, it is necessary to acknowledge past sufferings in the present 
and to forgive in light of the future. As such, the human condition can stay an 
open and dynamic temporal experience with oneself and others.311 
Ricoeur’s writings on forgiveness, pardoning and recognition represent an 
ethical mirror image of his early writings on evil, defilement, sin and guilt.312 The 
                                               
310 This is not just a political idealistic slogan but the final conclusion of Ricoeur’s enormous 
work and complex phenomenological-hermeneutic examination of the human will in its 
epistemological, poetic, ontological and affective experiences. 
311 Forgetting forms a “pair” with forgiveness: forgiveness is a form of active or “happy 
forgetting” motivated by a striving for reconciliation, this leads, eventually to, what Ricoeur 
calls, a “reconciled memory” (M 285): the capability to forgive is the height that equates the 
depth of the original fault. Human fallibility, symbolized in the dark depth of evil, is, therefore, 
countered by the height symbolized in the human capability to forgive. 
312 On a methodological level Ricoeur places the ethical or moral issue outside his systematic 
analysis of the dialectical and hermeneutic experience: the fault in his treatment of the free 
will, the promise in the studies on selfhood, forgiveness in the dialectic of memory and history. 
Does this mean that the ethical moment stands outside the phenomenological, hermeneutical 
and ontological experience and praxis? In these three cases – the fault, promise and forgiveness 
– the ethical signifier refers to an unsolvable aporia of the free will, selfhood and history. In the 
conceptual space of this aporia the ethical sign/ imputation is inserted to complement the 
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hermeneutic understanding of symbol and myth are levelled with an analysis of 
the ethical capability as part of a personal and social ontology. This is persued by 
affirming the potential for persons and communities working through suffering 
and aiming at a recovery (a recovery that also hopes to recover the Joy of 
existence). Forgiveness extends the concept of the promise in a sense that both 
the promise and forgiveness show how we relate ourselves to others in time: the 
promise is based on a future relation with the Other, and forgiveness looks at a 
past that needs to be overcome to enable the community to go on into the 
future: we forgive in the present towards the past and we promise in the present 
towards the future.313 In Oneself as Another the promise symbolizes the relation 
between identity, attestation and accountability; forgiveness in Memory, History, 
Forgetting symbolizes the ethical relation between history, remembering, 
forgetting and the community at large. For Ricoeur promising and forgiveness are 
two forms of trust; the promise, on the one hand, promises trustworthiness 
while forgiveness, on the other hand, aims to convalesce from a lost trust (which 
is the ultimate glue of any sensus communis).314 
 It is in our ethical commitments (exemplified by our ontological affections 
and commitments) that we overcome and re-affirm who we faithfully "stand for" 
when we attest our self in the present or when we testify the past (both as 
personal testimony or collective histories). The "ethics of memory" connects 
Ricoeur's hermeneutics of selfhood with a phenomenology of memory. Both 
identity and memory show a fragility or "wound" which we counter by taking up 
the difficult task of self-affirmation; the me, voici of attestation and the j’y etais 
of testimony symbolize our existential “notwithstanding” in light of the 
fundamental vulnerability (identity can fall apart, memories can be illusions) of 
our capabilities. The "I can" is only aware of its will or capability against the 
actual experience of its incapability and limits. In this way, we have to admit that 
the anthropological itenary in Ricoeur’s work forms a dialectical spiral bringing us 
back to the very beginning.  
In Summa; Paul Ricoeur’s search for a non-totalizing, poetic and ethical 
remedy for the wounded cogito allows him to connect the typical themes of 
philosophical anthropology (as the inquiry into the nature of human nature) to a 
                                               
 
dialectic: the ethical need necessitates the consent with the finite and involuntary aspects of 
the human condition. 
313 In both cases it seems as if only “time” can come between me and fulfilment of the promise 
(is not stating the promise already an imperative act to one-self ordering its fulfilment?).   
314 Time and Narrative, thus, connects Oneself as Another and Memory, History, Forgetting also 
as a quest for our ethical self-understanding.  
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philosophy of action, narrative, selfhood, history and justice. These topics 
become part of his hermeneutics of the poetic will, in particular narrative and 
action (because they enable the re-binding of time, identity and ethics), 
amounting to a philosophy of attestation which reflects a phenomenology of the 
capable moral self. This leads to an anthropological line of thought which – in a 
harsh reduction – can be summarized by the following core assumptions: 1) The 
"nature" of humans is determined by the reciprocal relation between our 
capabilities and incapabilities; 2) this dualism is not a paradox but the source of a 
productive intertwinement between the voluntary and involuntary aspects of our 
existence; 3) our freedom to decide and act, to take initiatives, create meaning 
and respond to others is not just an attempt to overcome a primordial negation 
but is, moreover, driven by the desire to exist and endure (this recalls Spinoza’s 
conatus); 4) our existence is concrete, embodied, intentional, intersubjective, 
situated in history, expressed in language; 5) all reflection is immediate, indirect, 
the result of interpretations (following the structures of texts), enabled by our 
productive imagination; 6) through action we inscribe ourselves in the world - we 
“read” the world and act upon our interpretations; 7) there is no metaphysical 
substance called “self”; 8) the “I” is circular because it is what seeks and what is 
sought; 9) we can only attest a “selfhood” as that for which we stand, this 
“standing for” represents an ontological, narratively expressed commitment to 
“who” we are ; 10) this self-attestation not only integrates the passive and active 
parts of my “ownness” (idem- and ipse-identity) but also interlocks the 
dependence, inscription and refiguration of our experiences with time, 
intersubjectivity and norms upon my selfhood; 11) We strive for a "good life" 
with and for others in just institutions which; 12) reflects and recognizes our 
fundamental vulnerability, reciprocity and need for care, dignity and self-esteem. 
Of course, this overview is by no means complete and can easily be extended.       
What has become clear is that Ricoeur’s most basic intention is to save the 
anthropological and humanistic project and re-define the subject as a capable 
and moral self able to make decisions, create meaning and live with others in just 
institutions. These topics recall the actual continuity of the overall 
anthropological theme of Ricoeur’s work: the question of human freedom as 
determined by the dialectic of human suffering and action. Within this “condition 
humaine” we understand ourselves as self-reflexive animals able to interpret the 
world unfolding in front of us, a world in which we desire to be, to endure and to 
affirm the existence of the other and thus, be affirmed ourselves as another. 
Hence, Ricoeur's anthropological itenary shifts the question of the cogito and the 
will to the question of meaning and action and finally, to the mutual constitution 
of and ethical relation between selves and/ as others. It is exactly in this ethical 
turn "of oneself as another" that Ricoeur's repositioning of philosophical 
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anthropology culminates. The initial philosophy of the cogito (of the "I will") has 
now become a philosophy of attestation (of the "Here I am, this is what I stand 
for" as another among all others, as a "oneself as another"). The question of the 
subject no longer takes the "I" as its center but starts from the "other". This, 
therefore, has transformed the cogito into the self and the question of atomistic 
willing into the question of mutual care and solicitude. Consequently, the "who 
we stand for" anchors in our notion of a shared humanity, of our fundamental 
being an "other among others".    
The main assumption of my exploration of Ricoeur’s project was the vital 
relation between anthropology, poetics, and ethics. In the center of this triangle 
we find the question of meaning and ontology – “who is this Being for whom 
being is in question?”. We can perhaps never really answer this question but we 
can respond to this ontological aporia as a capable moral self motivated by the 
desire to exist and endure as an accountable person with and for others in just 
institutions – notwithstanding our irresolvable fragile and fallible human 
condition.  
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Summary 
 
The main argument of this study concerns the central relation between 
anthropology, poetics and ethics. It is the ontological problem – which can easily 
be summarized by the question “who is this Being for whom being is in question” 
– that silently binds these sections together. What “we are” does not tell us 
“what we ought to do or not do” (unless our ideology is socio- or 
neurobiologically determined); prescriptive rules do not follow from descriptive 
insights. This makes the relation between anthropology and ethics a precarious 
one. It is in the poetic response to the aporetics of being that the ethical position 
can be co-clarified: the good life must be imagined before it can be lived. Here, 
the biggest challenge lays in the simple counter-assertion that identity, and, thus, 
narratives and ethics, do not matter because their aporetic status can never be 
overcome and, therefore, we need to let go of their importance. Ricoeur’s 
philosophy must be understood as an attempt to fundamentally dismiss this 
assertion.   
Ricoeur’s itinerary is motivated by his attempt to find a “remedy” for an 
anthropological diagnosis – the “cogito brisé” – of his early work. This remedy is 
finally found in the concept of attestation—the “cogito blessè”—which brilliantly 
integrates his theories of text, action, narrative and ethics in a concept of 
temporal intentional causality (responding to the inadequacy of pure analytical 
claims of physical causality). This anthropological arch connects different but 
interdependent methodological with topological registers: phenomenology (in its 
eidetic, existential and pragmatic variations), hermeneutics (clarifying the 
relation between speech and writing, text and action, explanation and 
understanding), and ethics (in its teleological, deliberative and phronetic 
assertions). Because immediate access to the cogito is an illusion, all self-
reflective processes are mediations evoked through the expression of our 
experiences in language, art, science and history. All these expressions attempt 
to grasp and recognize the “real” behind our concrete experiences or 
metaphysical intuitions.  
But the instrument of grasping and articulation always already defers from 
what is grasped, thus making it impossible for any reality to directly totalize itself. 
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All meaning structures we “discover” in the world are irresolvable bound to the 
confines of human self-articulation. Thus, we are left with the task of 
understanding the aporias and confines posed by the instruments of our 
corporeal grasping and recognizing: consciousness, language, perception. After 
the aporia of narrative (what is time?) and identity (what is sameness?), the 
aporia of memory (what is the past?) shows that the “absent past” can never be 
fully recollected in the present. These aporias of narrative and memory overlap in 
the problem of representation; is narrative a fictional or historical 
representation?; is the recollection of the past in the present a re-imagination or 
a re-actualization of a neural imprint? In short, it is through an a priori aporia that 
Ricoeur develops a “point d’acces” for a phenomenological, hermeneutic and 
ontological examination of our self-understanding as humans in confrontation 
with an unknown world of otherness. 
This study is divided into three parts—Anthropology, Poetics, and Ethics—
consisting of six chapters. After the Introduction we turn to the German tradition 
of Philosophical Anthropology (Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, Ernst Cassirer) which 
forms the “invisible college” surrounding Ricoeur’s early anthropology. A more 
visible college, in the sense that Ricoeur directly interacts with these philosophies 
(Gabriel Marcel, Jean Nabert, Karl Jaspers), extends the former. Together, these 
two circles represent Ricoeur’s early intellectual contemporaries. The goal of my 
somewhat scholarly overview is to show the deep, often forgotten, traces of this 
influence in Ricoeur’s entire body of work.  
Part two of this study examines in three chapters Ricoeur’s poetic “turn” to 
narrative, selfhood, and remembering. Time and Narrative rethinks the dualities 
of historical/fictional narratives on one side, and cosmological/phenomenological 
time, on the other. It confronts the plurality of articulation, history as objective 
narrative and literature as subjective narrative, with the plurality of human 
experiences of time: cosmic time as an experience of pure objective physicality 
and phenomenological time as an experience of pure subjective temporality. 
Narratives are forms of reflective re-appropriation of these experiences. The 
result is a narrative theory that shows how we translate our experiences in/with 
time into a narrative of “human time” (providing an alternative reading of the 
divide between time and being). 
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Within Ricoeur’s overall project, it is easy to recognize that the theory of 
identity laid down in Oneself as Another supplements and extends his early 
Fallible Man. The diagnosis of the finite and “wounded cogito” signifying the 
fragile and unstable subject is now elevated into the stabilizing synthesis of 
narrative and ethical identity in the concept of “attestation” or the me, voici (look 
at me, here I am, here I stand for). For Ricoeur “attestation” symbolizes the 
endurance and persistence of my “self with others in just institutions”. Since in 
Fallible Man the pragmatics of the will was at stake, Ricoeur now proposes a 
narrative, ethical and ontological selfhood in which identity affirms itself as a self-
endurance emerging both from an interior dialogue between idem- and ipse-
identity and an exterior dialogue between self and others. This ethical selfhood 
responds in and to the world, through language and towards and with others. 
Our mental persistence over time (for example by keeping a promise or 
attesting to what we stand for) is not possible without the capability to 
remember, this is why a theory of memory must complement any theory of time 
and identity: as humans we can remember things (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
and we can forget things. For Ricoeur the dialectic between remembering and 
forgetting determines our experience of historicity, of living through a past, in a 
present towards a future. This final topic of the poetic adds a systematic 
phenomenological, ontological and hermeneutic examination of memory, 
historicity and forgetting, extending Ricoeur’s early work on the historical 
condition (History and Truth), to describe what it means for us to live in a 
temporality sensed as a "present past". Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory, 
remembering and forgetting connects the narratives of time with the attestation 
and persistence of our selfhood over time. In short: the “I can narrate” and “I can 
attest” are in need of the “I can remember” to function. On all three levels – 
narrative, selfhood, and memory – time signifies a phenomenological experience 
and a condition of existence.  In this manner Ricoeur connects the me, voici of 
attestation with the j’y étais of testimony.  
The final part describes the ethical “supplement” of Ricoeur’s 
anthropological and poetic trajectory. It examines the difficult normative triangle 
between ethics, morality, and justice and its relation to the question of 
recognition. Although Ricoeur never wrote a separate book-length study entirely 
dedicated to ethics, his fundamental anthropology begins and ends with an 
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ethical vision: in the The Philosophy of the Will, his examination of willing leads to 
a reflection on the fault and evil while in Memory, History, Forgetting he adds an 
epilogue on forgiveness and pardoning. The “small ethics” Ricoeur proposes in 
Oneself as Another reflects a particular form of virtue ethics: we aim for the 
“good life with and for others, in just institutions” (OA 172). This ethical aim 
needs translation into moral laws and norms and an understanding of the 
fundamental mutuality of self and other (this explains the title: one-self as an-
other). Put differently: Our ethical intentionality binds the idem-aspect to the 
ipse-aspect of my identity, which means that it binds “oneself” to an “other,” and 
it binds me to all unknown others in a “shared life” of communality with a 
common desire to live equally in justice, with self-esteem for oneself and others. 
Ricoeur’s important renewal of philosophical anthropology consists of a 
paradigmatic shift from the question of “what is the human?” to that of “whom 
does the human stand for”. It is in the connection between anthropology, 
poetics, and ethics – bound by a shared “ontology in view” - that who “we stand 
for” is able to reveal itself. Seeing Ricoeur’s work as a fundamental contribution 
to philosophical anthropology also reconnects his early assessment of the fragile 
human being with current attempts to develop a “thicker” anthropological 
philosophy of “bare life” and human “precariousness”. The growing political, 
financial and ecological vulnerability of humans in a biotechnological, globalizing 
and neo-liberal time which occurs “out of joint”, calls for a philosophical 
anthropology that is able to reflect upon this vulnerability and our potential for a 
response that testifies to what we can, or wish to, “stand for” as self-affirmative, 
creative and responsible beings. 
 
 
Samenvatting 
 
De vraag waar wij voor staan – als individuen en als samenleving – neemt in 
tijden van ecologische, financiële, nationale en sociaal-politieke crisis een steeds 
grotere urgentie aan. Deze urgentie kan simpelweg worden begrepen als de 
behoefte om te weten wie we zijn en waar we voor staan. Het werk van de 
Franse filosoof Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) biedt een complexe inkijk in hoe deze 
vraag beantwoord zou kunnen worden.  Hierbij staat de verbinding tussen wat 
we zijn (antropologie), hoe we ons articuleren (poetica) en wat te doen (ethiek) 
centraal. Alleen de erkenning van de onlosmakelijkheid van deze drie polen, via 
onze waarneming van de Ander, kan uitwijzen hoe een filosofische antropologie 
"voor onze tijd" eruit zou  moeten zien.  
In mijn proefschrift Het Wankele Evenwicht: Paul Ricoeur’s Vernieuwing 
van de Filosofische Antropologie plaats ik het werk van Ricoeur terug in de 
traditie van de filosofische antropologie. Vanuit deze herpositionering onderzoek 
ik de rol van de notie van coherentie in relatie tot het transcendentele vermogen 
tot betekenisgeving als centraal uitgangspunt van Ricoeur's hermeneutiek en 
koppel dit vermogen aan Ricoeur's reconceptualisering van de ervaring van tijd, 
identiteit en herinnering. Deze drie thema's zijn verbonden door de ontologische 
vraag: “wie is het wezen voor wie het bestaan een vraag is?”. In een laatste stap 
wordt de relatie van de ethiek met moraliteit en rechtvaardiheid beschreven als 
poging de validiteit van het "goede" en "juiste" te verbinden met een 
humanistische anthropologie die geformuleerd wordt als een bestaansethiek 
gericht op menselijke zelf-affirmatie "met en voor anderen in rechtvaardige 
instituties".  
Deze studie bestaat uit drie delen en zes hoofdstukken. In het eerste 
hoofdstuk van deel een richt ik me op de Duitse traditie van de Filosofische 
Antropologie (Arnold Gehlen, Max Scheler, Ernst Cassirer) die het onzichtbare 
collegium vormt van Ricoeur’s vroege filosofie. In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt 
deze  aangevuld met het meer zichtbare collegium door wie Ricoeur’s denken 
direct werd beinvloed (Gabriel Marcel, Jean Nabert, Karl Jaspers). Het doel van 
dit tweeledige overzicht is de crucial invloed van de filosofische anthropologie op 
Ricoeur’s gehele denken te laten zien en te verduidelijken hoe haar 
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fundamentale vraagstelling - wat is de mens? - ook de kernvraag vormt van 
Ricoeur's denken.   
Het tweede deel van deze studie onderzoekt in drie hoofdstukken het creative en 
synthetiserende vermogen van onze transcendentale verbeeldingskracht in 
relatie tot de hermeneutische interpretatie. Drie onbeantwoorbare vragen staan 
hier central: wat is tijd?; wat is identiteit?; en, wat is het verleden? 
 Tijd. Hoe articuleert de mens zijn ervaring van tijd? Tijd is objectief niet 
kenbaar maar subjectief wel articuleerbaar. Voor Ricoeur wordt tijd "menselijke 
tijd" (in de zin dat ons idee van tijd de menselijke ervaring van temporaliteit 
weerspiegelt) in de mate dat ze middels verhalen vorm krijgt, en verhalen krijgen 
eerst betekenis wanneer ze een voorwaarde worden voor onze ervaring van de 
tijd. De kern van temporaliteit is de relatie tussen hetgeen dat was, is en zal zijn 
terwijl de kern van verhalen de "plot" vormt waarin alle dispersieve 
gebeurtenissen plots een zinvolle samenhang vormen. Het verhaal als een 
vertelling in en over tijd en tijd als ervaring van een geheel (gisteren, vandaag, 
morgen) complementeren elkaar op de manier waarop wij ons leven door en in 
de tijd zin geven ("de moraal van het verhaal!"; "de tijd zal het zeggen"). Dit leidt 
tot de relatie tussen tijd en identiteit; wij begrijpen onszelf en onze plek in de 
wereld middels het verhaal dat we over ons "zelf" vertellen, wij verworden tot 
het verhaal dat wij als ons leven ervaren en steeds opnieuw interpreteren en 
herschikken; de samenhang van ons leven en de samenhang van onze "zelfheid" 
hangt af van de potentie en constructie van een verhaal over dit zelf door en in 
de tijd. We beginnen in een tijd/ het verhaal waarin we worden geboren 
("geworpen" zegt Heidegger). Dit vormt ons voordat we onszelf vorm geven. 
Vervolgens proberen we wat ons vormt te begrijpen door de zin en "plot" van de 
tijd/ het verhaal dat ons vormt te begrijpen. Uiteindelijk beginnen we zelf de tijd/ 
het verhaal over ons leven te sturen en vorm te geven - dan ontwikkelen we een 
'narratieve identiteit' waarin ons zijn zich steeds opnieuw als een naar 
samenhang zoekend verhaal door de tijd heen ontvouwt in relatie tot een proces 
waarin we ons er van bewust worden "waar we voor staan" in het leven van ons 
leven.  
Identiteit. Wat betekent het te getuigen van "wie" wij zijn? In zijn vroege 
werk, de Filosofie van de Wil, legde Ricoeur de nadruk op wat hij het "verwonde 
cogito" noemde: de "wond" of het litteken wordt veroorzaakt door ons 
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zelfbewustzijn, in tegenstelling tot dieren weten wij dat we eindig, breekbaar en 
feilbaar zijn. Er is een kloof tussen ons subject-zijn en zelf-zijn, deze kloof verwijst 
ook naar de spanning tussen onze ervaring van eindigheid en oneindigheid, een 
spanning die zowel creative als ook destructieve krachten kan oproepen. In zijn 
opus magnum Soi-même comme un autre ontwikkelt Ricoeur een originele 
theorie van het zelf door de relatie tussen idem en ipse-identiteit te herijken. 
Traditioneel wordt de vraag naar de menselijke identiteit gesteld als: "wat is de 
mens?". Ricoeur verschuift deze vraag naar "wie is de mens?". De mens is een 
organisme dat spreekt, handelt, zichzelf verteld en in staat is verantwoording af 
te leggen naar anderen toe. In het kort: wat we zijn is waar we bereid zijn voor te 
staan; daarom is de mens een wezen dat in staat is te getuigen van "wie" het is. 
Deze zelf-getuigenis van wie-we-zijn en waar-we-voor-staan vormt de kern van 
Ricoeur's theorie van de identiteit. In dit model is identiteit niet een metafysieke 
kern (ziel), een substantieel of atomistisch "ik," een onveranderbare eenheid of 
linguistieke of sociale constructie, maar een articulatie van hoe wij onze identiteit 
ervaren als de interrelatie van het onveranderbare en veranderbare in relatie tot 
het Andere in/ dan onszelf, de wereld en de tijd middels welke wij ons eigen zelf 
ervaren en articuleren als een getuigenis van waar wij als zelf-heid voor willen 
staan.  
 Herinnering.  Hoe kan wat afwezig is aanwezig zijn? Waarom heeft de 
mens het verlangen het verleden  terug te brengen in het heden?  De articulatie 
van de tijd en de ervaring van ons zelf door de tijd is zonder het vermogen van de 
herinnering onmogelijk.  Mensen die hun vermogen te herinneren kwijt raken 
raken de (temporele) consistentie en coherentie van zich-zelf kwijt. Ons 
vermogen te herinneren verwijst dus naar de functie van het geheugen voor onze 
zelfheid maar ook naar een idee van een/ het "verleden" zoals wij het als 
"geschiedenis" construeren. Naast het vermogen mogen te herinneren bezitten 
wij het even noodzakelijke vermogen te (kunnen) vergeten. Het vermogen te 
vergeten is cruciaal niet alleen omdat we niet alles willen onthouden maar ook 
omdat vergeten als "loslaten" de mogelijkheid geeft los te komen van het 
verleden om door te kunnen gaan in het heden, in een toekomst zonder de 
schaduw van het verleden. Alhoewel het vermogen te herinneringen ons 
verbindt met wat was is het moeilijk dit vermogen te vertrouwen; herinneringen 
zijn uiterst subjectief, ze vervormen en misleidden ons. Het getuigen van "wat 
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was" kan daarom niet verwijzen naar een objective waarheid ("de geschiedenis" 
bestaat niet) maar alleen naar een poging tot een waarachtige getuigenis of 
vertelling van waar in het heden het voorbije verleden voor ons voor staat.  In 
relatie tot onze collectieve identiteit verwijst het vermogen van de herinnering  
(bijvoorbeeld als  nationale geschiedenis) ook naar een groot gevaar: het 
misbruik van die geschiedenis (die altijd subjectief is omdat ze bestaat uit een 
keuze van wat we als groep ons wel en niet willen herinneren) voor ideologische 
doeleinden. Een ander gevaar is de verstarring van de herinnering in een bepaald 
aspect van deze geschiedenis (bijvoorbeeld in slachtofferschap of ontkenning van 
het eigen geweld). Op deze manier kan de collectieve identiteit zich klem zetten 
in een "idem" zonder opening naar het "ipse" aspect van onze identiteit.  Daarom 
moet het menselijke vermogen zich te herinneren altijd gezien worden in relatie 
tot het vermogen te vergeten en geschiedenis als een ervaring van historiciteit - 
van het zijnde door en in de tijd  - worden begrepen en niet als objectieve 
representatie van wat was. In het laatste deel wordt de poetische articulatie van 
onze zelf-getuigenis teruggekoppeld aan een bestaansethiek. 
 Ethiek. Is waar we "voor staan" in ons mens-zijn  bepaald door een 
ethiek van het "goede" of "juiste" leven? Wordt hoe we leven bepaald door de 
normen en waarden van de tijd waarin we leven? Of is het eerder onze intuitie 
die bepaald wat rechtvaardig of onrechtvaardig lijkt? Het kernprobleem van de 
relatie tussen identiteit, samenleving en moraliteit ligt in de vraag hoe morele 
beslissingen geldigheid verkrijgen.  Ricoeur wil de traditionele scheiding tussen 
ethiek en moraliteit vervangen door een model waarin ethiek en moraliteit een 
wederzijdse toetssteen wordt: het teleologische doel van de ethiek dient 
getoetst te worden door de moraliteit terwijl de deliberatieve moraliteit door de 
"filter" van de ethiek gezuiverd kan worden. Op deze manier ontstaat een 
situatie waarin een "kritische wijsheid" tussen universele principes en historische 
normen bemiddelt om zo tot de best mogelijke beslissing in een concrete, 
singuliere, situatie te komen. Hoe wij willen en kunnen leven hangt nauw samen 
met onze relatie tot alle anderen, anderen die net zo zijn als ik, mensen onder 
mensen. Voor Ricoeur kan iedere vorm van samen-leven met het doel een 
"goed" leven te realiseren alleen voortkomen uit het bestaan van een gedeeld 
verlangen naar rechtvaardigheid in een situatie waarin het zelf de ander als het 
"andere zelf" herkent en erkent.  Daarom vormt de fundamentele wederzijdsheid 
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waarin ons bestaan zich afspeelt de juiste afsluitende conceptualisering van 
Ricoeur's anthropologische ethiek: de mens getuigt van waar hij voor staat, van 
"wie" we zijn, als antwoord op de vraag van de Ander "wie ben jij?".  
 Conclusie. Het is in de relatie van de antropologie tot de poetica en 
ethiek dat Ricoeur's filosofie zijn uiteindelijke eenheid vindt. Ricoeur's werk toont 
aan dat de "mens" als reflexief en handelend subject alleen vanuit de vraag naar 
het "wie" (wie ben ik?) de vraag naar het "wat" (wat ben ik?) kan begrijpen. Deze 
verschuiving behelst een radicale omkering van de antropologische traditie. Het 
uiteindelijke doel van deze omkering is om tot een nieuw begrip van het 
vermogen tot zelf-affirmatie van ons mens-zijn te komen door het 
bestaansverlangen terug te koppelen aan ons poetische antwoord op de 
fundamentele enigma's van de taal, tijd, identiteit, en de herinnering. Het steeds 
opnieuw (uit-)vinden van een poetisch en ethisch equilibrium middels de inzet 
van onze vermogens is wat ons tot mens maakt;  zelf-articualtie van onze 
ervaringen in en ten opzichte van deze wereld, zelf-articulatie ten opzichte van 
de Ander met wie ik mijn mens-zijn en de wereld deel, zelf-articulatie ten 
opzichte van alles wat mijn gevoel van coherentie, consistentie en voortgang 
ondermijnt en uitdaagt. Ik weet alleen wie ik ben als ik weet waar ik voor sta, ik 
weet alleen waar ik voor sta als ik weet wat mijn vermogens zijn en hoe ik deze 
kan inzetten om de ervaring van mijn onvermogen te articuleren, accepteren of 
reconfigureren.  
 De kern van onze drang tot zelf-affirmatie getuigt uiteindelijk van een 
diep verworteld menselijk verlangen gericht op het goede leven met zich-zelf en 
anderen in rechtvaardige instituties. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat Paul Ricoeur's 
werk niet alleen de traditie van de filosofische antropologie vernieuwd heeft 
maar ook het moderne humanisme van een nieuwe urgentie voorziet.  Juist op 
het moment dat de fundamentele differentie tussen dier en mens, tussen wat en 
wie we zijn, tussen onze vermogens en onvermogens, een paradigmatische 
verschuiving ondergaat, is het van cruciaal belang de Filosofische Antropologie 
opnieuw als kern van het humanistische project in de 21e eeuw te begrijpen.  
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What a chimera, then, is man! What a novelty, what a monster, what a chaos, 
what a contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, helpless earthworm, 
depository of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error.  
Glory and scum of the universe. 
 
Pascal (2004: 36) 

  
 
